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Summary 
T'his study traces the influence of scientific management on the development of 
modem management methods in Britain from the end of the 19th century to the 
outbreak of the second world war. It is concerned with both the organisation of 
work and the management of the worker, with employers' labour strategies and 
worker and trade union responses. The Introduction discusses key concepts like 
Taylorism, Fordism and mass ptoduction; chapter one identifies technical and 
managerial changes taking place at the turn of the century and the reception 
Taylorism received in Britain; chapter 2 is mainly concerned with premium bonus 
schemes and the impact of the first world war; chapter 3 analyses the growth of 
new management fimctions and roles, particularly production engineering between 
the wars; chapter 4 discusses the impact of mechanisation and deskilling on 
workers in the engineering industry; chapter 5 traces the growth of piecework 
schemes and time study, the significance of the Bedaux system, and the impact of 
worker resistance. A postscript and a conclusion relate these themes to the post 
second world war history of work study and to contemporary debates about 
fle)dble specialisation and post-Fordism. 
Three key issues are addressed; the meaning of scientific management, the extent 
to which employers adopted scientific management practices, its impact on 
workers and the effect of worker resistance. 
It is argued that, if scientific management is located historically, it is seen to be 
concerned with the management of production as well as the management of the 
worker; with production engineering, progress and planning departments, as well 
as time and motion study and incentive payment schemes. As such it is not 
reducible to any particular form of Taylorist practice. 
Employers were slow to develop the new management methods. Slow adaptation 
to change was part of the more general problem of relative economic decline. But 
both were uneven. British employers were reluctant to abandon tools and 
techniques which still made money but some did, and more followed. Taylorism. 
was more positively received in Britain than has been suggested and was widely 
accepted by the end of the first world war. Its impact on managerial practice can be 
traced in the inter-war period in the development of production engineering and 
more rigorous payment systems, including those inspired by Bedaux. 
A'deskilling dynamic', centred on a new split between mental and manual labour, 
was fatally undermining both craftsman and foreman in the engineering industry, 
though it owed more to the jig and tool designer, and more broadly, the 
management of mechanisation, than the efficiency engineer. But changes in the 
labour process also affected women and semi and unskilled men and they were 
centrally involved in shop floor resistance to 'speed-up'. Resistance modified but 
could not prevent the restructuring of the labour process consequent upon 
scientific management. 
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Introduction 
Scientific Management in Britain 
This study aims to trace the influence of scientific management on the development 
of modem management methods in Britain from the, end of the 19th century to the 
outbreak of the second world war. It is concerned with both the organisation of 
work and the management of the worker, with employers! labour strategies and 
worker and trade union responses. A postscript and the conclusion relate these 
themes to the post second world war history of work study and to contemporary 
debates about flexible specialisation and post-Fordism. 
It is a commonplace of management literature that Taylor, along with Fayol and 
Weber, was one of the principal architects of modem management (Cole 1990, 
Pugh 1990 Woodward 1965). Drucker descrilbed scientific management as our C7-- 3ý 
most widely practised personnel management concept and the most powerfid 
contribution America has made to Western thought since the Federalist Papers 
(1955: 247) and a popular text book on organisational. behaviour asserts that'The 
influence of scientific management pervades management thinking and organization - 
fimctioning in all industrialised countries of the world' (liuczynski and Buchanan 
1991: 278). T'hat such influence has often been attacked from a human relations 
standpoint only serves to underline the importance of Taylor. 
But historical studies have been less certain about the extent of Taylor's influence 
in Britain or when it occurred. On some accounts, the influence of scientific 
management was apparent in changes in work practices before the first world war 
(Steams 1975: 195; Hobsbawm 1976). For others it was a product of the first 
world war (Burgess 1980: 166, Pollard 1983: 47) while Littler (1982) and Price 
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(1986) identify scientific management in Britain with the Bedaux system in the 
1930s. Kreis (1990) believes that Bedauxtook Britain by storm! but also argues 
that Taylorism. had spread from America and grew out of conditions in British 
workshops before the first world war. On the other hand it has been argued that 
while Taylorism, became the accepted managerial ideology, management practice 
remained largely untouched by it (Child 1969: 75/103; Holford 1988: 60)1; that new 
work methods were applied with'Iess zeal and more compromises'in Britain 
(Cronin 1984: 59) and that while scientific management spread between the wars 
there was no 'dramatic transformation of work organisation on scientific 
management lines! (Gospel 1987: 180). Mant believes that the'scientific 
management movement began to die of natural causes in the 1930s'to be replaced 
by human relations strategies (1977: 30) and Merkle goes so far as to argue that 
Taylorism in Britain never passed the'luncheon meeting stage' (1980: 230). 
Such differences about the influence of Taylorism reflect, in part, uneven 
development and differences between industries. But they are also bound up with 
three critical issues. First, the meaning of Taylorigm and associated concepts like 
c-laassical management theory, mass production and Fordism. Second, the thesis that 
British economic decline is rooted in the specific character of British class relations 
and that the failure to rationalise production along Taylorist lines was a feature of 
such British backwardness. Third, that Taylorist prescriptions do not in any case 
account for the actual behaviour of either managers or workers, that the labour 
process is the product of class struggle not capitalist structures or management 
programmes. 
Each of these issues will be considered in turn below. But the argument in brief is 
that scientific management was the product of a cluster of technological and 
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business changes at the turn of the century and is better understood more broadly 
as the management of mechanisation than narrowly as a time-studied system of 
labour control As such its influence is apparent before the first world war and it 
has been more significant in Britain than has been commonly allowed. However, its 
development was slow, uncertain and incomplete -a process which certainly owed 
something to the conservative character of British capitalism but such conservatism 
reflected the uneven development of British and world capitalism and should be 
seen in relative not absolute terms. British employers did adopt Taylorism but work 
study spread rapidly only after the second world war. Finally, it is argued that the 
effect of class struggle, conducted at the point of production or at the negotiating 
table, modified the effects of Taylorism and exposed its weaknesses and 
pretensions but did not alter in any fimdamental way the organisation of work and 
production which it inspired. 
Taylorism, TechnologY and Management 
John Lee's Dictionary of Industrial Administration noted that scientific 
management- could be understood in the broad sense of the organisation of industry 
or the narrow sense of the organisation of labour (1928: 1059) and similar 
distinctions have been made by Gospel (Sasocki 1992: 25; Gospel 1992: 55,201) 
and Kreis (1990: 32). More controversially, Taylorism has also been distinguished 
as the development of management from the development of technology 
(Braverman 1974: 85); as a means of labour control from Fordism as a system of 
control based on machine paced work (Hounshell 1984: 252); as the 
bureaucratisation of structures of control from the wider process of the 
bureaucratisation of the employment relationship (Littler 1982); and as a means of 
perfecting existing tasks from the separation of conception and execution, 
consequent upon the scientific-technical revolution (Burawoy 1978: 277). 
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All such distinctions are vulnerable to the charge made by Palmer against 
Braverman that he'arbitrarily separates vital and complex relationships that 
formed part of a basic unity (1975: 32). It is perfectly legitimate of course to 
distinguish and study separately parts of a basic unity. Put it ought to be 
reassembled. The central argument of this thesis is that to understand Taylorism it 
is necessary to locate it historically in all its interconnections. Because Littler 
argues that Taylorism should be distinguished from the wider trends of 
mechanisation, job fragmentation and systematic management he concludes that 
scientific management in Britain is largely the history of the Bedaux company. I 
argue that Taylorism. cannot be understood apart from those trends which formed 
the larger historical context. For that reason, the experience of workers, foremen 
and managers were often more similar than dissimilar in workplaces that adopted 
the Taylor system and those that did not, between firms that employed Bedaux and 
those that did not. 
It is clear, for example, that the separation of conception from execution was 
licit in the scientific-technical revolution and was developing in Britain 
I 
- independently of any self consciously scientific management practice. Indeed, there 
were those advocating such changes who were also hostile to Taylorism for its 
extremism- It is equally clear that Taylorism was the most important managerial 
tool for expressing and systematically organising such a division. It was, as the 
English engineering worker and writer W. F. Watson argued, 'the direct outcome of . E;; -- 
the development of machinery and was the generalisation derived from analysis of 
experiments in management of workshop organisations'(1935). Distinctions which 
might be legitimate for some purposes have been elaborated as competing concepts 
which become a barrier to understanding. 
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If Taylor were alive today, a speaker told the Institute of Industrial Technicians in 
1954, he would be a production engineer (Havelock 1954). In fact, it is more likely 
he would have been a management consultant. He was concerned with the 
management of work as production management or production engineering, and' 
the management and motivation of the worker in ways required by production 
management. He demanded a new division of labour among managers as well as 
workers. Time and motion study, arguably his single most important contribution 
to modem management, formed the bridge between management planning, the 
task defined for the worker and a payment system which would provide the 
incentive for first class men. He provided one of the foundation stones of a 
developing classical management tradition which was creating a more elaborate 
and speciahsed managerial hierarchy2. Indeed, for the British theorists and 
practitioners of the new management, Taylor more than anyone else was the 
acknowledged inspiration (Urwick 1962; Brech 1967). 
Taylorism has to be located within the overall production system before it can be 
usefiffly analysed in detail (Glucksmann 1990: 154; Blackburn et al 1985: 4). 
Scientific management grew out of systematic management, itself a product of the 
American system of manufacture, the process of specialisation. and standardisation. 
which laid the basis for mass production (Rowe 1928: 90). The difference 
between Europe and America lay not in technical knowledge but inhow this 
technical knowledge and skill was used. The European manufacturer used it to 
make a product: the American manufitcturer used it to make a process for making a 
product' (Litterer 1961: 466). There was a double implication for technology and 
division of labour. First, unskilled labour could be substituted for skilled where the 
latter set up general purpose machinery for unskilled operators or where single 
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purpose machinery was installed. But secondly, the focus on organisation and the 
study of work generated pressure to improve processes and update and standardise 
machinery, accelerating the search for technological innovation in further 
developing standardisation and division of labour. At the very least, as A. P. 
Young, man aging director of British Houston Thonq) so n remarked in the 193 0 s, 
'this new outlook on human economy must have a profound effect on tool and 
fixture design' (1937: 152). 
The relationship between Taylorisrn, technology and management is therefore 
centraL Landes! summary remains unsurpassed: 
.... reorganisation of work entailed reorganisation of labour: the 
relationships of men to one another and to their employers were 
implicit in the mode of production; technology and social pattern 
reinforced one another .... the effort to improve the workers 
efficiency, an effort which grew out of the increased efficiency of 
capitaL opened the way to advances in the use of equipment. 
Scientific management was logically linked both as cause and effect 
to the innovations in machine tool operation, handling of materials, 
division of labour in the shop, and organisation of work flows 
discussed above, for the establishment of norms rested on an 
analysis of the production process and inevitably turned up both 
weaknesses and possibilities of improvement. What Taylor preached 
was the substitution of reason for habit, a new way of looldng at 
familim things (1969: 317,321). 
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Taylorism. in the sense described above could,, and did, exist independently of time 
study, much as Taylor himself would have disapproved. Hobsbawm notes that 
outside the USA before 1914 scientific management hardly existed in the modem 
sense of its association with time and motion study. 'However, in a more empirical 
way even this was implicit in mass production by specialised machines or processes 
which now expanded greatly; particularly where labour was the expensive factor. 
Innocent of Taylorism, the Bristol Boot and Shoe employers, who devised the 
team system around 1890, applied his principles. They sub-divided the process and 
made sure that the team was 'waited upon hand and foot and never kept waiting for 
anything, whereas when they have to "shop" their own work a waste of time is 
involved! (1976: 359). As early as 1906 the industry adopted the machinery and 
patterns of subdivided labour common in the USA and piecework was spreading 
rapidly before 1914, but work study did not reach the boot and shoe industry until 
after the second world war (Fox 1958: 264; TSE July 1950). 
In his study of scientific management in Australia, Chris Wright argues that the 
dominance of Taylorism only became an article of faith within academic literature 
because a broad definition was adopted (1993: 34). If a narrower definition 
focusing on the control of the worker is used, a process which Wright, following 
Littler, calls the bureaucratisation of the shop floor, scientific management is 
shown to have much more limited impact. And on Wright's definition an account of 
scientific management in Britain would be remarkably similar to that in Australia. 
The Australian Institute of Management was formed after the first world war and 
consultants were active in the 1930s. But, as in Britain, it was the 1950s and 60s 
which'werý the boom years for the application of Taylorist techniques! (1993: 40) 
with work study departments being absorbed within general production 
management in the 1970s (1993: 47). 
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Ile problem with the narrow approach taken by Wright is that ultimately it makes 
scientific management incomprehensible as a complete historical phenomenon. It 
would be impossible to understand why Taylor demanded a mental revolution on 
the part of employers and why they found his demands sometimes impossible to 
accept; how it could have inspired an international management movement; or. 
what possible claim it could have to pervade management thinking in all 
industrialised countries. Work study was Taylor's single most important 
contribution but he also laid the foundations of production engineering (Armytage 
1961: 278)3. When work study practitioners created their own professional 
organisations in the 1940s, they established three of them The Industrial 
Technicians specialised in time study and the Motion Study Society, in motion 
study. The body which became the Society of Industrial Engineers were specialists 
in production planning and control and believed thatthe scope of work study 
practitioners should cover all activities involved in the planning and control of 
industrial production, and should not be limited to method study, motion study, 
_ 
and work measurement' (TMS Feb. 19 5 5). Tayldrism was a distinctive link in the 
chain of development of management methods but it was also an integral part of 
the process of economic change in which changes in business organisation, 
technology and labour management were interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Taylorism, Fordism. and Mass Production 
We have argued that Taylor was both the product and prophet of a set of 
economic, technical and business organisation changes at the turn of the century. A 
more ambitious attempt to relate scientific management, mechanisation and 
division of labour is advanced by the French regulation school which has argued 
that regimes of accumulation and associated modes of regulation characterise the 
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development of capitalism According to Lipietz,, 'Very schematically, the regime of 
accumulation which prevailed in the most advanced capitalist countries between 
the first industrial revolution and the First World War was primrily extensive, and 
centred upon the extended reproduction of means of production. Since the Second 
World War, in contrast, the dominant regime has been intensive and centred upon 
the growth of mass consumption' (Lipietz 1987: 33). From our point of view the 
most interesting point is the argument that Taylorism, as a revolutionary new mode 
of work organisation, was the critical moment in the transition between one regime 
of accumulation and another (Lipietz 1987: 35,36; Aglietta 1987: 116,118; Brenner 
and Glick 1991: 57). Fordism. supersedes Taylorism as a new stage in the regulation 
of capitalism a new regime of intensive accumulation marked by a labour process 
based on semi-automatic assembly-line production and institutional regulation 
founded on an extension of working class purchasing power backed by the 
development of collective bargaining and state spending. 
The immediate problem with regulation theory is periodisation. Taylorism. arises in 
late 19th century America; Fordism. is a real phenomenon for contemporaries by 
the first world war. But Fordism as a regime of accumulation with matching 
institutional regulation only succeeds after the second world war. It is as if the 
transition to the new regime stretched from the late 19th century to the second half 
of the 20th century, but the new regime itself only lasts twenty years, beginning to 
break up in the 1960s. Lipietz observes that the crisis of the 30s can be analysed as 
the first crisis of the period of intensive accumulation or the last for the period of 
competitive regulation (Lipietz 1987: 34). It would seem Preferable to regard both 
the crisis of the 1930s and the post war boom simply as phases in the development 
of 20th century capitalism rather than as landmarks for regimes of accumulation. 
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A second problem is the precise relationship between regimes of accumulation and 
modes of regulation. Other than in times of crisis one might reasonably expect 
mass production and mass consumption to go together but the theory claims more 
than a simple correspondence. It is argued that social institutions were created to 
guarantee consumption. For example, Aglietta believes Fordism i lied legislative MIP 
arrangements such as the establishment of social insurance, and that Fordism would 
be incomprehensible without centralised collective bargaining (1987: 159,195). But 
quite different social insurance and collective bargaining arrangements are to be 
found in countries with the same Fordist production regime and it is unclear why 
either should be a necessary consequence of the regime of accumulation. 
At the same time the criticism of the regulationist position can be pushed too far. 
In their wide ranging critique Brenner and Glick argue reasonably enough that craft 
worker control cannot adequately characterise the labour process of the regime of 
extensive accumulation but go on to suggest that the Taylorist-Fordist process only 
'represented a finther phase of an ongoing, though hardly continuous, evolution' 
(199,1: 59). It was not a critical moment of discontinuity but simply an extension'of 
the processes of transforming technology and the labour process that have 
ChLaracterised capitalist production for at least a centurý (1991: 99). TIlis, runs the 
risk of reducing history to empty generalities. There is ample evidence to support 
the view that the combination of changes in technology, management and business 
organisation at the turn of the centuly did amount to a moment of discontinuity; 
this argument is pursued in detail in chapter I. 
Other uses of terms like Fordism and mass production have little theoretical 
substance. A distinction commonly made is that between Taylorism. and Fordism, 
with the latter as a labour management strategy based on machine pacing. Littler 
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argues that Fordism, is 'systemic' while Taylorism. is not because the latter might be 
applied to one department only, leaving the rest of the factory untouched, whereas 
notions of flow production and automation were 'intrinsically systemic' (Littler 
1982: 187/188). But in fact assembly lines or any other form of machine pacing, 
might operate in one part of the plant only. Even in the motor industry no more 
than 18% of the workforce were assembly4ine workers (Chinoy 1964). And the 
extension of mechanisation and division of labour which underpinned Fordism. 
operated in industries without assembly lines. If something called Fordism is 
systemic, it is only so because it expresses in extreme fonn a critical Part of a 
common experience. 
Exactly the same is true of Taylorism. It will be important for some purposes to 
distinguish rationalisation. in, say, the boot and shoe industry from what scientific 
managers were doing, but not for others. As B ardou et al argue, 'The trend 
towards tighter management control eventually found a name (scientific 
management), a prophet (FW Taylor), and some basic principles: openly scientific 
procedures to determine the most mechanically efficient way to perform tasks, 
insist that employees follow these methods even if they contradict traditional 
usages, and reward workers liberally. Although scientific management was often 
called 'TaylorisnY, it was more than a one man crusade and would probably have 
evolved without the pressure of Taylor at aff (Bardou 1982: 67). 
Flink says that the term mass production originated with Henry For&s use of the 
term in an Encyclopedia Britannia article in 1926, 'Until then, tile system of flow 
production techniques perfected at the Ford Highland Park plant was popularly 
referred to as "Fordism... (1988: 47). In fact the term was used earlier and more 
widely. Morris's production manager, F. G. Woollard, was criticising its use in 
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1924. He preferred the phrase continuous production because modem flow 
production did not necessarily mean producing enormous quantities (1924: 420). 
Austin preferred the term progressive production but it amounted to the same 
thing. 
Such contemporary uses have not satisfied historians. ToRiday describes the British 
approach as 'intermittently enlarging quantity flow production' (1987: 30 1). Overy 
distin .,;, -"-es between flow production which involves a moving assembly line and 
mass production which may involve flow production but does not necessarily do so 
(1976: 83). Wild makes a similar distinction but says that flow production may be 
based on either a manual process or an assembly line (1973: 6). There is a danger 
that such distinctions multiply without meaning. Woollard identified the key 
elements in his Principles ofMass and Flow Production'... flow production is the 
modem form of mass production, bom of a marriage of management and 
mechanism in which management is the dominant partner' (1954: 187). We win 
argue that the marriage of management and mechanisation is also the key to 
understanding Taylorism 
More recently, Williams et al have argued that For&s production strategy was not 
Fordist at all (1992). TIleir argument is that the key to Ford's success did not lie in 
the division of labour or the conveyor belt but in a policy of continuous 
improvement in layout and work flow, a policy the Japanese now call Kaizen. Nor 
does the Fordist stereotype fit in other respects. Ford's operations were fle)dble; 
most of the machinery at Highland Park was general purpose machinery used with 
special1y designed jigs and there was no Taylorism or time study at Highland Park 
where foremen set the work pace. Far from being standardised, the Model T was a 
stretchable product with countless changes in its design over the years. The move 
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to River Rouge ended the experiment. Rouge was a long travel factory and its 
twenty seven miles of conveyors generated new problems of rigidity and 
infleNibffity. 
I But if Ford invented a low stock, lean production operation it was a result of 
policy failure not success, since Highland Park was planned to run with twenty firve 
days stock cover and it only worked because of insatiable demand. Stretchable or 
not, the Model T initially offered huge advantages over multiple models (Sward 
1968). Changing over to what Hounshell characterised as fleNible mass production 
cost Ford $18 million and involved scrapping around a quarter of the eNisting 
machines, rebuilding half of them and purchasing 4,500 new ones (1984: 288). 
Ford was certainly committed to constant experiment, continuous revolutionising 
of methods. But contrary to Wiffiams et al there does seem to have been time study 
at Highland Park. Sward cites Arnold and Faurote on how'one buman automaton 
at Ford's had been taught to raise his daily quota of 7000 pieces of work, thanks to 
a time and motion study which showed that he had been making 70,000 waste 
motions per day' (1968: 47). And Meyer cites Ford on stop watch studies to 
increase the division of labour and increase output. In the space of a few years 
Ford transformed his factory from'a congeries of craftsmen shops'to a 
fragmented, machine paced operation carried out by semi and unskifled operatives 
(1981: 21,15,50). 
Williams et al dismiss concepts like mass production and Fordism (and their 
opposites, flexitble specialisation and post-Fordism) as representing the post- 
Marxist coiltinuation of a 'marxisant' tradition of interpreting the genesis and 
resolution of economic and political crisis in the advanced capitalist countries. In 
fact terms like mass production and Fordism were not designed by MarNists - or at 
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least they cannot claim exclusive ownership - nor did they originate in the current 
debate about flexible specialisation. Nor does it seem in the least reasonable to 
locate Daniel Nelson (who dismisses Braverman in a footnote) or Alfted Chandler, 
both of whom discuss mass production, in a marxisant tradition. 
But it is reasonable to ask whether such concepts are useful of not. Hyman has 
questioned whether they are empirical generalisations or ideal types. If the former, 
they are open to criticism on empirical grounds. If they are ideal-types and involve 
'a level of abstraction not directly susceptible to empirical testing, then it is 
necessary to explain precisely how the notion informs historical and contemporary 
explanation (a familiar problem with ideal type analysis)' (1991: 275). 
If Taylorism is tied too narrowly to Taylor's own particular prescriptions including 
fimctional foremen and a payment system based on a differential rate, and Fordism. 
is tied too closely to what Henry Ford did in the Ford plants and to the assembly 
line as the basis of the labour process, then the answer is that they are probably 
more of a hindrance than a help. Tolliday and Z6itlin, having defined Fordism 
(reasonably enough) as the 'manufacture of standardised products in huge volumes 
using special purpose machinery and unskilled labour' argue that it was unsuitable 
to British and European market conditionS4. In Britain, Fordist production 
strategies coexisted uneasily with 'Sloanist marketing strategies! (Tolliday and 
Zeitlin 1986: 7). But at General Motors, Sloan too could be said to combine Fordist 
production strategies and Sloanist marketing. In fact Ford himself was forced in the 
same direction. The whole product and production strategy of the Model T, which 
had been such a brilliant success, was in ruins by the mid 20s. David Noble even 
left Ford out of his account of how engineers designed America on the grounds 
that he 'resists categorisation'(1977: 283). 
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On the other hand, Taylorism, mass production and Fordism. are important 
precisely because they express something of the essence of the most advanced 
forms of capitalist production and this is the sense in which they are used in this 
study. Ford serves as a symbol of the era because his enterprise I was an early,, 
dramatic and extreme manifestation of key characteristics of the period, not 
because he was typical. They are abstractions in the literal sense that they disregard 
the complexities of concrete history in order to identify what is essential in the new 
developments. As such they can be useful analytical tools. Their empirical 
verification consists in the extent to which they succeed in illuminating experience. 
They have to be consistent with the evidence. Where such concepts take on a life 
of their own, either as theories without empirical support, or models narrowly 
based on a particular experience of a more general phenomenon, they can obscure 
what they set out to explain. 
The relevance of this argument to Taylorism in Britain is simply this. Too many 
jud . gements about scientific management have been made by considering too 
narrowly the question of management practice according to a set of Taylorist 
nostrums. If scientific management was in part the product of wider economic and 
technical change, elements of scientific management will be apparent in a more 
mixed managerial practice wherever more elaborate managerial structures were 
put in place to plan production more systematically, and in particular, to exercise 
more detailed direction over the work that employees did and the ways in which 
they did it. We would miss a great deal about management change in Britain if we 
confined the search to firms which practised precisely what Taylor preached. At the 
same time, if we see Taylorism as a force shaping those wider economic and 
technical changes we will not be satisfied with explanations of the fate of scientific 
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management in Britain which depend on more hmited markets and varied 
production. 
British Economic Decline and Class Relations 
Although Payne is unconvinced by the entrepreneurial failure thesis as an 
explanation of British economic decline he does identify so-me failuýes, one of 
which was'the continued indifference to - even outright hostility towards - 
Taylorism and scientific innanagement'(1978: 218). The failure to root out craft 
practices and the unwillingness of employers to sacrifice social and industrial peace 
for the promise of scientific management have been attributed to the social nature 
of British capitalism, its early industrial institutions and a non interventionist state 
unable to challenge an unenterprising culture (Fox 1985: 225,343; Edwards et al 
1992: 4-5). Elbaum and Lazonick (1986) believe that British decline followed from 
institutional rigidities formed in the 19th century. It has been argued that Britain 
failed to develop a service class capable of sustaining scientific management (Urry 
1986); that employers preferred human relations strategies (Merkle 1980); that 
shop floor control was surrendered to shop stewards and could not be regained 
(Lewchuk 1987); and that the aristocratic ruling class culture of British capitalism 
was hostile to production values (Wiener 198 1; Glover 1978; Glover and Kelly 
1987). 
A case can certainly be made that the conservatism and pragmatism of British 
capitalism runs like a thread through the 20th century, inhibiting and limiting 
industrial change. Modem forms of management only emerged slowly and 
unevenly. The Anglo American Productivity Council was hardly less critical of 
British performance in the 1950s than the Moseley Commission had been in 1902. 
production management was a continuing area of weakness (PEP 1965: 17; Wild 
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and Gallagher 1977; Gospel 1992: 49) and this may still have been true in the 
198W. TIlis is nevertheless only one side of the story. Employer hostility to 
scientific management has been greatly overdone, scientific management practices 
were adopted more widely than has been suggested and the use of work study 
grew fastest after the second world war just as the rate of British relative economic 
decline accelerated. All these issues are addressed in the body of the study. We 
comment below on two of the more important themes, the notion of institutional 
rigidities and worker control on the shop floor. 
Elbaum., Lazonick and others have argued that rigidities in the social and economic 
institutions that developed in the 19th century were at the root of decline. These 
included specialised product markets, destructive competition among small scale 
family firms, and the consolidation ofjob controls by many groups of British 
workers, 'aided by the growing strength of the Labour party and the emergency 
conditions of two world wars' (Elbaum and Lazonick 1986: 6). In cotton the failure 
to integrate spinning, weaving and marketing, fierce competition, rigid wage lists 
and the conservatism of vested interests ensured continued technical backwardness 
(Lazonick 1983). Unlike America, the transition from iron to steel in the United 
Kingdom took place without disturbing the structure of small scale producers and 
competitive firms and trade union organisation and collective bargaining 
arrangements survived intact (Elbaum and Wilkinson 1979). 
The institutional perspective has a certain attraction. British economic performance 
in the 20th century is ahnost certainly rooted in the difficulties of adapting social 
and economic structures of one period to those of another. And there is plenty of 
evidence to suggest that a British conservatism rendered many of the key 
institutions infle)dble (Levine 1967; Aldcroft 1981; Aldcroft and Richardson 1969; 
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Chandler 1976). On the other hand, there is no consensus that British economic 
difficulties stem from the late 19th century as opposed to the early 20th century or 
the period after the second world war. Nor is there agreement on the underlying 
thesis of Elbaurn et 4 that it was entrepreneurial failure that explains the rigidity of 
inherited institutions (Payne 1988; Pollard 1989; McLQskey 1970; Dintenfass 
1992). 
The perspective suffers from trying to do too much. The concept of 'institutional 
rigidities! itself becomes an inflexible tool of analysis in trying to understand the 
uneven development of the British and world economy6. There is no one, catch all 
explanation for such a complex process. 
The family firm may have retarded the development of corporate structures in 
Britain as compared with America but family firm conservatism was common in 
Europe (Harbison and Myers 1959), and'research on other European countries 
suggests that Britain was no slower than France, Germany or Italy in the early 
intrA)duction of multidivisional organisations' (Hannah 1976: 185). Toffiday 
provides a convincing account of the consequences of fragmented and competitive 
markets in steel and the failure of employers with vested interests to rationalise the 
industry. But he is not convinced that rationalisation was necessarily'an ideal 
solution or a high road to economic success'. And in any case, 'even by muddling 
along, the industry equalled or bettered the performance of its European rivals and 
survived to serve the war economy and prosper in the post war boom! (1986: 105). 
Ile weakest part of the case is the assertion that job controls established by British 
trade unionists at the end of the 19th century were consolidated through the 20th 
celltury and served as an obstacle to modernisation. This seems to be more of a 
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requirement of the theory of institutional rigidity' than of the evidence. Even if it 
were true that craft workers were more firmly rooted in British industry than 
elsewhere at the end of the 19th century, the balance of forces in the class struggle 
cannot be frozen in this way and projected across the 20th century. We have to 
take account of defeats as weR as victories and the overaR direction of change. The 
ability of engineezing workeis to fight off changes to the division of labour in the 
period before the first world war has been exaggerated. Bedaux engineers were 
more common in the cotton industry from the mid 1930s than anywhere else. And 
a steel employer told an enquiry into trade unions in 1935 that 'the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation is the best, the most intelligent, and the most ideal trade 
union in the country' (Hilton 1935: 207). New management structures,, payment 
systems and a new division of labour on the shop floor and in the office A found 
their way through despite institutional rigidities. 
Explanations of British economic decline which rely more directly on the supposed 
power of shop floor workers also locate the problem in the late 19th century. 
Lewchuk, for example, argues that the failure to carry through the change to 
measured day work in the 1960s was'the last chapter in a sequence of events 
which can be traced back to British management's inability to break labours 
influence over the organisation of the workplace in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century' (1987: 215). His argument is that British producers adopted 
American production techniques but not the production institutions that went with 
them. Piecework allowed labour to control the pace of work. The transfer of 
authority from workers to managers achieved by Ford was incomplete in the 
British motbr industry where managers were 'unable to alter the production 
institutions which continued to be based on the institutions employed during most 
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of the nineteenth century when the production process revolved around the sIdHed 
artisan! (1987: 5). 
Tolliday (1987) has delivered the obvious rejoinder to the claim that worker 
resistance frustKated. management change by pointing to the weakness of the unions 
in the motor industry. We argue in chapter 3 that Austin and Morris at least, 
operated sophisticated management control systems between the wars and, in 
chapter 5, show that piecework systems were increasingly underpinned by time 
study and conceded very little to the shop floor. Interestingly enough Lewchuk 
himself notes examples of trade union advocacy of American methods (p 104) and 
suggests at one point that limitations to managerial authority were self imposed 
(p 160). Insufficient attention has been paid to both of these points. The institutions 
of the labour movement, trade unions, TUC and Labour Party, quickly identified 
themselves with the progressives and modernisers in the scientific mana ement 
camp. This did not prevent shop floor resistance but it did limit its scope and 
deprive it of important sources of organisation and support. 
There is truth too, in the idea that Ernitations to managerial authority were'self 
imposed'. The conservatism and short sighted pragmatism of British capitaEks and 
managers cannot be explained away as determined by the force of circumstances or 
by the action of others. 
The Labour Process 
The theoretical framework that informs this study derives from Mar, -, es view of the 
capitalist labour process as one determined by the demands of value production. 
Tlie source of surplus value is unpaid labour, and the source of relative surplus 
value is an increase in the productivity of labour achieved by the use of improved 
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machinery or methods of working. Since there is an inbuilt advantage to the 
Capitalist in increasing the intensity and effectiveness of labour, in closing up the 
gaps in the worldng day, and lowering the cost of labour power, the management 
of the worker in the labour process is a matter of vital interest. In the process of 
the production of value, all kinds of labour-power are reduced to-the simple, 
abstract labour embodied in commodities. From the point of view of the value Of 
commodities, Marx described this as part of a 'social process that goes on behind 
the backs of the producers! (Marx 1977: 5 1). From the point of view of the 
management of the labour process, the division of labour based on particular kinds 
of labour-power is continually broken down and reconstituted in ways which also 
tend to reduce all labour to simple average labour. Mechanisation extends the 
productive power of the worker but also enables the capitalist to seize control of 
production from the producer and reduce the worker to a mere appendage of the 
machine. Braverman! s analysis of Taylorism as theexplicit verbalization of the 
capitalist system17 extended and enriched this analysis for the 20th century. 
The acclairnwhich greeted Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital was soon 
buried in an avalanche of criticism It was argued that he had offered a one 
dimensional view of control relations that ignored other sources of capitalist 
authority and the use of alternative strategies (Littler and Salaman 1982); 
neglected worker resistance (Friedman 1977) making the capitalist class appear all 
powerful and the working class inert (Elger 1979); failed to appreciate the 
contradictions which beset any management strategy (Hyman 1987) and failed in 
particular to understand how the labour process was shaped by the need to secure 
worker co-operation and consent (Cressey and MacInnes 1980; Burawoy 1979). 
Braverman! s postulate of a 'linear process of deskilling and intensifying contror 
(Littler 1990) was challenged on empirical as well as theoretical grounds. At a 
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more fimdamental level, exception was taken to Braverman's insistence on 
analysing the working class as a 'class in itself (Stark 1980), which in turn reflected 
more far reaching debates about the base- superstructure metaphor in Marxism and 
the whole relationship of structure and agency, reaching far beyond Marxism and 
the labour process to 'the central dilemma of the social, sciences! (Edwards 
1986: 60). 
One purpose of this study is to test some of these arguments historically. It was 
Marx who argued that events must be studied in their historical context and not 
with the aid of 'the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory, 
the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historicar (1934: 352). T'he 
development of the labour process in Britain cannot be 'deduced' from labour 
process theory. It must be investigated as a unique historical experience. Labour 
process theory identifies immanen tendencies within capitalism It does not, and 
could not, begin to describe the particular outcomes in a given, concrete capitalist 
formation where the level and development of production technique, history, 
culture and class struggle all play a part in shaping society8. 
We can illustrate this point with reference to the controversy about deskilling. 
Marx argued that 'Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it 
vanishes in many others'; that the simple separation of a hierarchy of labourers is 
replaced, first by the distinction between skilled and unskilled and always by the 
pressure to cheapen labour power, except where'the decomposition of the labour- 
process begets new and comprehensive functions' (1977: 341,33 1). Similarly, 
Braverman thought that the reconstitution of the labour process under 
management control was an ideal'realized by capital only within definite limits and 
unevenly among industries' and one which itself created new crafts and technical 
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specialities (1974: 172). There is therefore no inevitable, inescapable elimination of 
all skills at all places and at all times. What there is, as Armstrong clearly explains, 
is a 'deskilling dynamic - or 'law of motion! - intimately linked with the operation of 
the capitalist economy' (1988: 144). 
An historical exploration ought also be able to move beyond the terms of the 
exchange between Braverman and his critics. Storey was probably right to say that 
the'labour process bandwagon has run into the sand' (1985: 194). T'hompsoes 
rejoinder defending labour process theory only tends to confirm Storey's 
judgement since his version of the 'core theoryjettisons so much of its former 
theoretical baggage that little of substance remains (1990). 
One reason for this state of affairs may be that so much of the criticism which 
Braverman attracted simply fails to connect with its target. Braverman is not 
concerned with the whole capital-labour relation but the way in which the human 
activity ofwork is transformed and degraded through capitalist relations of 
production, and the consequences for the structure of the working class and 
patterns of occupational change. Flis discussion of industrial psychology and 
sociology shows he is clearly aware of other managerial techniques brought to bear 
on the worker9 but he sets them aside because 'they do not by and large concern 
themselves with the organisation of work' (1974: 140). Hisneglect' of other 
aspects of the employment relationship, of other sources of capitalist authority and 
control and of the activity of workers and trade unions clearly means that he does 
not seek to provide a complete picture of class relations even in production, much 
less at the level of society or the state'O. Management, for example, may be based 
on Taylorism but management practice is not reducible to it. 
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nese are important limitations. It certainly means that Braverman does not 
provide a complete account of the social organisation of production as it actually 
develops in the workplace; of the effects, for example, of continuing divisions 
among workers based on the survival of 'craft'j ob monop olies or, more generally, 
of the influence of competition among employers and between groups of workers 
(Elbaum et al 1979). However, the first question is whether subsequent studies 
with a different focus on the labour process have undermined what Braverman did 
say. A second, and more fimdamental question is posed by Elger, who argues that 
Braverman is not simply incomplete, but that his analysis closes down crucial 
questions about the relationship between the capitalist labour process and class 
struggle and broader forms of p olitical domination and struggle ( 1979: 60- 6 1). 
This study, by contrast, argues that the insights of Braverman's analysis remain 
fundamental to understanding the labour process and that- the failure to integrate 
such insights into analyses of the wider social organisation of production can lead 
to contradictory and even absurd results. TIlompson (Snr), for example, argues that 
the work of Coventry car workers has been deskilled although, 'Paradoxically, 
Coventry engineers took a pride in the very specialisation which was in a more 
general sense a sign of their own deskilling'(1988: 58). This leads to some 
interesting discussion of shop floor culture but also to the odd conclusion that 
'Coventry skilled men of the 1970s had already survived by a fall half century the 
dire coRapse of the labour aristocracy portrayed by HobsbawnY (1988: 67). But 
whatever it was that had survived into the 1970s, it wasWt Hobsbaw&s labour 
aristocracy! At the centre of this issue is the nature and effects of worker resistance 
and it is to this question that we now turn. 
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Worker Resistance and Employer Strategies 
The key question might be put this way, how far were the laws of motion of 
capitalist economy bent, shaped or overturned altogether by the struggles of 
workers and their employers. K 'In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their wiff (Marx 
1970: 20), to what extent did they subsequently succeed in exercising a will of their 
own? And iý as Braverman says, workers were forced to 'build for themselves 
more 'modern!, more 'scientific'. more dehumanized prisons of labor' (1974: 233) 
why has there not been a revolt? Tliese questions do not stop with Braverman of 
course. According to T'homp son, Marx too, 'failed to reconcile adequately his 
analysis of the transformation of work and the form and content of workers' 
struggles! (1983: 58). 11ýrice puts the same question but in a larger frame when he 
notes that history has not produced the revolution required by the Marxist analysis 
of capitalism (1986). 
In the labour process literature, this question is usually discussed in terms of 
worker resistance and the employers need for worker co-operation, but too much 
is claimed for both. For Cressey and MacInnes, the need for co-operation arises 
from the two fold character of labour power, as exchange value and as use value. 
To obtain the useful aspect of labour power capital must surrender control of the 
means of production to the worker for use in production while workers in turn 
have an interest in maintaining the viability of the unit of capital which employs 
them (1980: 14-15). Friedman's argument that worker resistance can force 
employers to adopt alternative labour management strategies, responsible 
autonomy rather than direct control (scientific management), has been equally 
influential. 
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But the compulsion to co-operate does not arise in the way Cressey and MacInnes 
suppose, nor is it specific to the capitalist labour process. Slave owners 
surrendered the means of production to slaves too, and unless a degree of co- 
operation had been secured, stock would be hobbled and crops wasted. Slaves also 
slowed the worý down, attempted to establish work norms, falsified the weight of 
cotton and made gains in the quality of everyday living as a result (Genovese 
1976: 621). Co-operation with capital is, in the first instance, an expression of the 
worker's dependence. The establishment of a modus vivendi may become a way of 
life, may even be preached as a virtue. As such it has enormous importance in 
every day life and, in the shape of reformist trade unions and political parties, a 
corresponding importance in social life. But such phenomena are not derived from 
the essence of the capitalist labour process. They are a product of the struggle 
created by that process. 
Friedman's distinction between responsible autonomy and direct control strategies 
overlooks the way elements of both can be combined. The gang system at 
- 
Standard's car plants in Coventry ceded, for a tinie, ýey controls to shop floor 
workers and their representatives (Donnelly and Thorns 1989). But the 
introduction of the gang system was preceded by a major time study exercise in 
which hundreds ofjobs were re-classified, and 'craft union interests in particular 
job functions had to be overridden in the interests of securing the division of labour 
and allocation of work appropriate to the operation of a modem motor vehicle and 
tractor plant' (Melman 19 5 8: 3 6). 
There is, nevertheless, a point of real substance in the criticism that the effect of 
human agency cannot be left to one side. The labour process has manufitctured 
consent as welt as conflict and this is as important for what people do and the way 
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they live, as the process of value production. At the very least, it is clear that the 
actual social organisation of production cannot be simply'read-off from trends in 
the labour process. Braverman believed that worker hostility had been forced into 
subterranean streams from which revolution would be the ultimate escape (1977). 
But that hostility also expressed itself in the struggle for more limited, immediate 
gains. Workers might not have demolished Braverman's prisons of labour but they 
made them more habitable. 
Such resistance is, as Friedman observes, double-edged, since it allows'the 
possibility for capitalism to accommodate such challenges by offering concessions 
and by co-opting institutions which were intended to marshal worker solidarity 
against aspects of managerial authority' (1977: 54). We will discuss the effects of 
worker resistance in struggles around premium bonus (chapter 2), the machine 
question in engineering (chapter3) and against the Bedaux system in the 1930s 
(chapter 5). In each case, concessions to worker resistance were matched by 
accommodation to the demands of capital". What has not been sufficiently 
app . reciated is the extent to which the institutions of the labour movement and its 
leading figures were positively supportive of scientific management. The speed and 
thoroughness with Which trade unions adapted to the demands of Taylorism is 
particularly striking. 
Turning to employer strategies, two points might be made. First, management is 
not reducible to Taylorisni When Taylor died in 1915, time and motion study was 
still in a primitive state, even as practised by Taylor, and a whole raft of other 
management techniques for the design of work and the management of the worker 
had yet to be developed. But Braverman was clearly right to argue that Taylorism. 
had not been superseded. Urwick thought Mary Parker Follet and the Hawthorne 
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experiments had supplied a 'missing segment in our theoretical knowledge of 
management' (1956: 48-49). His four-sided pyramid of management knowledge 
found no difficulty in incorporating Taylor and Myers on one side dealing with the 
task and the man, and Fayol and Mayo on the other dealing with the group and its 
morale (1956: 53). Scientific management and human relations have sometimes 
been presented as competing phidosophies corresponding to strategies of control 
and seduction but 'Seduction now complements control in virtually every major 
corporation' (Hurd: 1987: 239). The compatibility of apparently different strategies 
was clearly revealed in the enthusiasm of the work study industry for job redesign 
in the 1970s. 
Secondly, scientific management did not make management all powerful. And not 
just because workers resisted. It formed part of a significant advance in terms of 
the organisation of production and provided new techniques for increasing the 
intensity (and productivity) of labour. But there was precious little scientific about 
Taylor's time and motion study. His belief that he could take the determination of a 
fair day's work out of the realms of argument between worker and employer 
proved to be a utopian iDusionI2. 
Finally, this study seeks to extend the scope of the labour process debate in two 
directions. First, the reconstitution of the labour process on the shop floor required 
the reconstitution of management itself Tlis involved more than the demotion of 
the foreman and the appearance of the rate fixer. It also involved the development 
of new fimctions in planning and directing production. Daniel Nelson (1974,1980, 
1992) has addressed the impact of scientific management on management in detail 
but this tends to get left out of a labour process debate centred on the skifled 
worker, And this leads to a second point. ne impact of Taylorism. on unskilled 
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and semi-skilled workers has been woefidly neglected. In part this is 
understandable because the craftsman was the principal victim of the separation of 
conception from execution. But it is clear that Taylorisnys field of operation 
included labour of all kinds. 
A Note on Sources 
Extensive use has been made of the technical journals, particularly in 
engineering. They are the best, single source for changes in management and 
technology, and much else besides. In his Scientific Management in Europe, 
Devinat notes that 'it is the technical periodicals that offer the most valuable 
documentation' (p92), and Landes too, says that the best source for 
scientific management 'remains the contemporary engineering periodicals' 
(p322, footnote). The technical journals provide a unique record of the 
discussions of engineers and managers about their tasks. Reactions to 
scientific management range from the enthusiastic endorsement of Cassiers 
through the early scepticism of Engineering to the outright hostility of The 
Engineer. 
Cassiers Magazine was founded in 1891 and originally published in New 
York and London. American influence was pronounced with articles 
regularly reprinted from the New York magazine, 'Industrial Managemene. 
In December 1913 it became Cassiers Engineering Monthly (incorporating 
Cassiers Magazine), and in 1919, Engineering and Industrial Management, 
a magazine 'devoted to management, production and economy in 
engineering, shipbuilding and all other branches of industry'. In 1921 the 
magazine incorporated Works Management and in 1923 changed its name 
again, to Cassiers Industrial Management. In the mid to late twenties, it 
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became more and more preoccupied with changes in mechanical handling 
technology and continued publication from 1929 as Cassiers Industrial 
Management and Mechanical Handling. Cassiers was a supporter of 
'modem' and scientific management methods. On the occasion of 
incorporating Works Management its editorial declared that both journals 
had covered much the same ground: 'The application and practice of 
scientific management in our factories and works has been the predominant 
feature of the p olicy adopted by Engineering and Industrial Management, 
since its inception thirty one years ago'. 
Interestingly enough the two heavyweights of the British engineering press, 
The Engineer and Engineering, were both founded by an American, Zorah 
Colbert (Armytage 1961: 184). ne older of the two, The Engineer, was the 
more conservative. The editors resisted caUs for standardisation and, though 
strong supporters of premium bonus, were dismissive of time study. Of 
particular interest is the journal's sustained hostility to Taylorism expressed 
ina series of scathing editorials, angry exchanges-with Gilbreth (1917), and 
most unengineering-like tirades against the 'tyranny of human efficiency' 
(1921). In similar vein The Engineer defended 'English methods! from critics 
inspired by American practice. 
Engineering, founded in 1866, was similar in design to its sister journal. 
Overwhelmingly technical and immensely detailed both journals provided 
wide ranging comment on labour issues and management developments. In 
1911 the magazine became involved in controversy with Gilbreth over 
motion study and scientific management and this has been widely quoted as 
evidence of British employer hostility to scientific management and the 
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strength of union opposition to it. But this is misleading. Engineering 
showed an early appreciation of Taylors work, demanded a sharp 
distinction between manual work and thinking and managing (1903), and 
called for Taylor's time study to be used with premium bonus schemes 
(1905). Reservations about scientific management'extremism! were quickly 
dropped during the first world war. 
ne leading journals had a significant readership among employers and an 
international reputation. The Moseley Commi sion seems to have had its 
origins in responses to a series of articles in Cassiers Magazine on the 
theme of American competition. Tom Westgarth, managing director of 
Richardson! s, Westgarth and Co., Middlesborough, wrote to complain about 
British workers and suggested a visit of 'masters and workmen! to include 
trade unionists and non-unionists to America. Cassiers responded by 
conferring with employers in 'London, Manchester, Leeds and other places! 
and establishing a fimd for the visit, the outcome of which was reported in 
detail in subsequent issues. For its part, Engineering was described by an 
American correspondent as the Times of the engineering profession when he 
wrote to rebuke the 'Thunderer' for its criticism of scientific management. 
When the editor, W. H. Maw,, died in 1924, Mechanical Engineering, the 
journal of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers wrote that'... his 
editorial office was a Mecca for distinguished American engineers who 
called to introduce themselves and to thank him for what he had done for 
the profession!. 
Notwithstanding sharp differences in editorial line all the main journals carried 
reports on American competition, engineering conferences, debates on premium 
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bonus, technical change and implications for shop management, making it possible 
to trace the growing acceptance of scientific management in the midst of The 
Engineer's criticism and the continuing gaps in British practice in the pages of 
Engineering and Cassiers. Of the other engineering journals cited, Machinery, 
founded around 1912, carried many of the most interesting contributions. The 
journal was distinctly modem in its approach and favourably inclined towards. 
scientific management even before the first world war. But none of the rest of the 
engineering press rivalled The Engineer and Engineering, and to a lesser extent, 
Cassiers. 
Summary of the Argument 
Scientific -management was the product of the most dynamic capitalist economy at 
the turn of the century, the USA- It was an expression of changes in technology 
and the labour process, business and management organisation, variously referred 
to as the scientific-technical revolution or the second industrial revolution. It was 
also a programme for driving forward such change. The use of work measurement 
to underpin a new type of incentive scheme is the feature of scientific management 
most commonly associated with Taylorism but this was only one aspect of a much 
more far-reaching change in the organisation and management of production. 
Europe shared the experience of the scientific-technical revolution, but with 
important differences in timing and of degree and scale. Technical change and 
competition tend to create a unified world economy but the process is always 
uneven, never complete and encounters numerous conditions which ensure rich 
differences within that common experience. 
This study investigates one strand of that experience, the influence of scientific 
management on the development of modem management practice in Britain in the 
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20th century. It does so by integrating a number of themes historically: the 
relationship between technology and management and between scientific 
management and management more generally; the management of work and the 
main agement of the worker; employers' strategies and the effects of worker 
resistance. The argument is that scientific management extends, all the way ftOm 
the development of production engineering to work study. Elements of a scientific 
management practice are apparent in workshop rationalisation before the first 
world war, and in the period between the wars new structures of management 
control were created alongside the spread of payment systems making more 
systematic use of time study. Taylorism, as one of the foundation stones of 
classical management theory and practice, was already an integral part of 
management before the second world war. As it actually developed as theory and 
as practice, Taylorism had little difficulty in accommodating other developments in 
management thinking from the human relations of Mayo to the behavioural science 
of the 1950s. 
A Al. 
Aner the se-cond world war, the use of work study became general throughout the 
economy, reaching a peak of influence at the end of the 1960s. Ironically, the 
spread of work study exposed its limitations as a technique for use with payment 
by results. At the same time, a plethora of new management tools found other 
means to continue Taylors work. Work study became one technique among many, 
and Taylorism one element of a management practice which had long since 
developed beyond the point at which Taylor left it, but which rested on 
foundations he had laid. 
We begin with a discussion of the changes in technology and associated 
developments in management thinking at the turn of the century (Chapter 1). 
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Taylorism had a mixed reception in Britain, welcomed in some quarters as an 
expression of modem trends and resented by more conservative elements for the 
same reason. Significantly, Tayl&s British contemporaries in engineering 
emphasised his wider role as a production engineer rather than the particular 
significance of time study, which adds weight to the argument that a broader 
interpretation of Taylorism is appropriate. 
01. 
Chapter 2 discusses the significance of early developments in workshop 
management practice and premium bonus schemes as the first, hesitant, partial and 
incomplete steps down the road indicated by Taylor. In chapters 3 and 4, we 
discuss the impact of these changes on the structure of management control and 
practice, and the division of labour within management and workforce. The i 
focus is the period between the wars but it is sometimes necessary to reach back to 
the late 19th century and to look forward to the second half of the 20th century to 
pursue these themes in detail. 
In chapter 5 we consider the development of payment by results systems between 
the wars, the use of time study, the significance of the Bedaux system and the 
struggles it provoked. A postscript outlines the post-war history of work study. 
It is clear that scientific management in Britain developed more directly from the 
management of mechanisation than from the activities of Taylor's followers and 
disciples. In the first half of the 20th century, the jig and tool designer and his 
successor, the production engineer, was more important than the efficiency 
engineer. But the direction of change was the same. In the 19th century the 
labourer was deployed around the skilled man; in the later 20th century the 
relationship is reversed with the skilled man deployed in support of the labourer 
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who now appears as direct labour or the production worker (Doray 1988: 62). 
Taylor's time and motion study played its part but it was rarely the sole or even 
direct instrument of deskilling. It was a combination of processes which included 
the machine question as well as time studies and incentive schemes,, new jigs and 
fixtures for producing SIMPlified, standardised goods and detailed instructions from 
the office. Nor was it the priMary fimction of scientific main agement to deskill the 
craftsman. It was simply that the craftsman was the biggest obstacle to the 
reordering of production. Scientific management aimed to transform the conditions 
of all kinds of labour and some of the toughest battles against the efficiency 
engineer were fought by women and semi and unskilled workers. 
New management functions, directed by planning departments, reorganised work, 
routing, scheduling and directing the activities on the shop floor much as Taylor 
demanded. The new managers in thethinking departments! relegated the foreman 
to a position on the periphery of the production process along with the craftsman. 
But scientific management in any form developed only slowly and unevenly, as 
British business struggled to adapt to the demands of the newly emerging mass 
production economy. Nevertheless, before the second world war, new 
management structures were in place, time study was used more frequently and the 
Bedaux company had established a base from which it would build after the war. 
That worker resistance could frustrate the labour process plans of the employers 
became an article of faith among critics of Braverman. This study discusses the 
struggle of engineering workers around the machine question and the grading of 
labour, and resistance to premium bonus schemes and the Bedaux system as well 
as the experience of piecework following the second world war. Its findings are 
really not very surprising. Workers could and did fight for discrete interests within 
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the labour process, but they were completely unable to change its character in any 
fundamental respect. To do so would have required a political struggle of a 
different order. They could get a better or worse deal out of any payment by 
results system but could not get rid of piecework, premium bonus or Bedaux. They 
could maintain for a period job controls and job monopolies over processes and 
machines, but they could not prevent the reordering of production from the office 
or the transformation of labourer into producer and craftsman into maintenance 
engineer. Such struggles made an enormous difference. They humanised what 
Braverman described as'dehumanized prisons of labor' (1974: 233) but worker 
resistance, as long as it was confined to trade union resistance, could only achieve 
a 'better bargain! (Price 1983: 62). Workers arrived at a better bargain through 
struggle, the trade union by pursuing a deliberate strategy of collective bargaining. 
If workers have not freed themselves from the labour process, capitalists have not 
always been successful in directing it. The Engineering Employers Federation 
determined to deskill. work by redesigning the job, principally through changes to 
machinery and equipment, before putting semi-skilled labour on it. They were not , 
entirely successfid but there is little substance in the argument that British 
employers surrendered control of the shop floor by relying on piecework rather 
than Tordist' methods of management control (Lewchuk 1986). Premium bonus, 
piecework, Bedaux and work study were aH designed to increase the intensity of 
labour. Piecework was just as common in America as in Britain, and the piecework 
systems which replaced premium bonus between the wars were intended to tighten 
time study standards. In the motor car industry, flow production was a 
consciously thought out process devised by talented engineers and piecework was 
used to support a systematic and largely successful attempt to determine work 
standards in ways which did nothing to surrender control. 
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Finally on employer strategies, it is argued that the human relations of the .79 
industrial psychologists aimed to refine Taylorism. not substitute for it. Arthur Lee 
and Sons, a pioneer of scientific management, welcomed Mayo's work at Western 
Electric and looked forward to combining financial, and non financial incentives 
(Lee 1932). So did Urwick. The behavioural science of the post second world war 
was ostensibly more challenging, but work study, far from clashing with the new 
critics of Taylorism, offered to put its skills at the disposal of the human relations 
industry. 
On the Whole, Taylorism. was absorbed into a rather unscientific management 
mainstream in Britain. Criticism of weaknesses in production management surfaced 
in the 1960s remarkably similar to those which animated the discussion of 
American competition in the 1890s and the reports of the Anglo American Council 
on Productivity in the 1940s. But British managers, like their counterparts 
elsewhere, based themselves on principles that Taylor had established. 
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Notes 
Carter argues that Taylorism did not form part of management ideology and that its 
adherents today are few, 'Nevertheless the practical importance of scientific management was, 
and still is, immense' (1985: 105) 
'The whole idea of planning shop operations in advance of performance was due to 
Taylor's influence and all modem planning departments are modelled more or less on his 
methods'(Bowie 1948) 
Nelson goes so far as to argue that scientific management had little to do with the 
changing nature of industrial work, the worker, or personnel management but it'was an 
important step in the evolution of modem manufacturing practice' (1974: 5 00). 
4 Fordist strategies in Britain were not helped by ýhe failure to offer a right hand drive 
model until 1922, and Fords refusal to sanction a small-bore, high- speed engine (Church and 
Nfiller 1977). 
Voss and Robinson (1987) found few companies making serious efforts to implement 
just-in-time practice. 
6 Ackrill (1988) argues that more could have been done at the level of the individual firm 
to overcome institutional rigidities. 
7 Sayer is clearly wrong to suggest that Braverman believed managerial control and 
deskilling was 'a goal in itself rather than one among many means to increase profits (1986) 
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Tolliday and Zeitlin are setting up straw men when they assert, against radical 
economists, Marxists and others that, 'employers and managers must be treated as potential-ly 
autonomous historical actors whose substantive choices can modify as well as reflect their 
environment' (1991: 2) 
McLoughlin and Clark's comment that Braverman thought Taylorism was synonymous 
with capitalist management in toto (1988: 67) oversimplifies and consequently misrepresents 
Braverman's argument. Clawson is more accurate in repeating Braverman's point that Taylorism 
'dominates engineering, work design and top management - which together make up only one 
side of the work process' (1980: 204) 
10 J. Ehrenreich and B. Ehrenreich argue that Labor and Monopoly Capital was mainly 
criticised'for failing to answer the questions it never raised in the first place' (1977: 10) 
11 P. K. Edwards argues that the Braverman debate comes to an end once worker resistance 
enters the picture and is seen as more than 'something which simply interferes with capitalists' 
, goals' 
(1986: 45). His conclusion that many of the issues raised in the debate have to be addressed W- -- - 
in a new way is probably right in any case, but the evidence does not support the view that worker 
resistance prevented the reconstruction of the labour process along scientific management lines. 
Time-study men 'never truly succeeded in wresting control over production from the workforce' as 
the subsequent history of piecework showed (Noble: 1986: 34). But the system of work and pay 
which provided the site of continuing struggles for control derived from the production 
organisation inspired by Taylor. 
12 Studies found variations in effort rating of 12% and overall, the time study engineer's 
#concept of normal varied from 30% tight to 30% loose' (TSE Jan. 1950; Desmond 1962). 
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Chapter 1 Technology, Business and Management 
Introduction 
In this chapter I wiff discuss the view that British economic backwardness at the 
turn of the century consisted, in part, of a failure to adopt modem management 
methods. In particular, I will examine the argument that the character of British 
markets was a major obstacle to the development of mass production and that the 
failure to rationalise industry accounts for employer neglect of Taylorism. I will 
show that employer conservatism and inertia in the face of e)dsting economic 
structures and practices was as important as structural constraints but that 
arguments about the causes and consequences of British economic decline must be 
treated with caution. The performance of industry between the wars, or after the 
second world war when British economic decline accelerated, cannot readily be 
explained by the acts or omissions of the Victorians and Edwardians. 
Economic and managerial change might have been sluggish and uneven but there 
was change nevertheless. Chandler observed that the most significant technological 
and organisational innovations took place in the metal working industries where 
- 'the policies and procedures of modem systematic or scientific management were 
devised and perfected' (1977: 244). In this chapter I will examine changes in the 
engineering industry after the flood of American machine tools onto the British 
market in the 1890s and discuss the relationship between the new technology and 
the development of new management methods. 
Finally, I will. discuss the reception in Britain for scientific management ideas and 
show that Taylorism was firmly identified by British engineers as an extension of 
technical and managerial changes that were already taking place in British 
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workshops. Hostility to Taylorisin has been greatly exaggerated, but even in the 
writings of his most consistent critics it is possible to discern the conversion of the 
engineering establishment to scientific management. 
Business Management and British Economic Performance 
Whatever the disagreements about the causes or long term consequences, the 
British economy was toppled from its dominating position in the world economy at 
the end of the 19th century by new competitors in Europe and by America 
(Bagwell and Nfingay 1970; Landes 1969). And if the foundations of a modem 
economy had been laid by 1900, it took more than twenty more years for its shape 
to become apparent in Britain (Hobsbawm 1968: 179). Mechanisation spread 
rapidly, but it was not until 1924 that factories, distinguished by their use of a 
power source, were more numerous than workshops (Engineering July 1925). 
Electricity generation was still quite a minor producer among the fuel and power 
industries in 1907. And while the numbers employed in the chemical and allied 
trades grew rapidly between 1881 and 1911, in 1907 they only accounted for 3% 
of the net output of industry (Ashworth 1960: 78). In the new, science based 
industries, British producers clung too long to outdated methods or failed to 
develop new ones fast enough. The trend towards concentration of industry was 
slow too, and only really took off between the wars (Hannah 1974). The rise of 
the managerial firm was also slower in Britain; commonplace in the USA by 1914, 
it was still a rarity in Britain in 1919 (Chandler 1976: 28). 
it has nevertheless been argued that British business decisions were economically 
rational given resource constraints, the availability of cheap, skilled labour, and the 
character of British markets (Harley 1973-74; McLoskey 1970). But much of the 
literature which charts British economic performance and debates the causes of 
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relative decline is deeply critical of employer, or entrepreneurial, behaviour. For 
Landes (1969) and Aldcroft (1969), the failure of the British economy to grow as 
fast as her rivals before 1914 was due to a failure of entrepreneurial drive and 
vision. Particularly serious was the tendency to cling to old established processes 
and technologies. Levine (1967) too blamed 'weak entrepreneurial drives! for 
industrial retardation in Britain before 1914 and located them in the conservative ý 
nature of British society. 
What many of these accounts also record is a parallel neglect of management 
(Simm 1981: 146). Aldcroft argues that 'by 1914, rationalised methods of 
production and scientific management of the labour force had made only very 
limited progress in British industry' (1981: 27). Even Payne, who finds the charges 
brought against British businessmen substantially unproved, points to the continued 
indifference, even outright hostility, to Taylorism and scientific management, as 
evidence of a lack of entrepreneurial vision (1978: 218). Pollard too notes that the 
British were'slow to adopt modem methods of internal management', and also 
cites employer hostility to Taylorism, though he observes that in all these areas, 'the 
continent was scarcely more advanced than Britain! (Pollard 1989: 54)1. 
I discuss below two features of this debate, the Emiting effect of British markets 
and the socially conservative nature of British capitalism But in general terms, the 
idea of British decline stemming from conditions at the tum of the century must be 
treated with caution. It overlooks the unevenness between sectors, pays too little 
attention to changes that did take place and gives too little weight to subsequent 
developments. The same conservative business behaviour might be rewarded in one 
case and punished in another. Dintenfass finds'clear cut evidence of a British 
resistance to technological change'Which hurt the iron and steel industry, but was a 
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matter of sound judgement in the case of cotton (1992: 19-2 1). And despite the 
slow start made by the British motor industry, Morris and Austin were modem, 
competitive producers by the 1930s (Overy 1976: 54)2. If the subsequent decline of 
this industry is related to the failure of the two big producers to rationalise capacity 
earlier (Rhys 1976), it can hardly be said to share a, common historical 
backwardness with British industry in general, which accounts for a phenomenon 
of long term decline. 
Every generation carries the burden of inherited structures and received wisdom 
which makes adaptation and change more or less difficult. Some attitudes and 
institutions may become more ingrained in the national culture than others, such as 
the contrast between British and German attitudes to education and training for 
example. And some of them feature in criticisms of British performance from the 
1890s to the 1980s (Engineering 1899; Anglo American Council 1952; Roderick 
and Stephens 19 8 1). Our attention is drawn to the difficulty of the industrial 
pioneer adapting to change driven from beyond its shores. But it was an experience 
which was uneven; more problematic in old industries than new ones; easier in 
terms of machinery than production methods; more successful in some markets 
than others. Each partial adaptation creating the conditions under which new 
challenges were to be met. 
Markets and Management 
One major factor, for contemporaries and historians, has been the influence of 
British product markets. Gospel argues that the inadequate development of 
managerial hierarchies and control of labour in Britain contributed significantly to 
poor economic performance and that these failures are explained by two main 
factors; the nature of markets and employer strategies in externalising the relations 
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within workplace and firm. Tlie argument is that 'the nature of product markets, in 
the 19th century and early 20th century, in particular their heterogeneity and 
degree of fragmentation, had a profound effect on systems of labour management 
in Britain' (1992: 6). Market structures are mediated through the firm. Weak 
managerial hierarchies and inadequate corporate development together with. 
employer choices of market (external) relations with employees rather than ones 
internal to the firm, help explain labour strategies in Britain and the problems to 
which they gave rise. 
Zeit&s argument, that engineering employers failed to transform the division of 
labour because of an absence of large scale programmes of capital investment and 
dogged craft resistance, is also heavily dependent on arguments about product 
markets (1983: 26; 1985: 228). Similarly, McKinlay and Zeitlin argue that British 
employers 'overwhelmingly rejected Taylorism. as inappropriate for the high- 
quality, smaR batch production which again dominated British engineering after the 
Armistice' (1989: 39). 
This is clearly an argument of substance. It is beyond doubt that fragmented 
product markets and batch production discouraged the development of scientific 
management just as specialisation and standardisation encouraged it. Indeed, I 
argue that scientific management grew out of a systematic management response to 
the possibilities inherent in new forms of business organisation and new 
technologies. But Taylorism on this argument was both cause and effect: both a 
product of those wider changes and a force driving them forward. Markets are 
created as well as served. It may be that Ford could not have succeeded without 
the vast numbers of mid-west farmers in need of basic transportation. But his 
historical achievement, and that of a number of other mass production industries, 
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lay in devising production strategies which brought those markets into being and 
continued to help shape them even as they were supplied. 
Britain and its markets did not exist in a vacuum Designers in the British motor car 
industry might continue to demand greater accuracy in workmanship thanthe. 
Americans, but by, 1914 (if not well before) the Ford motor company had'stamped 
itself and its product indelibly upon the minds of all classes the world over' 
(Machinery Feb. 1914). There was not much doubt after the turn of the century, 
even in the minds of critics, that the American system of manufactures represented 
the future, and that future existed in the here and now amidst all the clutter of the 
first industrial revolution. Nor was attention only drawn to engineering and the 
newer, mass production industries. TIle first issue of the World's Work in 
December 1902, a magazine devoted to 'national efficiency and social progress!, 
carried a report of the achievements of 'A Yankee (Construction) Bo ss in England'. 
James C Stewart, it reported, had been called over to England to manage the 
building of the new Westinghouse factory in Manchester, and in so do' g 
confirmed his reputation as a miracle worker (The World's Work Dec. 1902). He 
increased the number of men employed from 236 to 2,600, and the standard for 
bricklayers from around 600 bricks a day to a peak of 1,800. According to the 
World's Work it was a result of systematic organisation - detailed reports from 75 
foremen and sub foremen being analysed daily. 
The argument about whether American methods suited, or could be adapted to 
British conditions, was, of course, a question that was widely debated in British 
industry. Predictably enough, the advocates and practitioners of Amexican methods 
dismissed objections about British conditions just as firmly as their critics advanced 
them. There were some cautionary tales from the newest industrial sectors which 
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could be cited in support of the view that one could not buck the market. 
Lanchester and Standard both suffered in the pre-war motor industry as a 
consequence of their early commitment to standardised interchangeable parts and 
lack of variety in design. In the electrical industry, British Westinghouse stuck too 
closely to American designs'which they tried with little success to force upon the 
customer' (Saul 1962: 41; 1960: 32). But if attempts to imitate America could come 
unstuck examples of the adoption of modem methods suggest that talk of special 
British conditions could be an alibi for inaction. 
The Rowan marine engine works in Glasgow provides an interesting case. 
Although David Rowan 'vigorously defended English practice and the position of 
mechanical engineering in Britain! from an attack by Orcutt at a meeting of the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers in 1902 (The Engineer Feb. 1902), the Rowan 
works had, by the turn of the century, adopted a considerable measure of 
standardisation. and advanced management techniques, including the premium 
bonus system. Rowan produced about twenty marine engines a year of between 
1500. and 1600 hp for cargo ships but made a point of standardising the engines as 
far as possible, using accurate machining and interchangeable parts. The tool room 
- had adopted the 'modem practice of having tool cutters ground and stored' for 
giving out to the men, and limit gauges of every kind were available. Engineering 
commented that it was quite a modem idea to introduce such refinements into the 
practice of making such powerful manne engines and that, 'Probably a certain 
number of orders are lost when firms insist on adhering strictly to their standard 
sizes and patterns; but this is more than compensated for by the economy that 
comes from repetition worle (May 1902). 
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Even where producers built on variety to meet particular customer requirements, 
and this was explicitly advocated as policy, there were considerable possibilities for 
standardisation of certain of the components. This is turn would give 'the 
opportunity of designing special tools for the purpose of producing the standard 
articles economically in the shop' (The Engineer July 1902). Orcutt's paper on 
'Modem Machine Methods! took this argument finther. The point about American 
methods, he argued, had been widely misunderstood: 'Many labour saving 
appliances could be adopted without changing the product of the shop in any way 
whatever' (1902). Orcutt was replying to criticism from J. R Richardson from 
Lincoln who had argued that Americans did not understand British conditions. As a 
locomotive builder, his firm catalogued over 500 engines and had to take any work 
they were asked for. 
Essentiafly the same point was put to James Rowan in the discussion which 
foflowed his paper on premium bonus in 1903. Mf John F Robinson pointed to the 
vast amount of detailed work involved in producing locomotive engines. The idea 
of having to fix standards for those operations appaRed him And anyway, they had .1- 
to work to other people's designs and did not have the freedom to alter designs as a 
result of cost analysis. Rowan's reply was direct: 'He feared Mr Robinson had not 
studied the question properly ... (the speaker) thought that marine engines were 
equally difficult to deal with; in fact it had been his opinion that a locomotive 
factory was an ideal one for the introduction of the premium system! (Engineering 
A nril 1903). ýlp 
The argmuent about what might be called standardisation in detail was also 
developed by the remarkable W. H. Maw, editor of Engineering, in his Presidential 
address to the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in 190 1. Two things above all, 
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he argued, distinguished modem manufacturing practice. First,, production to 
definite sizes with sophisticated measuring instruments for support. The second 
striking difference was the way production detail was determined in the office, 
'exactly how its manufacture shall be carried out, the successive processes it is to 
undergo being specified, and the machines and tools used in them to perform these 
processes being fixed' (Maw 190 1). Even firms where a great variety of work was 
undertaken could take advantage of modem methods'if care is taken to resolve 
these products into their component units, and to classify these units, it will be 
found that opportunities exist for the introduction of standard parts and repetition 
work which are frequently entirely unsuspected'. 
War production pushed such reasoning into the background and focused attention 
once more on the association between volume production, repetition and scientific 
management. But the argument surfaced again after theý war. A report in 1921 on 
scientific management in the French shipyards at Saint Nazaire suggested that it 
'dispels the notion of any indissoluble bond between mass production and scientific 
management' and underlined the point that conditions at Saint Nazaire were the 
same as ýin many machine shops in this country today, where mass production is 
definitely out of the question' (The Engineering Review vol. 23 1919). In the 
following year, a paper by I W. Curtis to the Manchester Association of Engineers 
described the management of a medium sized business erecting more or less 
complete installations of coal carbonisation plant or gas undertakings. The 
management function was well developed with a design and estimating department, 
a general drawing office and a production department whose business it was 'to 
know every single item which constitutes the finished product'. Again, the 
argument was made that modem methods were not only applicable to mass 
production: 'T'he author stated that it was a mistake to assume that production 
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control could only be applied to mass production or speciality work. It had been 
shown in his paper that production control could be successfidly applied after 
careful development in a works in which the articles manufactured were numerous 
and varied and the work finther complicated by erection on site' (Curtiss 1922). 
Finally we may note the testimony of A. P. Young, managing director of British 
Thomas-Houston works in Rugby, where scientific management was installed 
complete with rate-fixing department, motion study and the use of motion cameras 
as early as 1937. 'Our weekly production', Young told the 36th Oxford 
Management Conference, 'is about 30,000 castings spread over some 1,500 
different designs. The very antithesis of mass production' (193 7: 15 3). Of course 
this meant adapting new production methods to meet more Emited or diverse 
markets. But this was, after alL what the motor industry had to do too. Hence the 
distinction Woollard made between mass production and flow production, and the 
point made in the President's address to the Institute of Automobile Engineers in 
1921. It would be a hopeless struggle, he argued, to conipete with America as 
assemblers. TIle British market was more limited and demanded an individual 
touch, '... but even so we cannot hope to succeed unless we apply modem methods , 
of production' (Watson 192 1). 
The Social Conservatism of British Capitalism 
The case to be made for the social conservatism of British capitalism is most often 
based on the supposed survival of the pre-industrial attitudes and an aristocratic 
culture which despised industry and mere money making. But it had much more to 
do with the 'conservatism of practical men determined, in the words of The 
Engineer, to 'make the best use of the means at hand, who continued to make 
money and win orders with existing equipment and methods. 'Of late years a great 
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deal has been written on the advantages of specialising in the manufacture of 
machinery', wrote The Engineer, 'but for many reasons ... it is undesirable, even if 
it were possible, for many engineering finns in Great Britain to restrict themselves 
in the variety of goods they offer to their customers' (July 1902). British business, 
faced growing American competition but fidl order bookswas the principal reason 
why'orders have gone abroad, and machinery and materials have been imported 
into this country' (The Engineer Nov. 190 1). 
At the same time, the example of America was pressed upon British engineering 
from every side. Its dynamism could not be ignored. In 1900 7he Engineer 
responded with a classic statement of conservatism and one which speaks volumes 
for much British practice and a good many accounts of British economic and 
industrial performance which have been produced since. If there were an American 
Commi sioner for Britain, argued The Engineer, he would findEngfish methods to 
be in no degree less suited to England than American methods are to America! 
(Aug. 1900). England was a mighty tree. She had ceased to grow upwards, though 
- she stiU 
towered above others, and was greater iii'girth and stabilitý. America, by 
comparison was a sapling, ceaselessly struggling to grow and compete, a country 
which would one day also become a great tree. You must start, argued Ae 
Engineer, from the patterns of trade and traditions of a country before 
pronouncing on her methods. When, in fifty years time, America herself was 
overtaken, 'will they utterly cast out the ways of their fathers and grandfathers - 
will they be able to stamp out tradition and overcome hereditary ideas and spring 
up fresh and green from their ashes? No, and a thousand times no. They will do 
what England is doing. They will make the best use of the means they have at 
hand'. 
50 
The manufacturer most affected by the'goblin' of American competition was the 
least concerned by it because he was maldng money. If he retained his old tools it 
was because they were 'a very important consideration; secondly they do the work 
as fast as he wants it done; and lastly they are cheap to use. Thus it is with 
, 
hundreds of our'antiquated! ways, both in maldng and selbng'. English-methods 
worked because t: heY were. there and they made money; change was problematic. A 
correspondent wrote in to point out that America'puRed down many edifices and 
shops just because a new one would save more time and laboue and many of those 
scrapped tools ended up in British factories (Nov. 1900). But The Engineer was 
not shaken in its conviction that there was little alternative to making the best use 
of what was at hand. As late as 1927, yet another report on America inspired the 
forlorn hope in the editorial office that 'it may be the last of such productions' and a 
response remarkably similar to that delivered twenty seven years earlier. Many 
people had launched diatribes against Great Britain because 'she is not as America 
is'. But, in two to three centuries time (the horizon had shifted), America would 
find herself where Britain is now, 'she will have to suffer comparisons with some 
new nation given by Providence vast possibilities, unhampered by a long tradition, 
uncontrolled by a 'fixed genius' and free from that resistance to rapid changes 
which is the constant and natural accompaniment of age' (April 1927). 
It was a penetrating and lucid expression of the relationship between Britain and 
America, between traditional ways of doing things and radically new methods that 
would have drawn sympathetic approval from many in business and angry 
impatience from others. 
it would have influriated that leading British theorist of management between the 
wars, Lyndall Urwick, one-time manager at Rowntree! s plant in York, director of 
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the international management institute at Geneva and author of numerous books 
and articles on management. Urwick was fond of quoting the historian, Philip 
Guedalla, on certain British characteristics: 'A happy inability to apprehend general 
ideas appeared to stand between the people of England and their disturbing impact 
... The pursuit of theory was left to professed theorists, W, hile an obstinately 
practical community eschewed the primrose path of general ideas and confined 
itself austerely to the solution of practical problems! (1956: 25). Scientific 
management was a general idea and the British had allowed it to be obscured by a 
determinedly empiricist outlook, by'minds so pre-empted with technical issues that 
there was little room for the seeds of more effective management' (Urwick and 
Brech 1957: 102,120). 
But it would have been perfectly understood by the'practical men! at Courtaulds. 
Samuel Courtauld IV might be a signatory of Mond's letter to the TUC but 
hostility to unions was maintained, on the ground, at the plants throughout the 
193Qs (Clegg 1985: 469). In 1937, Courtaulds hired consultants to investigate the 
company's purchasing system. Courtaulds! historian, Coleman commented, 'This 
characteristically American move would have horrified the older generation of 
I 
- British directors of Courtaulds. Scientific management, business efficiency systems, 
tune and motion study .... 
A remained anathema to the old schoor (1969: 455)3. 
Coleman's discussion of the culture of 'gentleman and player, of the educated 
amateur and the practical man, is revealing. The practical man could be more 
conservative than the educated amateur but togetherthey could and did perpetuate 
inertia in business because both parties to it had a built in distrust not simply of 
'science', but of any theoretically based knowledge! (1973: 113). 
52 
It seems certain that the conservatism of practical men slowed the pace of change 
and inhibited the adoption of more modem forms of production and management. 
It may be, as Phelps Brown has suggested, that the very success of older methods 
made managers reluctant to leam the new, that'T'he minds of practical men became 
bounded by the processes'and products that they had mastered in long 
apprenticeships' (1977: 25). But slow adaptation to change did not prevent change 
taking place. New American tools in engineering began the process of re-equipping 
British workshops and British engineers were discovering for themselves that the 
management of mechanisation demanded new methods as well as new 
technologies. 
The Management of Mechanisation 
The 1890s were a crucial learning period for British industry. At the beginning of 
the decade there was considerable complacency. A special meeting of the 
Manchester Association of Engineers heard a report following a visit to America 
which criticised American machinery for being too light and for striving after'mere 
novelty, American goods for lacking quality and American production methods for 
relying on sub contracting, which had'long ago been abandoned'in Britain. The 
visitors had seen electric welding machines in operation in Boston but did not 
believe they would ever be a commercial success (The Engineer Dec. 1890). 
Confidence in British machinery was boosted later in the decade by the 
development of high speed steel requiring heavier machines, but American machine 
tool makers were quick to respond and their mere novelty - actually, labour saving 
attachments - enabled exports of four leading USA manufacturers to grow in value 
from L86,165 in 1895 to 037,528 by 1897 (Saul 1960: 23; Floud 1974: 70). 
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By the turn of the century coverage in the engineering i ournals of the challenge 
from America reached a new level of intensity (Engineering 1899). Tie sober 
truth is!, wrote Louis Cassier in 1900 during an enquiry into American competition, 
'that in machine shop methods Britain has fallen behind Germany, and America has 
shot ahead of Germany (1900). 'Mere were still flattering accounts of British 
practice by Americans (Sweet 1896). But the tide was definitely running the other, 
way. European machinery was criticised for its academic design, being constructed 
with only a 'superficial knowledge of shop practice' (Binsee 1899). The great 
mistake made by Barnes and the ASE, The Engineer now discovered, was to have 
underestimated the revolution in methods of production which began in the USA: 
Ve see daily being introduced into workshops and shipyards, tools and methods 
which have been in ahnost universal use in the United States with great advantage 
for months and even years! (Jan. 1898). By the end of the year The Engineer had 
concluded that English manufacturers could no longer profess 'to despise American 
methods'(Dec. 1898). 
All observers were impressed by the use of sp ecially designed jigs and templates in 
American-workshops which enabled cheaper labour to produce more accurate 
work and were aware of the contrast with Europe (Smith 1894; Grimshaw 1895). 
But they were equally impressed by American management. In a widely reported 
account of American practice by a Belgian engineer, the emphasis was 
unmistakably on methods rather than technology. Three facets of American 
practice were discussed in detail. First, the idea of simplicity and uniformity of the 
product together with the use of cheap materials - the finish on American goods 
was only what was required in terms of function. Secondly, workshops were more 
highly mechanised with more self acting and better quality machines. And thirdly, 
the methodical system of working was noted and related to the development of the 
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main agement function: 'I was shown administrative offices invested with plenary 
powers. Among their duties were not only the making of plans, but also the giving 
of necessary instructions to each department, forge shop, pattern room, foundry, 
iron and steel store houses, shops etc. ' (Francois 1896). 
There was some catching up in British engineering in the first decade of the 20th 
century. The performance in textile engineering machinery and locomotive 
manufacture remained impressive (Saul 1970). And if American competition still 
exposed the backwardness of traditional engineering methods, there was 
nevertheless 'evidence of a renaissance in engineering generally at this time' 
(Sau11960: 36; 1962: 39). There was renewed confidence among tool makers. By 
1900, Herbert was producing twenty different kinds of milling machine for use'in 
almost every branch of mechanical industry' (Herbert 1900). In 190 1, The Engineer 
was struck by the quiet confidence of British manufacturers given the advance, in 
Britain, of 'specialisation and the adoption of the higher methods of manufacture, 
including the use of 'rigs and jigs'. Ilere were even claims that the whole of the 
British machine tool industry had learned from the American invasion of the 90s 
and that high speed steel tools were being taken up more quickly in Britain than 
America (Coxon 1909). T'hat there was some basis for this optimism is suggested 
by the slower rate of growth in imports of American machine tools in the first 
decade of the 20th century (Saul 1960: 26). 
By the turn of the century then, British workshops were acquiring the latest 
machine tools and British firms were now significant producers of them But the 
source of Ainerican competition had never simply been a higher level of 
mechanisation so much as the way production was organised and managed. 
American manufacturers were careful of the workers time to a remarkable extent 
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(Gimson 1905); in English workshops labour was wasted with every part'finished 
with equal care and accuracy, regardless of its relative importance' (Blount 1906). 
The contrast between American and European foundries, another observer noted, 
'was the great stress laid upon system and organisation in the strictly modem 
establishments! (Cassiers vol. 29 1905). The Birmingham manufacturer, R 4. F. 
Orcutt, a fierce critic of British engineering performance returned again and again 
to theme of American management. Even if Britain My caught up technically, 'It is 
the profitable operation of good plant that is generally not understood in England 
and in which America leads' (1902). 
British manufacturers found it easier to import American machines than American 
methods, but while those machines could be - and often were - operated in a 
workshop which remained largely unaltered in almost every other respect, the 
technology created new pressures for changes in the division of labour, not only on 
the shop floor, but in the office. These connections were grasped much more 
quickly, and acted upon, in America by systematic as well as scientific managers 
_ 
and weremore important than the technology itsdlf in guaranteeing American 
economic leadership. But even in Britain, business was being driven slowly, 
painfidly and unevenly down the path already trodden in America. 
Management and Technical Change in British Engineering 
Changes in engineering technology have been well documented. In the early 19th 
century, the all-round skills of the millwrights began to be broken down into 
separate trades, including those of turner and fitter, which survive into the 20th 
century as the basic skilled occupations. Put crudely, the former shaped the metal 
parts and the latter made them fit. While both fitter and turner of the 1850s would 
have been at home in an engineering workshop at the beginning of the 90s, things 
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changed rapidly thereafter. The fitter's job was split into 'erector, bench fitter and 
tool and gauge maker' (Jefferys 1945: 124) - and one might add, eventually, 
assembler - while the turner confronted a host of new processes for turning and 
shaping metal including capstan and turret lathes, vertical and horizontal millers 
and borers, surface grinders and radial drills. Tbc turret and capstan lathe was. 
developed in a variety of forms. The turret could slide up and down the lathe bed 
horizontally or revolve so that one tool after another was brought into contact with 
the workpiece. Vith the introduction of 'stops', so that the tool can only begin to 
work in the right position and automatically disengages when its work is finished, 
we have the semi-automatic machine which can be operated by any man after a few 
hours instruction, once the machine is 'set-up' for the job (Rowe 1928: 265). 
In a sense the new machines were not new at all (Engineering April 1897; Landes 
1969: 309). 'Turning, milling, planing, grinding, and boring are as old as the hills, ' 
wrote Orcutt. 'It is the latter-day developments of these operations in which the 
progressive manufacturer is interested, developments which have practically taken 
place with the last twenty years, some of them within the last five years! (1902). 
Those latter day developments included new grinding materials and the critical 
breakthrough of hio-speed steel but in the main they were of two types. First, a 
series of small improvements, tending to semi or automatic operation, which 
changed the nature of otherwise familiar machines and the development, alongside 
the machines themselves, of the jigs and templates for standardised output and the 
limit gauges which substituted the idea of interchangeable parts for a 'dead fit'. It is, 
of course, the trend to specialisation by manufacturers in a select line of business or 
limited output range and the accompanying standardisation of the product to 
cheapen production of larger quantities - the key business changes at the tum of 
the century - which drives and is driven by such technical change. The management 
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of new business strategies, mechanisation and the management of labour were an 
bound up together. 
Arthur Homer, who wrote extensively in the engineering press, described 
how in the revolution of recent years the craftsman had become'merged and 
obliterated in the machine'(1899). TIle tuffet lathe with its stop mechanisms 
meant that 'each tool in the turret is limited and arrested without any care 
on the part of the attendant'. Milling machines were replacing planing, 
slotting and shaping machines in a number of operations and accurate 
grinding meant that 'cutter and tool grinding is done to precise angles, 
without skilled attendance'. Increased speed and accuracy in result was 
apparent everywhere, much of it dependent on the new use ofjigs, templates 
and gauges. A new division of labour was growing up in the wake of such 
technical development: 'From all this specialisation of machines, and the use 
ofjigs, templates and gauges, there follow as a natural result, much division 
of tasks and separation in the shops ... In the modem machine shop the tools 
are ground by men who do no machining or fitting, while those who fit 
seldom carry out the final adjustment, assembly and erection of the complete 
I 
- mechanis&. 
As early as 189 1, Engineering complained that with improvements in 
machinery and in milling cutters in particular, 'the cutting speed is frequently 
quite neglected, and the rates of rotation, given by the various speed cones 
of the machine, are comparatively seldom known by the workman. 
Consequently the machine is usually run at a speed determined by the merest 
chance' (Oct. 189 1). But the development of high-speed steel tools 
, disturbed the equilibrium! of the shop in a variety of directions (Cassiers 
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vol. 35 1908). T'here were now many different methods of machining and 
choice of tools available to produce the same engineering result but with 
considerably different cost implications. Turning may be more profitable 
than forging; loading and setting a machine may be more costly than the 
actual machining. The development of cost accounting in Britain was 
encouraged by the move towards production decisions based on cost rather 
than technical considerations. And the decision about which method was 
most cost effective could only be arrived at after more systematic study. 
High-speed steel tools 'at once rendered the machinists! traditional 
knowledge of proper cutting feeds and speeds obsolete' (Montgomery 
1989: 23 1). They opened up dramatic new possibilities and widened the 
knowledge-gap opening up between shop floor engineers and a growing 
body of production specialists and managers. In 1905 Homer described 
them as 'the greatest innovation in workshop practice which the present 
generation has ever known'. Cutting speeds which had remained little 
changed for fifty years could now be doubled, trebled and quadrupled 
(Homer 1905). It was claimed that the text book speed for machining cast 
iron was 15ft per minute. In practice this might be pushed up to 30ft but 
high-speed steel made speeds of 90ft per minute possible. Mild steel could 
be machined at 130 foot per minute against the text book figure of 25ft. 
But, Not all our mechanics, nor alas, our foremen can give the cutting speed 
of the different diameters they may be engaged on; and our older hands, 
who instinctively know the proper speed for the old tools, are at sea in 
judging from sight the proper speeds with the new steels! (Fielden 1904). An 
article in Cassiers magazine noted dryly that time must have hung heavily on 
the hands of the operator of twenty five years ago, drilling at the rate of one 
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third of an inch per minute, when a modem machine'will drill a one and a 
half inch diameter hole in cast iron at five inches per minute. Six rates of 
feed are available, instantly changeable ... '(Coxon 1909). And when electric 
motors were used to drive machines directly, Homer noted, changes of 
speed could be more easily accomplished and then, 'We workman, "ill have 
no plea to urge against making repeated changes in speeds to suit work of 
different diameters! (1905). 
The separation of specialised and more highly skilled work in the toolroom 
was further encouraged by the special maintenance necessary for the new 
tools. Reporting the high speed steel tools exhibition in Paris, Engineering 
noted that such tools should be ground to definite angles'the most suitable 
of which have been selected as the result of an extensive series of 
experiments! (May 1902). It was a practice resented by-many skifled men 
and at nomeycroft's, on F. W. Watson's account, the skiRed men 
successfidly defended their prerogatives over the tools (1935: 92). But their 
victory can only have been temporary. Ile toolroom. had arrived to stay. It 
was not; however, simply a technical matter. A finer division of labour 
which prevented the waste of time and material'caused in the machine shop 
by workmen nmning to and from the grindstone, and grinding tools to any 
angle, usually the one that gives the least trouble' was an additional, and no 
less important, consideration (Camegie 1900). 
At the opposite end of the workplace, the drawing office was taking on a 
new role. The drawing office had always produced designs. Now, the 
drawing office is looked upon not only as the "designing" department, but as 
the , thinking" department concerned a much higher level of detaiL including 
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the methods of production and the jigs and special tools that would be 
necessary (Herbert 1919). 
The new men setting feeds and speeds and dictating the angles at which 
tools would be ground were intensifying labour by speeding up the process. 
Employers were warned not to allow men to work at a traditional pace. ' 
Oberlin Smith criticised the'crying evils! of slow speeds, shallow cuts and 
narrow feeding: 'Do not aRow a workman to think that sixteen feet cutting 
speed per minute on soft cast iron is "good enough" because he did it 
yesterday or last year, or because his grandfather did it' (1895). Smith 
claimed that he had been able to cut the time taken on two boring operations 
ftom five hours and nine hours,, to half an hour each. 
Taylor's point that the benefit of high speed steel tools would be lost under 
the old system of management 'in which the machinist is left with the final 
decision as to what shape of tooL depth of cut, speed and feed he wiR use' 
was-not lost on an English audience (Mechanical World 1907). Ile point 
was made again and again, 'the manual worker should not have any 
avoidable head work'to do (T'homas 1908). The immediate practical effect 
of the separation of conception from execution, encouraged by these 
developments, was felt through the new job cards laying down details of 
how the job was to be done and in the growing specialisation of labour. Its 
wider effect was in the growing divorce of the skilled engineer from the 
larger questions of production planned from the office. Alexander Siemens' 
Presidential Address to the Institution of Electrical Engineers m 1904, 
expressed what was becoming a common opinion when he argued that 
developments in engineering had divided the workforce in two: 'a large 
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majority that shaU have no need to think, or to use their brains, and a small 
minority, who must think very hard all the time' (Engineering Nov. 1904). 
In two quite remarkable editorials in February and June of 1903, 
Engineering brought together the trend towards mechanisation and division 
of labour with the new task of management conceived as mental labour. 
'T'he secret of successful engineering production is that the thinking shall be 
confined to very few minds, and that they shall not only think very hard, but 
shall also think in conformity to one central idea or system of ideas! (Feb. 
1903). Too many engineers associated modem manufacturing methods 
simply with automatic machinery: '.. we have emphasised the point that 
modem manufacturing methods are more a matter of management than 
machinery... Modem methods are mental not mechanical in their essence. 
They have their seat in the inteRect of the manager. The craft of the ancient 
millwright, who designed, planned, constructed and fitted the article that he 
made, had no place in the modem world. The bad old system was onein 
which each workman was allowed to decide what constituted a fit and to 
attain it in what way he thought best. Modem manufacturing methods imply 
the laying down of principles to which all must conform.. '. The mil1wright in 
fact provided an inverted picture, a photographic negative, as it were, of 
modem, economical methods. Opposition could be expected from both the 
foreman and the machine minder, both of whom would rebel against this 
rule which could only be enforced with an iron will. The main thing was'to 
make the heads of departments think out each point completely and to 
prevent the Workman thinking at aff . 
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In June 1903, Engineering returned to this theme, arguing once again that 
the key to modem methods was management not machinery. A profitable 
engineering shop could be more easily obtained with old machinery and 
modem management than with new machinery and old methods. There was 
a link between them of course: 'Modem machines demand, modem methods. 
of management, and without them they are doubtfid investments' (June 
1903). Management cost money. T'his was sometimes not understood by 
accountants who could more easily quantify the savings from the purchase 
of a new machine than altering designs to standardise on one component. 
But it was management, a directing will, that was needed to reduce 
engineering construction to mere manufitcture. Such a step required a quite 
different relationship between the foreman and the men: 'Modem methods of 
manufacture demand more and better foremen than the old system, because 
their essential principle is that the machine man shall not exercise any 
discretion at all. The foreman now has to think for every man beneath him ... 
In spite of the perfection of mechanism which is the mark of the age, brains 
are still the most important part of the equipment of a works. Formerly 
every man was expected to be intelligent and thoughtful; now the mechanic 
is being displaced by the labourer, and the thought which he had to expend 
on his work has to be provided by the foreman'. It is hard to believe that the 
editors of Engineering had not just finished reading Taylor's Shop 
Management published in 1903. 
The British Reception of Scientific Management 
Urwick and Brech (1957), the historians of scientific management, have suggested 
that employers and managers were cool towards Taylor before 1914 and that the 
technical press paid him little attention, ignoring his book Shop Management 
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completely. More recently Locke has made the same point asserting that, 'An 
analysis of British engineering periodicals shows a lack of curiosity before the first 
world war about the new management being perfected across the Atlantic' and that 
what did appear 'indicates that the British engineering profession did not real1y 
understand modem management' (1984: 98). The apparently hostile reception 
Taylor received in Birmingham on the occasion of his visit in 10 10 and the criticism 
of employer like Cadbury, have served to complete the picture of ignorance, 
indifference and hostility which scientific management met in Britain before the 
first world war. It is a picture which must be substantially modified. 
First of A the engineering press did not ignore Taylor or the new management. As 
we have seen, discussion of management as a key factor in creating the success of 
American economic competition was commonplace. The quality and detail of the 
discussion in American journals was far in advance of anything in Britain, but it 
should be remembered- that Taylor, though known, was not notorious in America 
orBritain until the sensation created by the Eastern Rate case. And that case did 
generate substantial attention in Britain. 
There were are numerous references to Taylor and his work in the engineering 
press. Some were direct references to his papers, others passing references 
suggested by other contexts. Other Americans associated with scientific 
management Eke Gantt, Gilbreth and Emerson were also brought to the attention 
of a British audience. Cassiers Magazine reprinted Taylor's'A Piece Rate System! 
in 1895, and The Engineer reprinted it in three parts beginning in April 1896. In 
1898 Cassiers reprinted Taylof s'A. Partial Solution of the Labour Problem' with 
the comment that Taylor's work at Midvale was worth studying 'in view of the 
demonstrated excellence of his SySte&4. In 1905, Engineering carried a substantial 
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account of Taylor's piece work proposals including the inevitable story of Schmidt 
and the pig iron (Sept. 1905). And in 1907, at least four publications carried his 
'Art of Cutting Metals! (Engineering Jan. 1907; Cassiers vol. 31 1907; Mechanical 
World Jan. 1907; Ae Mechanical Engineer Dec. 1906). There seems little 
justification for Urwicles comment that management questions were ignored in 
favour of technical ones and that there was a temporary hali to progress between 
1900 and 1914 (1938: 20). 
Urwick and Brech also suggest that the British were only interested in the technical 
aspect of The Art of Cutting Metals (195 7: 93) but in fact interest went much 
wider. It is true that Engineering was mainly concerned with technical matters in 
its commen in January 1907, though it did note that Taylor's work began with a 
conflict with the men at Midvale over a fair days work and went on to argue that 
the ordinary turner has only'vague notions as to the maximum output possible with 
his machine' and that operating speeds could be doubled if feeds and speeds were 
fixed for Un In February, however, Engineering returned to the theme in a way 
which shows just how familiar Taylor and his ideas were. Referring to Taylor's 
proposals the editors wrote, We have on various occasions indicated the main 
- features of this plan, but in view of the extraordinary results which have in many 
instances been obtained with it, we have little hesitation in again dealing with the 
matter'. And it was clear that they knew precisely what they were talking about: 
The essential basis of the system is the putting the management in a position to 
know more thoroughly than the workman himself the best it is possible for him to 
do, and, armed with this knowledge, to lay down for him in detail the precise 
course of operations, and the tools, if any, which he is to use in executing any 
particular piece of worle (Feb. 1907). 
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Cassiers comment on the lesson of 'The Art of Cutting Metals' was that 'scientific 
methods of remuneration! needed to be introduced and The Mechanical World 
linked the article to Taylor's Shop Management. 
Gantt probably attracted a's much attention, perhaps because he was associated 
more with payment systems. The Engineer reported his work at Bethlehem in 
February 1902 and Cassiers carried Gantt's article on'Equitable Labour 
Compensation and Maximum Output'in 1904. In the same year Engineering 
printed an article from Emerson, 'A Rational Basis for Paying Wages, and in 1907 
The Mechanical Engineer and Mechanical World reprinted Gantt's address on 
Mie Economical Utilization of Labour. 
Indirect references to the pioneers of scientific management are scattered 
throughout the press. To cite a couple of examples: Engineering reported the 
introduction of the differential rate at a Huddersfield firm in 1905, a system 
'introduced from the United States into several works in this country' (Sept. 1905); 
Machinery refeffed to Taylo: es work and 'annihilation of nde of thumb'in a book 
review in April 1914 and The Mechanical Engineer reprinted two American 
articles on shop management and payment systems in 1910, both of which referred 
to Taylor (Waldon 19 10; Dickie 19 10). 
An analysis of the engineering Press does not support the view that there was 
ignorance of Taylor or indifference to his ideas. In 1914, Machinery defined 
scientific management as the 'application of common sense' and advised firms to 
train their own men in the shop rather than use outside efficiency experts 
(Machinery June 1914). And though there was some hostility, Taylor's visit to 
Birmingham is not a good example of it. Taylor was in attendance at a discussion 
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of a paper by H Brackenbury on high speed tools, at which a British engineer, 
Dempster Smith, had criticised Taylor's calculations in 'The Art of Cutting Metals'. 
Taylor's response was to say that the Proceedings of the American Institutewere 
already burdened with everything he wanted to say on the steer, and went on to 
describe in great detail, Gilbreth's bricklaying experiments. Brackenbury's reply, 
that machine builders are always studying the motions of men seems remarkably 
polite in the circumstances (Engineering Aug. 19 10). 
There was hostility to the specific programme of scientific management and 
nowhere was it expressed more consistently or forcefidly than in one of the 
principal engineering journals of the day, The Engineer. Its opposition provides 
both a fascinating study in conservatism and a measure of the gradual acceptance 
of scientific management as the editors are forced to accept that they have become 
a voice crying in the wilderness'. 
In May 1911, following the publication of Taylors book'Principles of Scientific 
Management', The Engineer declared that Taylorism. was unfair and inhuman. It 
was not '-sportsmanlike'. Interestingly enough, it was precisely those developments 
already identified in Britain, the separation of thinking from doing, which was The 
Enginee? s target. Taylor had 'made a central office, the route-ing office, do all. the 
thinking, and he endeavoured as far as possible to make the men machines' (May 
19 11). 'Route-ing' was a punishment for convicts, not fit labour for a free man who 
should be 'free to exercise his intelligence, something to make him higher than the 
machines he uses, and to give him the right still, to caU himself a man!. In April 
19121, The Engineer returned to the attack on Taylorisrn, describing it as'.. 
scientific management gone mad. It means excessive "motion study" and "route- 
ing" and 1 stop-watching" , and all. the other schedulings which take time and men 
in 
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American workshop iman agement' (April 1912). No question of profit could justify 
reducing humanity to the level of a beast of burden. 
T'he editors of The Engineer may have been influenced by reports of labour 
troubles in America and by the great unrest before the war in Britain. Edward 
Cadbury certainly was when'he made his celebrated critique of scientific 
management in the Sociological Review. 'Reducing the workman to a living tool 
will either demoralise the workman or lead to social revolt%, Cadbury warned. 'Our 
whole system of social, industrial and political life rests on the idea and practice 
that management and control are in the hands of the middle classes and the rich. 
The controlling positions in the army and navy, in the civil service, and in all the 
professions are practically barred to the workers, and the growth of the Labour 
Party and Trade Unionism, and even Syndicalism properly understood, are 
expressions of the worknian! s demand to control his own life! (1914: 105). 
Cadbury's solution was firstly, to avoid pressing subdivision of labour to the point 
of 'eliminating any httle judgement and initiative as to the methods of worle which 
workers exercised, since this would anyway damage productivity in the long run. 
And secondly, to encourage the development of collective bargaining, trade union 
organisation and employee involvement. The unions in. particular should be 
educated to accept 'this new industrial advance'. 
Cadbury of course was a leading Quaker employer and fully commited to a 
paternalist welfare policy. But for all his criticisms Cadbury was closer to Taylor 
than either would admit. At Boumville, there was a relatively well developed 
managemefit fimetion which included welfare and personnel policy, carefid 
selection of employees, a suggestion scheme and education for employees. It also 
included detailed organisation of work and a system of work study in which the 
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firm'make a study of every piece of work and the operations involved to determine 
what is a fair task for the average operator, so that the rates will not have to be 
altered unless some new machine or method is employed' (Cadbury 1914: 114; 
Rowlinson 1988). Hans Renold, who also took part in the discussion as a 
straightforward, advocate for scientific management, was, in no doubt. He thought 
Cadbury had taken it much finther than he himself had. 
In what was turning into an annual assault on Taylorism, The Engineer returned to 
the fray in April 1913. Anticipating Cadbury's worries about productivity, The 
Engineer argued that 'In advocating such systems the fact is frequently overlooked, 
that the main source of all industrial advance has been in fertility of resource, and 
keenness of observation of the individuaL and that any development which 
depreciates originality of thought or lessons the value of life long experience is 
bound to end in a lowered efficiency of production' (April 1913). At the same time, 
in the spirit that Taylorism was'scientific management gone mad', it was admitted 
that a 'modified system, carefidly applied' might be appropriate. In November of the 
same year however, The Engineer attacked the issqrtion of the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers that labour saving scientific management methods had 
been adopted in a whole range of industries. We all practise labour saving 
management, argued 7-he Engineer, but Taylor and Gilbreth stood for something 
quite definite, 'At the back of the minds of both of them is the conception of a 
factory as a huge machine tool' (Nov. 1913). The workers were its parts. The 
management 'the cam wheel that controls them ... The 
lubricant is the bonus!. 
What is interesting about the opposition of The Engineer is the emphasis placed on 
those more general extensions of the management fimction, arising out of increased 
specialisation. and the scientific-technical revolution, summed up in the notion of 
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'route-ing'. American methods won't work here, argued The Engineer, because the 
workers of Scotland and England won't put up with the route card. It is precisely 
this aspect of Taylorism which was developing fastest in Britain and which obliged 
even the increasingly intransigent editors of The Engineer to contemplate a 
'modified system, carefidly applied'. 
The other main engineering publication of the day took a different approach. In 
1905, Engineering had welcomed Taylor's remarkable system and recommended a 
combination of Rowan! s premium bonus and Taylor's time study (Sept. 1905). But 
Engineering too, developed a critical fine in the discussion before the war, 
although its opposition was short-lived. It too, saw Taylorism as the managerial 
consequence of increased specialisation and sought to modify its extremism 
In June 1911 Engineering criticised the'task work system! for treating workmen 
Eke machines and in September, attacked Gilbreth's prescriptions for motion study, 
'A. man is not a machine and no good can come from trying to make him one ... it is 
difficult to persuade oneself that good can come from going out of one! s way to 
cramp the worker's personality, not only by means of the appliances he uses, but 
also by means of a rigid control of the motions of his body. Those who opposed it 
should have 'little fear that we are on the eve of a revolution in our industrial 
methods' since the unions were sure to oppose it (Sept. 1911). 
However, in March 1912, Engineering was describing the revolution which had 
already taken place,, which consisted in removing from the shop to the office all 
questions concerning the design of the product, and locating scientific management 
as 'a tendency towards fin-ther specialisatioe. 'Scientific management then proposes 
that the work of manufactwing shaU be finther specialised,, and that instead of the 
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system in which a job is designed by one man in every detail and made by another, 
we shall substitute a system in which a job is designed by one man in every detail - 
that is, the machine it is to be made on, the tools that are to be used, the rate the 
machine is to be run, the time the job is to take etc. - and finally passed to a third, 
who shall do the actual physical worle. What was being, described here was the 
'development of production engineering, or production management and 
Engineering was incapable of rejecting such a development in its entirety since it 
had identified and welcomed just such a trend in Britain. Its thoroughly British 
objection was to the extremism of scientific management, 'Few doctrines will stand 
pusbin to their logical conclusions in this world, and compromise Res at the root 
of most material success'(March 1912). 
From America, William D Ennis, of the Polytechnic Institute, New York, wrote to 
say how disappointing it was that Engineering, widely regarded as the Times of the 
engineering profession, should take a position which made no more sense than 
opposition to Watt's steam engine would have done - the'Thunderele had got it 
wrong (Dec. 1911). Gilbreth wrote responding to a critical review of his book, 
accusing the editors of reproducing the criticism'we confront daily from employers 
in carrying out our work' (Oct. 1911). To all this, and a correspondence on motion 
study running through 1912, Engineering replied that 'where we differ from Dr 
Taylor and others on scientific management is not essentially in the methods it 
stands for, but on the extent to which those methods should be carried. We think a 
large part of the professional opinion in this country agrees with us in this! (June 
1913). 
The experience of war dispensed with such reservations. By 1916, Engineering 
was recommending the Taylor system to guarantee the intelligent workman the 
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gains from increased output, 'in this connection the adoption of the Taylor system 
of time and motion studies, if applied with due consideration and discretion 
promises to do away with much injustice' (Aug. 1916). Three years later, W. H. 
Maw, the senior editor of Engineering, moving a vote of thanks for the 
Presidential address at thelustitution of Mechanical Engineers, thought it 
regrettable that motion study had been ignored, though he welcomed the fact that 
it was now making slow progress here (Oct. 1919). The conversion of on e part of 
the engineering establisbmen was complete. 
The Engineer was not so easily moved. In 1916 it urged its readers to remember 
that it was possible to be carried away by efficiency to the point of losing all sense 
of beauty or happiness. There had to be improved machinery and work should not 
go through the shop without order and direction but even so 'each workmain should 
be permitted in his own little sphere, at the bench or the machine, to express his 
own individuality in his own way of doing things' (Dec. 1916). But even The 
Engineer had to recognise that 'It is crying in the wilderness to say- aH this at 
present. Nowadays one has got to show that every action is worth while, that it is 
made with the sanction of a motion diagram according to Taylor, Gilbreth and 
CO. 15. 
In 192 1, The Engineer broadened its attack on 'the tyranny of human efficiency' 
which was proving so destructive of human happiness (Nov. 1921). Men were 
condemned to repeatedly stamping metal parts without even knowing what they 
were for. And it was spreading '. -- the same thing is going on now in thousands of 
factories, and is extending daily as efficiency methods and mass production 
increase'. And the following year, the magazine was poking fim at the works 
organiser who would be in ecstasy at 'the forms, schedules, dockets, index cards 
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etc. etc. that would make the simple transaction a work of organisational art' (April 
1922). It was also increasingly out of tune with the times. In 1927, The Engineer 
had to admit that 'Tlle success of American labour methods is no longer in 
question' (Oct. 1927). And ten years later, its delight at public criticism of 
Taylorism. only served to illustrate how influential scientific management had 
become. 'Taylofism, ' The Engineer noted, lias won so much attention mi the 
industrial world since it was introduced over forty years ago that even those who 
do not adopt it, even those who disbelieve in it, hesitate to treat it with disrespect' 
(March 1937). 
By 1914 virtually all the main technological clianges which would underpin the 
inter-war growth of the mass production economy were in place. Mechanical 
handling of all kinds, including various uses for conveyors, had spread very rapidly 
from the 1890s. By the mid 1920s it was possible'to deal mechanically with any 
class of goods under almost any circumstances' (Cassiers vol. 12 1925). 
Unmechanised conveyors were common in the car industry in the early 1920s, and 
mechams-ed ones in the early 30s. But their use affected many industries and 
different types of labour from'coal bunkering' at British ports to handling cases of 
soap and laundry. And their effect on labour was usually more immediate and 
dramatic. At the Standard Motor Co. in Coventry, assembly Hne operations made it 
necessary'to split up operations which were formerly performed by one operator, 
between several operators, and in others to have twice as many if the time taken is 
double that of the standard time for each of the other operations'. At the Loud and 
Western laundry in Wimbeldon in 1926, the use of conveyors to carry laundry to 
women workers was found to have a number of advantages: 'Tlle workers are 
separated, thus preventing confusion and the annoyance of talldng and "visiting" 
among enVloyees. When the operator is in the booth she can deal with the work 
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with the fewest number of movements, handling each piece but once, and with no 
cross over of hands! (Zimmer 1926). Work study did not reach the laundry industry 
in a significant way until the 1940s but clearly, elements of scientific management 
had already arrived. 
Finally, we might note that The Enginee? s hostility to Taylorism. also serves to 
illustrate how the job of the engineer was changing from a purely technical one, to 
one with a commercial/managerial dimension. It was of course, something The 
Engineer regretted. There was something wrong with a system which diverted a 
trained engineer into administration (Dec. 192 1). 'The business man', protested The 
Engineer in 1923, 'is beginning to dominate the engineer. Commercial education 
had gone too far. Young men were having to learn too much science andwill be 
expected to attend lectures on, and pass examinations in, labour problems and the 
organisation of mass production factories! (Dec. 1923). 
Conclusion 
in this chapter I have suggested that the social conservatism of British capitalism 
almost certainly slowed economic change. At a. ii MavvIs discussion of 
standardisation in detail showed that there was more scope for modem 
manufacturing methods than was often admitted. It was a conservatism which 
could be complacent and yet, at the same time,, uncomfortably aware of the 
inadequacy of older structures and practices for dealing with competition from the 
American system of manufactures. Despite The Enginee? s bluster, the combination 
of mechanisation and competition which relied on new ways of managing 
mechanisatiol'i began to force the pace of change. 
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Engineering recovered to some extent from the American machine tool invasion of 
the 1890s. But more important than the accelerating pace of mechanisation was the 
realisation of the implications for management. What we see in engineering 
therefore, growing out of the scientific-technical revolution, is the beginnings of a 
new division ofmental/manual labour, and a managerial ideology to explain, and 
justify it, which shares a common starting point with the ideas of scientific 
management as developed by Taylor. 
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Notes 
Information about scientific management in Europe is sketchy but it appears that 
Taylor's impact before 1914 was minimal, with the most significant developments taking place 
between the wars. British experience does not seem to be exceptional. For the Netherlands, John 
Armstrong: s review (1990) of E. Bloemen, Scientific Management in the Netherlands; In 
Germany, Siemens adopted Taylorist principles after the first world war (Homberg 1983); for 
France, G. C. Humpreys (1986); In Italy, Taylorism spread after the war and became prevalent in 
the 1930s, Fiat adopted a Taylorist/Fordist strategy in the'20s, Alfa Romeo, in the 30s (Bigazzi 
1986). 
According to Thoms and Donnelly (1985: 87), by the 1930s production methods at 
Morris were said to'equal best American practice, with machinery following in line according to 
the. nature of the work rather than being grouped in particular areas of the factory. 
3 It is worth noting, however, that methods of organising work were not necessarily very 
different from what they might have been had efficiency engineers designed them. Castle 
(1986: 152) notes that for the women at Courtauld'the amount of work done each day was 
recorded on a card which hung above the machines ... The chargehand would check the cards 
every day and woe betide any girl who was 'down' on the amount of work produced or had too 
much waste. 
The minutes of the Engineering Employers Federation in 1898 record a decision to 
purchase 1,500 copies of an article on piecework in Cassiers for distribution to members which 
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could have been Cassiers reprint of Tayloes'A Partial Solution to the Labour Problem', which 
appeared at about that time (EEF ý&nutes Feb. 1898; Cassiers vol. 13,1898) 
5 Gilbreth wrote a furious reply (May 1917), arguing that 'our inethods aim to increase 
interest in work as well as eliminate waste and accusing The Engineer of being against training 
and progress. In reply, the editor simply noted that Mr. Gilbreth had enclosed a circular on 
simplified spelling! 
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Chapter 2 Scientific Management Practice to 1921 
Chapter I showed how British engineers identified Taylorism as an extension of the 
technical and managerial changes taldng place in British industry. In this chapter I 
review the evidence for scientific management practice in the period from the turn 
of the century to the boom fqllowing the first world war and show that while there 
were few explicitly Taylorist experiments before 1914, there is evidence of 
changing management practice sufficient to prepare the ground for the conversion 
of the engineering establishment to scientific management during the first world 
war. 
I also explore the relationship between Taylorism and premium bonus and discuss 
the effects of war-time dilution and the spread of systems of payment by results. I 
argue that although premium bonus could not be equated with scientific 
management, it came out of the same stable and in the hands of employers like 
Rowan was used in much the same way. The war popularised scientific 
management which reached a peak of influence during the short lived post-war 
boom With the slump in 1921 attention shifted away from broad principles to 
discussion of specific practices such as the role of planning departments and of 
time study. 
Scientific Management before the War 
There were early British theorists and managers who contributed, in more or less 
signifýcant ways, to the development of modem management thought and practice. 
Garcke and Fells who published their Factory Accounts in 1887 and Slater Lewis,, 
the general manager at a Salford Rolling Mill, who published The Commercial 
Organisation ofFactories in 1896, are frequently cited (Urwick 193 8: 3 7; Hom 
78 
1983: 9). There were others like Francis G. Burton, whose Commercial 
Management ofEngineering Works (1898) discussed in detail the role of managers 
and accountants, systems for handbng orders, invoices and estimating labour costs. 
But it remains true that there are no British theorists of scientific management to 
place alongside Taylor, Gilbreth or Gantt; no British showplace of scientific 
management in action Eke the Tabor Manufacturing ConVany, and no *industry of 
efficiency engineers comparable to that which grew up in America. And this 
remains true even for the inter-war years despite the best efforts of manufacturers 
like Renold, or of the industrial psychologists from the National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology, or engineers from the Bedaux company. 
On one view then there was little or no scientific management practice in Britain 
before the first world war. According to Henry Atkinson (1919), author of a 
lengthy series of articles explaining and advocating scientific management, only one 
firm in Britain had adopted the system prior to the war. And as late as 1917 
Engineering, although now claiming that scientific management wasmerely a 
development of a British system! (Dec. 1917), could not give a detailed account of 
an application in any important establishment. Even Urwick writing in 1938 found 
it I impossible to present any quantitative analysis of the degree to which modem 
methods of management have penetrated British business practice' (Urwick 
1938: 79). 
However, judgements about the significance of scientific management before 1914 
depend, to some extent, on whether a broader or a narrower view of scientific 
management is adoptedl. 'Me British efficiency engineer, Alexander Hamilton 
Church, who left Britain to practise in America, defined scientific management as 
the planning of industrial activity and the predetermination of standards of 
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efficiency. If Church was right, retorted an engineering critic, P Ballard, there was 
nothing new about scientific management and no need for its so-called body of 
principles. The modem tendency towards monopoly and the substitution of co- 
operation for competition led to 'the centralisation of management, and that 
because of this huge centralisation the discussion of "Scientific Management" 
springs into prominence' (1911). There is certainly more evidence of scientific 
management in ChurcWs sense than examples of the direct application of Taylor's 
principles. 
However, Engineering might have cited scientific management at Renold, for 
which Kreis (1990) has provided a detailed account for the period between 19 10 
and 1920. Systematic time study began with AlbnghanYs appointment as 
'production consultant' in 1911, and in the following year, a Production Study 
Department was established with Allingham now described as the Chief Production 
Engineer. By 1915 time study had been applied in nearly every department of the 
Manchester works, not only to find how long a job should take, but also to find the 
best methods of doing it (Kreis 1990: 136). A complex bonus scheme and labour 
grading scheme was adopted with a steep rise in rewards as efficiency approached - 
100%, and an experiment conducted with functional foremanship before it was 
abandoned for a line and staff modeL 
Charles Renold's own account states that'In 1912 methods of "Scientific 
Management" were introduced after an investigation in USA of the work of F. W. 
Taylor. By 1913 Organisation Charts were in fidl use, setting out the structure of 
the businesg and the delegation of authority (Renold 1950: 14). Interestingly 
ough though, Renold! s account makes it clear that a number of key en 4g, 
developments took place before 1912. By the end of 1909 a Central ýOffice 
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established by Charles Renoldý busily engaged in 'helping father'. 'had become the 
nerve centre of the whole business! and the starting point of a longer term 
reorganisation of management, developing fimctional specialisation at a number of 
levels. Renold records that 'a movement which began with attention focused on 
speeding up individual workers ended with attention focused on management and 
the means of control, coupled with great attention to the relationship between, 
management and workers. In our experience these latter developments far 
outweigh in their contribution to efficiency the original ones! (quoted in Kreis 
1990: 115). 
Renold was exceptional. There does not appear to be any other account of self- 
consciously scientific management practice before the first world war, though in 
addition to Renold, Urwick (1938) cites as a'complete application'the firm Taylor, 
Taylor and Hobson, lens and optical instrument makers from Leicester, where the 
Halsey premium system, job cards and time study was introduced after 1900. A 
number of others, including Dunlop Rubber, Arthur H. Lee and Sons, and Mavor 
- and 
Coulson began a reorganisation before 1914'wbich was completed during or 
after the war. 
Elsewhere the evidence is fragmentary, but there are traces of scientific 
management practice. At Hopkinson! s Valve Works at Huddersfield in 1905, 'Tlie 
card system is adopted throughout' and 'no instruction passes from the office to the 
foreman or the men without thenY. Hopkinson's foundry, though not the i 
works, implemented the differential rate, described as a system'introduced from 
the United States into several works in this countrý (Engineering Sept. 1905). If 
T-X- 
Hopkinson was not typical neither was it an isolated example. A- P. Loscher told 
the Manchester Association of Engineers in 1901 that his firm used the card system 
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and the differential rate with rates fixed by 'scientific methods' (Loscher 190 1). He 
expressed surprise that such methods were not more universally adopted in Brit 
and was told, by I Collier, that modem methods were more widespread than the 
author seemed to think. 
Elements of scientific management were also apparent in chan 'i workshop and ging 
manufacturing practice more generally, from the team system of the Bristol boot 
and shoe industry (Hobsbawm 1976) to the more advanced engineering and motor 
companies making extensive use ofjigs and producing interchangeable parts along 
repetition lines. At Daimler even the chassis for the king's car'in no way strikingly 
differs from the rest of the chassis in the shop' (University ofBirmingham 
Engineering Journal April 1903). It was implicit too in the subdivision of 
processes and use of automatic machinery, described by Edward Cadbury, which 
had almost eliminated any demand for initiative from workers (Cadbury 1912: 20). 
We know too that American influence was siýcant. Americans were vAling 
teachers as well as competitors. 'The charming openness of American engineers - in 
affording every facility for competitors to go freely through their workshops! was 
frequently remarked on (Wood 190 1). British engineers were not slow to take 
advantage of American hospitality. It was estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 
engineers ftom. various institutes would visit America in 1904, a figure which took 
no account of those making individual arrangements (Engineering April 1904). 
Among the latter, before and after the first world war, were nearly all the leading 
enmloyers including Austin, Morris and Herbert. Oliver Lucas! trips to America X- 
were found to be so profitable to the firm that they became an annual pilgrimage. 
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And if there was no systematic time study before the war, there were plenty of 
complaints about rate fixers and 'the method of speeding up by means of an army 
of non-productive officials' (Engineering Sept. 1912). Francis Burton had referred 
to piecework rates being fixed by the works manager'or by a department under his 
immediate direction if the analytical piecework system, is adopted' (1898). At 
Bournville, time study sought to establish the best methods to be chosen as 
0& standard 'with others taught to follow it' (Cadbury 1912: 141). J. E. Prosser of the 
Works Organisation Department, and management representative on the piece 
rates and grading committee, would probably have distinguished piecework at 
BournviUe from scientific management which he defined as a process which set the 
task for the worker to achieve as well. as the time allowed on the job, but the 
distinction is hardly fundamental (Prosser 1919; Rowlinson 1988). 
At G. and J. Weir, standardisation and the use of automatic machinery went 
together with time study and the use of the premium bonus scheme. Machinery was 
not grouped by type 'but rather into departments in which each distinctive part of a 
pump could be completed' (Engineering June 190 1). McKinlay argues that 
management at Weir's was unsophisticated because the piecework system was 
- administered by Weir together with five men and two boys (1986). But this does 
not seem particularly significant. Taylor himself had suggested that most places 
would only need one man for a rate-fixing department, and he would not need to 
give over his whole time to it ( 18 9 5). 
There were efficiency experts too. Allingham, Renold's Production Consultant, had 
conducted experiments at Brown and Sharpe Automatic Screw Machines in 
Manchester in 1913 (Allingham 1919). From Renold, Affingham moved to 
Armstrong VAiitworth and such experts were quick to defend scientific 
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management from criticism in the pages of the technical press (Engineering, Aug. 
1912, Sept. 1912, July 1913). New techniques in cost accounting were also being 
developed which moved away ftom simply recording production costs to analysing 
costs in the search for economies as part of the process of planning production 
(Engineering Feb. 1913). Standard costing 'developed as part of the'scientific 
management' movement' (Parker 1969: 22). If it had to wait until the 1920s to 
receive serious academic attention from the economists, and many engineers too, it 
nevertheless formed part of the discussion of workshop practice before the war. 
Writing before the war as'an old workman! about the'madness! of a generalised 
demand for the eight hour day, T. Good acknowledged that hours of work were 
bound up with the question of speeding up: 'The old slack methods of workshop 
management, under which men could invariably take things easy before breakfast, 
and enjoyed frequent rest times between jobs without loss of pay, have been 
superseded by American methods of hustle' (1913). Two years into the war, Good .r 
again drew attention to speed-up from the turn of the century, to 'the new 
machines, new processes, and new methods of workshop management., which have 
resulted in the men having to work much hardef (1916). Workshops, he argued, 
had been Americanised in methods but not in pay. 
Premium Bonus 
into Americanised workshops, alongside the new tools and forms of management 
organisation, new payment systems were being introduced from the turn of the 
century. Most noticeable was the spread of piecework. The number of fitters and 
turners, on piecework rose from around 6% in 1886 to 46% of fitters and 37% of 
turners before the outbreak of the first world war (Jefferys 1945: 126). Piecework 
had been around for a long time - Marx called it the system'most in harmony with 
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the capitalist mode of production! (1977: 52 1) - but many of the new schemes took 
the form of premium bonus or efficiency systems, sometimes backed by more 
rigorous analysis of productive time, but in any case more often linked to new 
instructions from the office, more tightly defined tasks, and new forms of 
supervisory authority in the form of rate fixers, progress chasers and feed and 
speed men. 
The two main forms of premium bonus system worked in Britain were those 
associated with David Rowan and G. and I Weir Ltd. Weir's system was similar to 
that of Halsey and relatively straightforward. The worker was credited with half 
the time saved on a job (Halsey usually paid a third) in the form of a premium For 
example, if a job was allocated 100 hours and completed in 5 0, the worker would 
be paid 75 hours at the agreed time rate. The Rowan system was more 
complicated. The worker received in bonus the same percentage of his hourly rate 
as the proportion of time saved. Ten percent time saved on a job was rewarded 
with a 10% increase in the hourly rate spent completing it, the bonus being arrived 
at by multiplying the time saved by time taken, divided by the time allowed. All ' 
such bonus schemes were regressive, that is to say, the worker's bonus earnings 
failed to rise in the same proportion as the increase in output, while unit labour 
costs fell for the employer. All were described as gain sharing plans, so called 
because the benefit of increased output was shared between worker and employer. 
Ile major difference between Weir and Rowan was the pattern of bonus earnings - 
the shape of the bonus curve - as worker output increased. With the Halsey/Weir 
scheme, bonus earnings rose more slowly to the point at which half the time 
allowed for the job was saved, but could continue to rise thereafter without limit. 
Rowan provided more rapid returns to the half way point but with sharply 
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diminishing returns thereafter and with something less than double earnings as a 
bonus ceiling (Cole 1918; The Engineer 1917). 
The TUC enquiry in 19 10 revealed that premium bonus chiefly affected the 
enlpneenng and related trades, especially ordnance, motors, and locomotive and 
electrical engineering Where rep etition work is the rule' (The Engineer March 
19 10). At that time only a little over 9% of the ASE's membership were on 
premium bonus (McLaine 1944: 634; Jefferys 1945: 126; Littler 1982: 85). EEF 
figures for men in engine shops in 192 1, the last year for which numbers on 
premium bonus are cited separately from'payment by results, suggest that a little 
under 7% of the workforce were on premium bonus (eef/237/13/3/4). 
But these figures may seriously underestimate the extent of the system before the 
war. Detailed returns from 90% of the federated firms for 1914 show 18% of 
CAA 
nuers and 16% of turners, 28% of grinders and 34% of millers, on premium bonus. 
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Table 1 Premium Bonus in Engineering, 1914 
Trades Total Time Piece Premium %age %age %age 
Work Work Bonus Time piece premium 
AliUer 2798 889 957 952 32 34 34 
Grinder 1688 698 520 479 41 31 28 
Slotter 1840 850 539 451 46 29 25 
Machine Men 7316 2150 3515 1651 29 48 23 
Borer 2146 1244 492 410 58 23 19 
Fitter 36117 21855 7785 6477 61 22 18 
Tumer 15863 8697 4588 2578 55 29 16 
Lab ourer 23095 21856 804 433 95 3 2 
Pattem M 4369 4164 87 118 95 2 3 
Millwright 1352 1275 2 77 94 0 6 
Smiths 3016 1927 855 234 65 28 
All figures to the nearest whole number 
Source: eeF237/13/3/3 
Premium Bonus and Taylorism 
But was premium bonus a form of scientific management? Cole (1918) 
distinguishes premium bonus from efficiency systems on the grounds that the 
former were not based on a scientific method of fiydng prices. There is little doubt 
that premium bonus was adopted in Britain precisely because it was seen as a 
safeguard against inadequate rate-fixing standards. The Engineer, with 
characteristic conservatisn4 saw premium bonus as an opportunity to put the rate- 
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fb6ng department, 'the other dreaded accompaniment of the premium systeny, in its 
place (April 1902). And William Rowan Thompson, one of the leading advocates 
of premium bonus, told the Institute of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland that 
the system of brealdng jobs into elements for the purposes of fi)dng times was too 
elaborate, 'it is magnificent but it is not business! 
1 
(eeF237/3/l/205). 
But Taylor himself distinguished his system from the Towne-Halsey pre i 
bonus plan on different grounds. In his system, time study was to be used to find a 
fair days work for a first class man and a bonus system constructed to deliver it. 
Halsey's system might use time study but 'Under the Towne-Halsey plan the 
management gives up all direct effort to reach this quickest time, but offers mild 
inducements to the workmen to do so, and turns over the whole enterprise to them! 
(1947: 5 9). Halsey was just as concerned to distinguish himself from Taylor and 
wrote to rebuke George Barnes of the ASE, and The Engineer, for describing the 
Taylor-Gantt system at Bethlehem Steel as a premium plan (The Engineer Apzil 
1902). But Halsey did not call time study into question. Moreover, Taylor seemed 
to think that -'It 
is task management which is in use in England, not the Towne- 
Halsey system... ' And that people using the two systems were confused about 
them, 'TIds is practiCially true in England, where in some cases task management is 
actuafly being used under the name of the Premium Plan' (1947: 43). Nor were the 
Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades in any doubt where premium 
bonus originated and denounced it asan adaptation of the most pernicious and 
degrading condition of employment in modem industrial history - the task work 
system! (eef/237/3/l/204). 
The distinction between rate ffiCing as a loose form of estimating and time and 
motion study is important - tune and motion study was the decisive innovation of 
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scientific management and one that linked new ways of managing labour to wider 
forms of production management. However, such categories should not be treated 
too rigidly. The distinctions in practice between rate fixing, systematic time study 
and modem work study are bluffed at the edges as one merges into another. 
Taylor's 'task management' is distinguished from Halsey's premium bonus by the 
figour with which the 'task' is set and the way the task is rewarded, not by the idea 
of task management as such. Both premium bonus and Taylor's differential rate 
scheme set a task in the sense that each offered a given bonus reward for a defined 
level of performance. Indeed, so did many piecework schemes in which the 
pieceworker was expected to earn a third more than the time rate for a given 
output. Taylor demanded the achievement of his scientifically determined task 
before bonus was earned (the differential rate), but Gantt's task and bonus and 
Emerson! s efficiency scheme, both of which must qualify as scientific task 
management, softened Taylors formula by providing graded bonus returns as 
'financial inducementsto meet the task. To this extent the distinction between 
Halsey and Taylor, where both use time study and are linked to the wider changes 
in technology and management taking place at the same time, is one of degree. 
To argue as much is not to underestimate the importance of the difference between 
them Kreis goes too far in arguing that'premium bonus was merely another name 
for scientific management' ( 1990: 9 5). Littler is surely right to emphasise that 
premium bonus represented only the beginnings of a shift to formal standards of 
effort, the beginnings of task measurement and the increased observability of work 
behaviour (1982: 88). ne problem with Littlers account is that it distinguishes 
premium bonus too sharply from scientific management because of the primitive 
nature of its time study procedures. Consequently Littler looks backwards to the 
break up of subcontracting to which premium bonus was not really connected at 
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all, and leaps forward from premium bonus to Bedaux between the wars, missing 
out important developments in time study finked to more traditional piecework 
schemes. Ironically, one American authority described Bedaux as'a special 
application of the principle of the Halsey premium plan' because part of bonus 
earnings were distributed to supervision just as premium bonus earnings were 
shared with the employer (Diemar 1930: 36). 
If premium bonus and its rate-ffidng procedures looked crude in comparison with 
what Taylor was doing, it was often distinctly advanced in comparison with past 
practice. Despite its compromised time-study standards, premium bonus was still 
widely associated with repetition work, was defended by employers who used it on 
much the same grounds as those who defended scientific management, and 
attracted the same sort of criticism that Taylorism did for being inapplicable to 
British conditions. It was a system from across the Atlantic and associated in 
people's minds with the flood of literature on'the equipment and organisation of 
engmeering works' (The Engineer Sept. 190 1). 
Work Standards and Time Study 
Premium bonus, Eke Taylor's plan, was designed to tackle what Taylor called 
soldiering and what was described in Britain as ca'canny, or deliberate restriction of 
output. A number of sources point to the paradox of increased intensity of work 
and falling labour productivity in the closing decades of the 19th century 
(Hobsbawm 1976; Steams 1975; Brown 1977). Certainly this period saw a 
sustained campaign by employers against restriction of output and an ideological 
campaign against'the lump of labour fallacy. TIle problem with day work, wrote 
Cassiers, was that workers slowed down, 'In individual cases a marvellous facility 
is sometimes developed in keeping a job going for an extraordinary tiane' (1892 vol. 
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1). The way to raise wages, Engineering told the workers opposed to piecework, 
is to raise the efficiency of the labourer (Aug. 189 1). If we could get as much work 
out of the worker as the Americans do, The Engineer declared in 1894, 'English 
employers might even accept the seven hour day with equanimity' (March 1894). 
And in the year that Alexander Hamilton Church called for'a campaign to convert 
the British artisan to a. proper appreciation of the true principles of progress! 
(190 1), Edwin Pratt's series appeared in the Times attacldng trade union 
restrictions on output for causing a crisis in British industry (Brown 1977: 116). 
The difference between premhim bonus and Taylorism, as well as their common 
purpose in attempting to seize control of work standards, was neatly demonstrated 
by Carl Barth in his re-statement of Taylors attack on the Halsey scheme. 
Comparing Halsey and Rowan on the one hand and Taylor and Gantt on the other, 
Barth argued that the worker would soon discover that. the Rowan plan was 
designed as a means of making him'disclose the real time required for the 
execution of a piece of work about which the management has shown its con3plete 
ignorance'. Ile different ways such schemes had of relating rewards to the 
accomplishment of the task were of secondary importance, 'The important matter is 
to abandon the old way of guessing at the time it takes to do a piece of work, and 
earnestly get to work to obtain scientific methods for the determination of the best 
time in which work can be done, and on the strength of this set ourselves and our 
employees a definite task to accomplish each day as so strenuously recommended 
by M-r Taylor' (Barth 19 10). Barth underestimated the role of time study in 
premium systems but his characterisation of Rowan is interesting since, while time 
study is the supposedly scientific way to disclose the real time required for the 
execution of a piece of work, the ends are clearly identical. And it was precisely for 
this reason that workers resented the threat of premium bonus. 
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It explains why, for example, despite the fierce opposition to premium bonus there 
were also fears that once established the scheme might be abolished! The ASE had 
insisted in Clause 4 of the CarlWe memorandum that no firm should establish a 
premium bonus system without intending to adhere to it. The fear was that the 
system would be introduced'to find out what workers could do and the firm. would 
then revert to day work but demand the same performance level of its employees. 
Ile system, argued the ASE official James Ratcliffe in conference with Armstrong 
VAitworth, was only a way of seeing what a man could do under pressure, an 
accusation he repeated in conference with another North East Coast firm, Central 
Marine, in July 1902. In 1904 the ASE coraplained that the system had been 
abandoned at Kerr, Stewart and Co. at Stoke on Trent and that the company had 
reverted to piecework. Tte following year the ASE lodged a similar complaint 
against William Muir in Manchester (eeF237/3/l/204). 
If employers wanted premium bonus to attack the output restriction of day work, 
they also offered the new system as a way of avoiding rate cutting. The problem of 
piecework, all agreed, was that as output rose, piecework prices were cut. At a 
time when changes in machinery, tools and methods made it even more difficult 
than usual to determine what constituted a fair day's work, premium bonus seemed 
to offer a way of estabhshing new standards of perforniance at ii risk. 
But if premium bonus compensated for rough and ready rate fi7dng it nevertheless 
entailed new attention to work standards and time study. In a series of articles on 
premiwn b6nus and efficiency for the International Engineering Congress at 
Glasgow in 190 1, the leading advocates of premium. bonus stressed the importance 
of accurate data for time keeping and cost purposes generated by the systemý the 
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links between premium bonus, standardisation and proper tooling, as well as 
making reference to the experience at Bethlehem Steel and Taylor's work (Rowan 
1901; Thompson 1901; Weir and Richmond 1901). Rowan! s paper on the 
premium system three years later advised employers to establish a separate rate- 
fbdng departmqnt and not to rely on times already established or reported by the 
men. 'Data should be gathered systematically and with great care', Rowan argued, 
and a time established for each of the elements of the operation. Moreover, in an 
indication of quite advanced thhAdng on time study, he argued that the time should 
be fixed as if the work were being done on the best machine with all the 
appropriate equipment and with allowances being added to compensate for a lack 
of such standardisation (Rowan 1903). These were Taylors ideas filtered through a 
particular British experience. 
It is true that time study remained underdeveloped. As late as 1918 Cassiers was 
complaining that very few works made adequate provision for it (March 1918). 
But something approaching systematic time study was certainly carried on at 
companies like Renold and Cadbury; almost certainly too at A- P. Loscher's 
company, at Hopldnsoes Valve where the differential rate was used, and at those 
companies where premium bonus approximated to the practice described by 
Rowan. At Central Marine on the North East Coast data had been gathered over a 
three year period to support it, more than a little excessive if they were simply 
based on existing practice (eef/237/3/l/204). The foreman based piecework prices 
or times on past practice and experience. Increasingly, rate fixers did not. The 
labour element in any job was problematic. But rate fDCmg was becommg more 
sophisticated on machine cycle times and these constituted an increasingly 
important element in the struggle over worldng time (pagot 1908). Post-war 
discussion snowed a shift away from premium bonus as confidence in accurate rate 
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ý fbing grew, and rate fixing was not a product of the war. It had been growing 
steadilY throughout the period to 1914. 
In the discussion of Rowan! s paper, Professor Barr, of Barr and Stroud,, attempted 
to play down the clerical costs of introducing premium bonus, a feature t: hat 
attracted frequent criticism (The Engineer April 1903). But the burden of his 
argument was that the premium systembrought management into touch with the 
methods of the workshop'Which increased knowledge of costs and led to fimther 
changes in methods and design. Although William Rowan nonapson had described 
Taylor type time study as'magnificent but not business!, he favoured careful 
analysis and comparison of accumulated data in setting times and argued that 'by 
far the greatest benefit to the employer is one that has to be experienced to be 
realised, and that is the amazing defects and short comin s, hitherto unsuspected 
which it brings to light in the general Management and Organisation of an 
Estabhshment'(eef237/3/l/205). In particular the job progress card, made out by 
the rate-fixing department, provided a great deal of useful management 
information. Premium bonus was not simply another form of piecework incentive. 
It was the product of changes in workshop organisation and tied in to- wider 
managerial change. 
Managerial Strategies and Worker Resistance 
The TUC protested that premium bonus undermined craftsmanship. Resistance was. 
certainly strongest in the older, established engineering centres of the North and 
the system spread fastest among the newer machine shop trades like millin and 
grinding, and in the newer industrial centres. In 1913, less than 7% of the 7,000 
fitters and turners on the North East Coast, where a considerable struggle had 
taken place, were on premium bonus compared with 43% in Coventry and London 
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(eef237/13/3/4). But what was undermining the craftsman was the combination of 
processes which included premium bonus alongside the machine question, rate 
fi., dng, job cards with feed and speed instructions and so on. The employers 
themselves rarely brought all these things together in a concerted offensive, and 
workers responded to a fragmented agenda in a piecemeal fashion. 
At the Elswick works of Armstrong Whitworth there were complaints that 'lads' 
were being set to work against the men to compare their speed with the 
journeymen, and that men who were unable to reduce bonus times were being 
discharged (eef/237/3/l/204). At the British United Shoe Machinery Co. in 
Leicester in 1914 there were complaints that premium bonus on capstan lathes was 
being worked at lower day rates, and of substitution of 'lower rated men for fully 
skilled men' (eef/237/3/l/205). But worker complaints about premium bonus were 
overwhelmingly about output targets which primarily concerned money and fears 
for employment. Ile response was largely a pragmatic one. 'At Barrow', reported 
Cole, '. the workman has usually been able to earn a good percentage on his day 
rate, because the time allowances give a good margin. This being so, he has not 
bothered his head, as a rule, about the fundamental justice or injustice of the system 
- under which he is working' (1918: 53). 'Me fact is that it was extremely difficult for 
conventional forms of trade union organisation and bargaiiiing to deal with the 
inter-relationships between different aspects of change. At Coventry Chain, Ryder, 
for the ASE, disputed the reduction of time aflowances Mowing the subdivision of 
jobs - the separation of roughing from finishing operations - on the view that the 
Carlisle Memorandum on premium bonus did not treat subdivision of labour as an 
improvement in methods of manufacture (eeF237/3/l/205). An inconclusive 
argument followed which Ryder could only try to resolve by asidng for greater 
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consideration for the man doing the finishing operation. Ile treatment of 
subdivided labour was the issue, not the subdivision itself 
Management tactics in introducing premium bonus were often extremely crude. At 
Browetts in 1902 Barnes omplained that'there are several men, who at the end 'Of 
I 
the week found small sums of money in their boxes more than they expected, and 
when they asked what it meant were told that they were working under the 
Premium Bonus System!. The firm blamed the day man for &iling to inform his 
mate on the nightshift! In the same year James Ratcliffe complained to the North 
East Coast Engineering employers that a number of firms were putting money into 
the men's boxes without telling them (eef/237/3/l/204). It all seems a far cry from a 
system that could provide an incentive to increase output. Cole suggests that this 
tactic of treating the bonus as an ex-gratia payment was designed to avoid any 
commitment to collective bargahiing, and although partly rectified by the Carlisle 
agreement, complaints continued that not only did employees not understand the 
system, but that they were kept in the dark about time aflowances on jobs and were 
unable to distinguish weekly pay from bonus earnings. In 1911 only half the firms 
making returns on the Tyne issued pay notes of any description to pieceworkers 
(eef237/3/l/204). 
The EEF certainly made a determined attempt to evade colIective bargaining on the 
essentials of premium bonus. At Vickers in Barrow, in 1909, the ASE asked for 
details of the times set by the rate fixer and for details of the methods the rate fixer 
had used in amving at them The company replied that details of the job were 
already provided on the job card but 'they considered it impossible for workmen to 
become sufficiently expert to determine whether the time values were correct or 
not'. Vickers were worried that if the unions succeeded in their aim of 
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'standardising basis times!, the job of the rate fixer would be made more difficult. 
The EEF agreed and wrote to the company telling them that 'If you agree to what 
the men now request you would very much affect the status of the Rate Fixing 
department and would probably increase your troubles instead of diminishing them' 
(eeF237/3/l/205). Similarly, in 1911 the EEF was resisqing the establishment of 
shop committees in connection with premium bonus because 'no matter what their 
fimction might be originally, that function would soon extend to the negotiation 
and fixing of basis hours' (EEF Minutes Feb. 1911). Throughout the EEF 
maintained the position that mutual agreement could only apply between the 
employer and his workmen. It could not be a matter for the union. 
This policy was clearly intended to confront the individual worker with the power 
of the employer and on countless unrecorded occasions the results must have been 
highly satisfactory for the latter. In a rare letter from a pieceworker to the 
engineenng press in 1923,1 Taylor complained that only 10% of the men in any 
shop were on paying jobs. Working piecework was physically exhausting and led 
to selfish-behaviour with tools being stolen or hidden. Pieceworkers were often kid 
off and men on day rates put on the job who were required to meet the same 
output (The Engineer Nov. 1923). However, the EEFs position could not prevent 
some form of bargaining taking place. A number of central conferences on 
premium bonus issues were held, particularly in the Barrow District 
(eef/237/3/l/205). At the Phoenix Dynamo Co. in Bradford, disputedjob, times 
could go to a joint union-management committee (Goodrich 1975: 170). And at 
Vickers in 1918 an Appeals Section was established, with shop steward 
representation, to hear disputes over job times which dealt with 194 cases between 
January and September of 1918 (eef/237/3/l/206). 
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In fact, the attitude of the EEF may have encouraged the very thing employers 
feared most, that shop floor workers would react to unacceptable job times simply 
by slowing down. Rowan abandoned the practice of paying the premium in steps of 
5% because the men had worked out whether or not they could make the next 
bonus payment and if they could not, made the job last (Rowan 1903). As premium 
bonus spread during the war' so did criticism that its regressive feature, far from 
safeguarding the employer, only led to renewed restriction of output. A 
correspondent pointed out to The Engineer in 1917 that the systernwas not as 
perfect as you would have us believe'. The return to the worker fell after saving 
50% of the time but 'if the men are awake, they take care not to reach this point. 
They figure it aH out to a half penny' (Jan. 1917). 
Workers could not defeat premium bonus but they could secure better times, fight 
for more generous allowances, appeal to the foreman against the rate fixer, and if 
necessary, spm a job out until something better came along. In 1900 the EEF 
requested the Executive Council of the ASE to ensure that the local opposition to 
piecework at Thwaites in Bradford would be dropped. It was a request which had 
to be repeated in 1902 and it wasn't until March 1903 that the EEF reported that 
Ilwaites had established piecework 'on their own lines' (EEF Miautes March 
1903). The struggle over premium bonus before the first world war, and over 
Bedaux between the wars, was a struggle on the one side against degrading 
systems of employment - systems which were justified from the other side as the 
means to secure lasting class co-operation through increased prosperity. But most 
of the time such perspectives, and the class antagonisms which lay behind them, 
were only hazily grasped. From day to day, the struggle for authority and control 
within the labour process was conducted, in Price's words, 'in the continual search 
from both sides for a better bargaiif (1983: 62). 
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The bnpact of War 
The war is often seen as a turning point, a decisrive break in the development of 
production methods and management, dziven by the needs of the munitions 
industry and dilution of labour (Burgess 1980: 166; Pollard 1983: 53). There, is 
some truth in this but matters were not quite so simple. The war created an 
artificial mass market for goods and pressure for repetition methods which 
legitimised scientific management. In that sense the war settled many of the 
uncertainties and hesitancies of the pre-war period. But it also exposed the 
conservatism of British employers, and with the passing of the artificial conditions 
created by war, British business reverted to a slower path of development along 
lines already apparent before 19142. 
ne state played a central role as catalyst in war-titne business and management 
change through the dilution programme, the spread of premium bonus and the 
establishment of the industrial Fatigue Research Board, as weU as the activities of 
the Reconstruction Council. Surprisingly, Lewchuk (1984) finds otherwise. 
Indeed, he argues that 'state intervention during the war moved the British 
economy away from the unilateral management control strategy of Fordism and 
scientific management'. Reid (1985) too argues that government appeased labour, 
and that government departments were divided over dilution and at odds with 
conservative employers resisting the rationalisation of labour. But Lewchules 
argument depends on the misconception that Fordism and Taylorism required 
unilateral control when scientific managers in America and Britain quickly oriented 
themselves to winmi g trade union support whatever Taylor's early prejudices 
(Nadworny 19 5 5; Atkinson 1919). And while Reid rightly draws attention to 
employer conservatism and Admiralty manoeuvres designed to retain sbIled labour 
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in the shipyards, the state forced the pace on dilution as long as the production of 
munitions demanded it. 
The focus of much of war-time production management discussion, and the single 
most dramatic change in the workshops, centred on the employment of women. 
The pre-war machine question which so agitated industrial relations in engineering, 
and which rumbled on throughout the inter-war years, disappears completely 
during the war to be replaced by struggles over the dilution of labour. The two 
issues are intimately related but they can be distinguished. Ile threat of 
mechanisation to the skilled worker lay in breaking the job down into simpler 
elements to be allocated to cheaper, semi-skilled labour. But particular struggles 
over new machinery did not always present this issue so bluntly. It might only mean 
a question of who would operate the new machinery to do much the same work, or 
to work on processes altered in relatively minor ways. Dilution using female labour 
was an extension of the processes of specialisation and niechanisation but involved 
immediate job fragmentation and new work processes, together with associated 
changes in training, supervision and management. At the same time dilution implied 
certain limits, most obviously in the temporary circumstances created by war, but 
also in deeply rooted prejudices against the employment of women on'men! s worle. 
In other words, dilution exposed the fragile claims of craft and confirmed the 
potential of new production methods but in circumstances where neither the threat 
nor the promise could be realised in full. 
Before the war ended more than three quarters of a million women were employed 
in the engineering industry and allied metal trades, including a variety of machine 
processes such as drilling, tapping,, millin , slotting, boring and shaping (Rowe 
1928: 147; Ministry of Munitions 1917: 19). The Engineer found the effect of 
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women in the workshops 'astonishing', and not only when employed on repetition 
work. They had shown themselves capable of performing operations hitherto 
'carried out exclusively by men' (Aug. 1915). Engineering was similarly impressed, 
commenting that 'T'he ability of women to do work that was previously exclusively 
done by men has been one of the outstanding revelations of the war' (June 1917). 
In fact, women did not so much do the work that sIdIled men had previously done 
as parts of it. As the Ministry of Munitions pointed out, Vhere the work is sIdRed, 
the operations are usually subdivided, and the women do the simplest work, and 
always under the supervision of skilled men ... In this sense, the processes done by 
women are dissimilar to those done by skilled men' (1917: 19). T'here were, of 
course, examples which could be cited of women on fully sIdMed work, and where 
semi-skilled processes were involved, the employment of women might lead to 
little change. But if women rarely replaced skilled men directly, the dilution 
commi sioners were quick to point out that the 'war experience with women in 
engmeenng works has entirely destroyed all preconceived ideas as to what 
constituted "skilled work... (Morgan 1918). 
- And the revelation of what women could do was quickly connected to Taylorism. 
The training programme of the Ministry of Munitions, argued Engineering, was 
'only carrying further the principle of specialisation, which is the prominent feature 
in all modem manufacturing operations. For a long time the sphere of each man's 
work has been steadily narrowing and the calls on his resource and originality 
dwindling until, under the Taylor systemý the man becomes an automaton, who 
gets through a prescribed cycle in so many seconds and then begins afresh. The 
manufacture of munitions lends itself admirably to such a system... ' (June 1916). 
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But despite claims by industrialists like Sir William Beardmore that women 
workers'in all cases produced more than double that by thoroughly trained 
mechanics - members of the trade unions - working the same machines under the 
same conditions! (Beardmore 1916), women left, or were expelled from the 
workshops in large numbers at the end of the-war. By 1921 the number of females 
engaged in the manufacture of metals, machines, implements and conveyances had 
fallen to 221,000 (Rowe 1928: 157). Across the economy as a whole the story was 
broadly the same. Tlie proportion of gainfiAly employed females stood at 30.8% in 
1911, and 32.3% in 1921 (Roberts 1988: 68). 
Employer Conservatism 
The restoration of pre-war practices owed less to trade union demands or to 
Government honouring war-time promises than employer conservatism and the 
changed economic conditions of peace. It could be difficult to persuade trade 
unionists to accept dilution, wrote a Ministry official, Ben Morgan, butthe 
employer often met dilution proposals with a blank increduhty which was beyond 
the influence or reach of reason'(1918: 53 1). The Ministry continually complained 
of employer obstruction (mun5/70/324/20). 'Trade union prejudices have 
undoubtedly been a lion in the path', commented one dilution commissioner, but 
'Bad works management in the hands of men to whom the production idea was 
totally unfamiliar has been another more serious difficulty' (Waites 1978: 17). There 
seems to have been three main sources of employer opposition: prejudice of one 
kind or another against the employment of women, an unwillingness to bear the 
increased overhead costs associated with their employment, and an inability to see 
the possibilities inherent in dilution or manage its introduction. 
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Officials of the Ministry of Munitions worked to persuade employers of the value 
of dilution and to overcome the violent prejudice against women in the workshop 
(Ba]Uie 1917)3. Sometimes that prejudice could take a simple and direct form. 
Charles Wickstead from Kettering claimed that women were not so truthfa 
honest, or reliable as men (The Engineer March 1918). - 
Sir, Alfred Herbert told the 
war cabinet that if women were cheap enough they could relieve the male worker, 
from the drudgery of routine, but 'owing to certain fimdamental differences in 
mentality it is perfectly certain that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, 
women cannot become skilled mechanics' (1919a). The miffor image of such 
prejudice was the elevation of women to a status beyond the realm of work. The 
first paper ever written (and read) by a woman to the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers, on the employment of women in munitions factories, was careful to 
warn against acquiring increased economic efficiency at the cost of physical and 
spiritual welfare because it wasthe sacred duty of the state to ensure that women 
are only used as wealth producers in so far as it does not affect the healthy 
development of the race' (Monkb se 1918). 
It is unlikely that Midland employers with a significant female workforce between 
the wars, or employers in the new light engineering industries in which women 
played a central role, spent too much time making such a calculation. But ideas 
about the proper place of women will have played a part - certainly in the common 
practice of dismissing women workers who married and in reserving certain 
occupations for men. 
The Production Idea 
There were also increased costs associated with the employment of women and 
employer fears of the loss of sIdIled men at a time of skill shortage. Women 
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supervisors were appointed to report to the foreman, setters employed to set up 
machines, and inspectors or 'viewers' appointed to check the work. Austin 
accounted for the reluctance of employers to employ women because of the 
expense of 'installing thenY, the added costs of changes in product design including 
the necessary jigs and fixtures and complaints. about quality from some 
Government departments'Who had no sympathy whatever with dilution' 
(Engineering May 1918). But of course, most of these considerations applied 
equally to the employment of semi-skilled male workers and had more to do with 
what the dilution commissioners called familiarity with theproduction idea'than 
the employment of women. 
By 1919 single purpose machine tools produced for war-time purposes were only 
fetching scrap prices as older patterns of demand were re-established. Women were 
advised that they could hardly complain if they were forced out of work. Returning 
soldiers had to have jobs and employers, once forced reluctantly down the path of 
dilution, were now free to choose in matters of works organisation'and it is only 
commercial common sense to expect them to re-organiseon the basis of adapting 
to ordinary trading conditions the best that was 4eveloped under the artificial 
conditions which have just come to an end' (Machinery June 1919; Feb. 1919). 
But if the war failed to permanently transform production organisation and 
methods, those methods were subject to a new level of critical scrutiny and 
challenge. In his inaugural address as President of the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers in 1917, Michael Longridge contrasted rule of thumb processes with the 
new approa: ch of scientific management: 
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Tliere are still shops without definite planning of the progress of the 
work, without adequate equipment of the jigs and gauges, and 
without standard shapes of tools or a tool room; where men drift 
about in search of tools and tackle, or wait in idleness for drawings 
or matedals; -where machinery is obsolete and light so bad that good, 
work could not be done if the machinery were up to date. Iley 
cannot compete in price or quality of work with those in which 
what is known as "scientific innanagement", or anything approaching 
it prevails .... (1917: 436). 
Despite employer resistance to dilution there were more and more workshops in 
which'something approaching' scientific management did prevail. Major C. W. 
nomas described the application of scientific management in a firebrick works 
(1917: 542); a paper on works organisation. at Parsons described how specification 
sheets issued by the drawing office passed through the production department 
before going to the shops (Parsons 1916: 177); Rankin described the application of 
- 
Emerson's payment system at his works (Rankin '1916); at the Lanchester works 
one of the Progress Department's jobs was to Tather' new parts through the works 
(The Engineer Feb. 1918) and an article by a senior progress section leader 
declared, p erhap s over optimistically, that 'Every engineering fwm at the present 
time has progress men, except in name, each of whom controls one or more of the 
duties that are assigned, under up-to-date systems, to the Progress Department' 
(The Engineer Dec. 1918). Responses to a paper on scientific management by 
James Richardson for the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in 1918 told a 
similar story. Mf James Andrews declared that scientific management might be new 
in name but was already practised in marine engineering. Mr John Holloway of 
North British Diesel conceded that scientific management had been neglected for 
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i too long, but not everywhere; that would be'a hibel on many finns and managers!. 
At North British Diesel there was a planning department which issued progress 
sheets, andWhere it was intended to utilise unskiRed labour the work was divided 
into unskMed jigging operations, and in that way many components which had to 
1rCII be machined to close limits could be successfidly carried out by ws]dlIed worke. 
(Cassiers 1918a). 
More generally, the war completed the conversion of a substantial part of the 
engineering establishment to scientific management4. A large section of British 
industry, argued Cassiers at the end of 1917, had learned the economic advantages 
of large output, continuous demand, standardisation and long production runs, 
automatic machinery, specialisation among workers and of 'universalising 
piecework speed' (Cassiers Engineering Monthly Dec. 1917). And in May 1917, 
W. L. Ifitchens, Chair of Cammell Laird, told the National Economy Exhibition 
that'Most people nowadays are familiar with the principles of scientific 
management so ably worked out by M-r Frederick Winslow Taylor and Mr F. B. 
Gilbreth' (Engineering May -1917). 
Payment by Results During the War 
Payment by results, and premium bonus in particular, spread more rapidly during 
the war. Although the Ministry of Munitions put no figures on it the Ministry's 
analysis of wage systems in operation between 1915 and 1918 found that premium 
bonus had been 'widely extended', and that 'notwithstanding the conservative 
tendency of many employers and the hostity of many labour organisations, this 
method of remuneration has made conspicuous progress! (Mun/5/82/342/20). One 
reason it did so was the determination of the state to press for payment by results. 
'17he Committee on Production invariably backed one such system or another in the 
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cases which came before it, one reason why the unions refused an invitation in Jan. 
1917 to participate in a joint enquiry into 'the most efficient and satisfactory system 
of payment by results'. In March 1917, the government pressed ahead with its own 
proposals and announced that'it is in the National Interest that a system of 
payment by results should be established'. Employers were required to come up 
with proposals and unions to respond. Failure to make progress was to be referred 
to an Arbitration Tribunal (Mun5/83/342/120). 
As with the period to the outbreak of war there is little evidence of payment 
systems being used directly to reconstruct the labour process along new lines 
determined by management. The massive switch to war work involving repetition 
methods and dilution was the principal focus of changing patterns of work. The 
question that dominated war-time payment by results was the familiar one of 
output standards and money, but with a war-time twist. Tie truth was that when 
almost every engineering shop in the country began to organise itself as an arsenal, 
it was, very difficult for the management to estimate the wisest rates of pay for new 
work. Iley had little or no experience on which to proceed' (Mun/5/82/342/20). In 
some cases output was increased by three or four times or even more. At 
Thorneycrofts in Basingstoke, output of back axle castings for lonies increased six 
fold and management responded, as they did elsewhere, by introducing trivial 
changes in methods to justify cuts in piecework prices (eeF237/3/l/206). The 
earnings of semi-skiUed workers outstripped those of skilled men. At G. and I 
Weir there was trouble when skilled men were transferred from repetition work to 
skilled work and were confronted with a cut in earnings from around O-VO to L2 
2s 9d a week (Mun/5/82/342/20). In other cases, semi-skiUed men on piecework 
refused to be upgraded to tool setters for the same reason. 
107 
There were cases though when the implementation of a new system of payment by 
results, particularly where systematic time study was used, involved a more 
deliberate attempt to re-model the work process. An unusually detailed and frank 
example of this was described by R. Ranldn to the Junior Institution of Engineers 
in 1916 (1916: 337). The payment system was one designed by Harrington 
Emerson, with bonus calculations made on time taken rather than time saved. The 
bonus rate was one hours pay and bonus rose from nil to 20% of the bonus rate 
when the job was completed in the time allowed and remained at that rate whatever 
finther reduction in time taken was achieved. The men weren't supposed to 
understand it. In Rankin! s opinion'the system was far more successful in operation 
than any system would have been which they could have understood thoroughly'. 
Stop-watch studies were carried out 'as in Taylor's system of scientific management 
but without excessive attention being paid to smaR details on account of the 
urgency of the matter. Operations were analysed to see if they took too long, if lu 
they were unnecessary, or to see if they'could be done by boys or unsIdUed labour. 
In so doing, Rankin encountered resistance from the foreman and the unions. 
In one example cited a job was broken down into skilled and unskilled elements 
with the latter allocated to boys. The number of pieces per hour increased from 
2.37 to between II and 12, with labour costs falling by 63%. In a second case, 
after much obstruction, it was found that'one skilled man could keep two labourers 
going' and the foreman was instructed to try this method out. But the foreman was 
a trade unionist and arranged with the skilled men to do the labourer's work 
himself Between them they slowed the job down considerably. According to 
Rankin, all this was observed without comment by the employer, 'the men deceived 
no one but themselves'. A second experiment was set up. This time, to 'avoid 
questions of trade union etiquette', the job was rearranged so that one labourer 
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kept two skiHed men going. This attempt was also sabotaged by the foreman but 
semi-slaed men were put on the job anyway and Rmildn claimed labour costs fell 
by 66%. 
In a third department more serious resistance was encountered. With subdivision of 
labour and the employment of semi-skilled men, Rankin proposed to increase , 
output from 6.5 to 30 pieces an hour. On the first day, a squad turned out 29 per 
hour but then refused to work the system and threatened to strike. A compromise 
was agreed and the struggle moved to a fourth department. Here the men 
responded to changes in work organisation with a demand for an increase in pay 
and went on strike to secure it. The workers contacted the London dailies and 
reports appeared under the headline 'Speeding Up Strike. The men claimed they 
had already accepted speeding up to meet the national emergency and proposed 
arbitration, something Rankin described as a 'patriotic- exaggeration' but 'rather a 
shrewd move on the part of the men. Even Mowing agreement to return and 
work the system, resistance continued. On the night shift there was a pacemaker 
who 'struck a bad patch' and reduced performance across the whole shift. 
Eventually however, output rose to more than fifty pieces an hour. Attention now 
reverted to department three and this time a strike was accepted and defeated with 
the men dismissed. 
There are several points of interest in Rankin's account, not least the collaboration 
of foremen with trade unionists to frustrate management designs. Such 
collaboration may have been unusual but obstruction and lack of co-operation by 
foremen, whose own position was being undermined by changes in the structure of 
management control, was not. The processes which Rankin describes, of separating 
skilled from unskilled elements and redistnibuting the work among a mix of skilled 
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and unskilled workers, establisbin new output standards for work reorganised in 
this way, backed by new piecework rewards, are all processes clearly at work in 
engineering from the turn of the century. Premium bonus, the machine question, 
rate fixers and other new managers, all the elements of what has been called 
'workshop reorganisation!, intensified these processes significantly. But where 
these elements were combined haphazardly, as was most often the case, change 
was partial, uneven and slow. Rankin described a management offensive in the 
Taylor tradition which brought all these elements together to confront labour, and 
some managers, with a new model. The self conscious, ' deliberate plan of 
reorganisation of the labour process distinguished Rankin from his contemporaries, 
but the elements that constituted that reorganisation were common enough. 
The experience of bonus schemes under war-time conditions underlined the 
importance of time study. The Ministry of Labour observed that whatever payment 
system was under consideration, rate fi-dng was crucial, 'No system of payment by 
results can ever get rid of this difficulty. Different systems merely change the 
conditions under which it has to be treated! (Mun/5/82/342/20). And for this reason 
premium bonus schemes were attracting increasing criticism 'Hopes of solving the - 
rate fixing ýdifficulty by means of the Rowan premium bonus system have long been 
disappointed', argued the Ministry, 'since workers had no difficulty in appreciating 
its "inner meaning"'. 'The workers are safeguarded against an occasional abuse by 
an arrangement under which the employer systematically shares in the time saved 
by the workers, that is, in the reward for special effort and increased production!. 
Nonetheless, premium bonus remained popular during the war. So much so that 
The Engineer reprinted its series of articles from 1902 as a book in 1917. But even 
The Engineer had difficulty defending its favourite system. A series of letters from 
W. I T. in 1917 argued that once the employer had set up the works and 
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established a time for the job, the worker should receive all the gain from increased 
output due to his efforts. Any finther improvements introduced by the employer 
could lead to revised job times but there was no justification for 'gain sharing'. The 
Engineer was reduced to pleading the need for falling labour costs to meet foreign 
competition (Feb. 1917). 
Fears that workers who had appreciated the inner meaning of the system would 
retaliate with output restriction grew at the end of the war. There was renewed 
mterest m piecework but backed by time study (Ramsey 1918). In 1918 the EEF 
established a sub-committee to investigate the basis on which payment by results 
systems could be constructed and 'The best methods of securing the data necessary 
to enable employers to fix coffect prices and basis titnesý (eeF237/l/l/14). T'he 
following year, responding to the unions' claim for a 47 hour week, the EEF told 
the unions that production methods would have to change, Ve will have to 
standardise, we wiU have to go in for repetition work and adjust the products and 
the machinery and the men and the work in such as will give bulk production, 
whereas, formerly we had special production which may or may not have been 
economicar (EEF Minutes May 1919). In focusing on payment systems, time 
study and 'bulk production', the engineering employers reflected a new post-war 
interest in scientific management, though one which was relatively short lived. 
Scientific Management After the War 
By the end of the war a distinct shift in mood with regard to scientific management 
is evident. Scott Maxwell, addressing the Institution of Electrical Engineers on 
scientific management in 1919, noted with surprise the extent of interest in the 
technical press and the lack of antagonism So too did Cassiers which recorded 
with obvious delight what it described as an 'official endorsement' of scientific 
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management in the report of the Committee on New Industries calling for the 
education of employers and their staff on what is being done in up-to-date works 
'where quantity production under scientific management is carried on!. And in May 
Cassiers Engineering and Industrial Management was'pleased to note a change in 
the attitude of many engineering journals on the question of efficiency ofthe 
management of works! (May 1919). 
The flurry of post-war activity and discussion around the question of scientific 
management included the efforts to promote it by the Reconstruction Council in a 
series of lectures during 1919 which led to the formation of a sub-committee to 
carry on the propaganda work. In the same year James Butterworth addressed 
managers at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich on scientific management, incentives 
and motion study; A- D. Denning, works secretary of Lotus Ltd and Edward 
Bostock and Co., delivered a series of lectures on scientific management for the 
Birmingham section of the Institute of Metals; and a series of articles by the 
Employment Manager of Turner Newall provided scientific management with a 
human relations gloss5. 
In part a heightened interest in scientific management stemmed from fears about 
post-war labour unrest. 'The minds of the workers, wrote Cassiers, 'are saturated 
with the ridiculous and repulsive idea of the "class war" and the public ignorance of 
economics and history is generally favourable to the acceptance of the obsolete and 
unscientific doctrines of the Genman Karl Marse . Educational work was needed to 
Ih convmce workers to accept te planning roonYs methods and programme, and to 
follow the system outlined by the experts in charge of the worle (Cassiers 
Engineering and Industrial Management March 1919). Scott Maxwell (1919) 
also advocated scientific management as an alternative to socialism. And in 1919 
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James Whitworth told the Reconstruction Council that the harmony and increased 
production created by scientific management obviated any need for a struggle 
between capital and labour over the surplus (1919). 
Intense interest did not mean, however, that the pace of change on the ground had 
changed very much. Cassiers probably got it about right when it endorsed an 
article on scientific management which expressed'the accepted opinion that while 
many establishments can lay no claim to any coniprehensive scheme of 
organisation, the methods in practice contain within them elements of successful 
management' (June 1921)6. In 1919 Henry Chellew, LSE lecturer and adviser to 
the Federation of British Industries on efficiency methods, had announced the 
formation of the Society of Industrial and Efficiency Engineers. Nothing more was 
heard of it. British employers were not yet ready for any 'comprehensive scheme of 
organisation'but many of the elements of scientific management had become the 
conmnon property of management as such. ParadoNicafly enough, the post-war 
years not only marked the height of interest in Britain in scientific management but 
the end of the debate about Taylorism and scientific management as a 'systenY. 
In 1920 K H. Tawney pleaded for time and motion study to be applied to 'the 
immense mass of literature which is being turned out on "Scientific Management" 
in order to eliminate useless words, sentences and pages! (Business Organisation 
and Management March 1920). By 1921 he must have been a good deal happier as 
the flood of literature began to dry up. Ten years later a Board of Trade official 
charged with investigating the position wrote that 'although the library got a good 
deal on scientific management between 1919 and 192 1, we have got hardly 
anything since' (BT56/44/CW1884/7). Talk of scientific management faded. A 
paper to the Institute of Production Engineers in 1923 spoke of the 'much used and 
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now much hated expression, "Scientific management... (Machinery Dec. 1923). No 
American, the Institute was told, now uses the phrase. Horn records the testimony 
of an engineer in the late 1920s Who thought that'The mere mention of Scientific 
Management today in an Engineering Works is sufficient to destroy a man's 
chances if he is after a management job' (1983: 3). 
However, the drying up of the great debate about scientific management that had 
begun in the years before the war did not necessarily mean that scientific 
management practice was no longer of any interest. For example, the manager of 
Metropolitan Vickers River Don works was scathing about the experts: 'Some of 
them as we know, could run the British Empire with a card index and could 
perform miracles of production by introducing their post-war systems into pre-war 
factories' (Engineering Review and Trader 1923). But he was describing, among 
other things, the operation of technical and mechanical processes and rate-fi)dng 
departments at his own works with the strong implication that his was an example 
of sensible and digestible scientific management as opposed to the over elaborate 
schemes of self proclaimed experts. 
Two quite different things were happening as the post-war boom collapsed. First, 
there was a hardening of class attitudes among employers. Tlie attack on wages 
took precedence over more sophisticated ways of reducing costs and increa i 
productivity, as employers turned inwards. The development of the personnel 
function via welfare work during the war was slowed or halted too. Ile great 
increase in power enjoyed by the employers diminished their interest in scientific 
solutions to a labour problem for which employer authority seemed a satisfactory 
answer. it is important to add the qualification however, that even in the depths of 
the slump, there were limits to what employers were able to do. There were also 
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limits to what they wanted to do, evidence of a certain 'constitutionalisnY, or at 
least a reluctance to engage in a frontal assault on positions however weakly 
defended. 
Secondly, the focus of concern and discussion was sbifting anyway, away ftom the 
I 
pre-war themes of mechanisation and division of labour, and scientific management 
as a system, to discussion in detail of management organisation, and in particular, 
of the role of planning and progress departments. However inadequately there is a 
sense in which the earlier questions had been settled. Elements of scientific 
management had been largely absorbed as part of a larger development of 
management. 'Comparatively little is heard about scientific management now, ' 
reported Machinery in 1925, 'and it might be inferred by those who are not closely 
in touch with manufacturing practice that the new plan has been discarded. While it 
is true that the rather elaborate expression "scientific management" is not used as 
often as it was, it is important to note that the fimdamental principle remains and 
has proved its wortW. Costly implementations had been cut back and people had 
leamed from this experience but 'the fimdamental principles laid down by Mr 
Taylor and other pioneers wilI continue to be applied' (Dec. 192 5). 
Much the same point was made in America7. Dexter KimbaU, in response to a 
suggestion from the secretary to the Industrial Fatigue Research Board in Britain 
that Taylorism was only practised in four or five American firms, argued that in 
America too, Taylorism had been absorbed. 'Few, if any enterprises wiU be found 
today that are organised exactly after the model set up by him at Bethlehem But 
combinations of his methods in endless variety are to be found all over this 
country ... Perhaps 
the most common elements to be found are those of rate setting 
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on the basis of accurate time study, and the planning and dispatching of operations 
on the basis of a prearranged time schedule' (Kimball 1927: 5 93). 
Conclusion 
IIn this chapter I have argued that elements of scientific management were evident 
in Britain before the first wodd war. Premium bonus fell some way short of 
Taylor's own prescriptions, but it could be used to define new work standards and 
tighten time study procedures as well as compensate for inadequate rate fi. -, dng. 
The war gave a sharp stimulus to the interest in, and the practice oý scientific 
management, but its long term effect was to accelerate developments already 
underway and to complete the process by which Taylorism became accepted rather 
than mark any fundamental break in development. We should therefore see the war 
and the post-war discussion of scientific management, as bringing to a close the 
period which began in the 1890s. Scientific management was no longer a novelty 
and its principle propositions no longer seriously disputed. Employer conservatism 
continued to be an obstacle to the spread of scientific management practice but 
. management was changing all the same. 
In Chapter 31 will examine changes in the structure of management and the 
development of new forms of production control from the turn of the century, and 
the extent to which this influenced management practice between the wars. 
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Notes 
1 Haydu suggests that scientific management existed more in theory than practice in the' 
United States before 1914, with employers picIdng what suited them from'among its techniques 
and that 'With the same provisos scientific management appeared in British engineering well 
before World War V (198 8: 3 8) 
2 Hyman believes it is arguable 'that the war did not accelerate but delayed these changes 
in the deployment of engineering labour which were apparent long before 1914' (1971: 85) 
3 Austin told a gathering of boys at Bromsgrove High School in 1939 that he did not 
believe factory employment did girls any real good. Although he thought them a better 
proposition than men for monotonous work, he remained of the view that their employment was 
not'right from a human point of vieW (Lambert and Wy4tt 1968) 
4 Longridge was congratulated by Machinery for his 'admirable summary of the aims of 
scientific management' (May 1917). Chapter I gave further details of debates about Taylorism in 
the engineering press. 
All were reported in Cassiers Engiheering and Industrial Management for 1919; see also 
A. D. Dennings book, Scientific Factory Management, published in 1919. Denning reflects the 
consistent concerns of British advocates of scientific management with the importance of 
planning. 
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There were contrasts too. An American observer, Dwight T. Farnham, remarked on 
older plants where 'machines are big and slow and the work is done with due regard for precedent 
and the rights bestowed by Magna Carta!. At the same time there were in England, 'certain 
pioneers who have consciously installed scientific management and whose plants are marvels of 
efficiency, which equal, if they do not exceed, anything which has been developed elsewhere'. 
(1921: 168,257). 
In 1947, A. S. Person, described by Daniel Nelson as the foremost authority on scientific 
management after Taylor, wrote that scarcely an American enterprise remained untouched by 
scientific management, 'Yet there are few individual examples of comprehensive, integrated 
scientific management' (1947: 893). 
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Chapter 3 Management 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will trace the development of new management functions and their 
effects on older management structures including the position of the engineer and 
the foreman, and assess the evidence for the influence of scientific management on 
inter-war managerial practice. I will show that the development of production 
engineering and the eclipse of the foreman were indications of the spread of 
scientific management, a process which was not dependent on any particular 
Taylorist system such as Bedaux. It was however, a process which was uneven and 
incomplete, and this is brought out by ei19 the experience of a number of 
companies including Alfted Herbert and ICA Metals Group 
I will also discuss the relationship between scientific management, labour 
management and industrial psychology and outline British participation in the 
international scientific management movement. I will argue that the critics of 
Taylorism among industrial psychologists offered a complementary rather than a 
competing management philosophy and show that the origins of British Institution 
of Management lay in the scientific management movement of the 1930s. 
Management Functions - The Growth of Office Services 
R W. Allingham, discussing his experiences as a production consultant at Brown 
and Sharp in 1919, offered this definition of scientific management, 'At is really 
the recognition that such things can be worked out along regular lines, brought to a 
fine art and controfled by a series of office services, which differentiates modem 
factory methods, generally described as "scientific management... (Allingham 
1919)1. Such office services were developing from the turn of the century as the 
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drawing office took on wider production fimctions linked to design work and 
engineers were obliged to consider commercial as well as technical questions. 
Parallel, associated developments on the shop floor, saw the separation of the 
toolroom. as a specialised department, the appearance of new management 
fimctionaries Eke the progress chasers, feed and speed men and rate fixers, and the 
transformation of the foreman from an organiser and planner of production to an 
executive for decisions made elsewhere. 
Some part of this change is reflected in the changing fimction and status of the 
engineer. McGuffie's important book on management and labour in the European 
and American metal industries argues that the period 1890-1914 saw a dual 
process at work invohing the specialisation and dequahfication of labour on the 
one hand and the hyper qualification and professionalisation of the labour of 
superintendence and management on the other. The emergence of engineering as a 
profession is traced in the growth of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and in 
the development of professional training which sought to commi employers and 
the state to recruiting a managerial cadre via extra-factory appointments from the 
school, college and university. 'From a managerial point of vieW, McGuffie argues, 
'engineering had become a "profession" by 1913'(1985: 105,114). 
The difficulty is that if engineering had become a profession by 1913, it was, from a 
managerial point of view, still a relatively underdeveloped one. Premium 
apprenticeships on which management training continued to rely before the war 
(McGuffie 1985: 114; Pollard 1989: 200) was a system in terminal decline 2. It 
taught pupils little or nothing' and was, according to Professor Kapp of 
Birmingham UniversitYý 'something brought down to us from the good old times 
when technical instruction could be acquired in no other way' (Engineering Sept. 
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1903; Kapp 1908). Engineers with college training were growing in number 
however, and by 1914 the combination of college and work based training had led 
'to the emergence of a systematic theoretically based pattern of engineering 
education! (Buchanan 1989: 175). Even so, it was not until 1924 that industrial 
economics was included in the examination syllabus for associate membership of 
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, lending some support to Locke's criticism 
of the inadequacy of the engineering curriculum (Engineering Feb. 1,924; Locke 
1984). However, the managerial finictions of the engineer were becoming more 
important and by 1924, half the college trained engineers could expect eventually 
to be employed on 'administrative worle (Engineering March 1924). 
In broad terms the development of management fimctions is indicated by the 
proportion of administrative, technical and clerical staff which grew from 8% of the 
workforce in 1907, to 15% in the mid 1930s and 20% in 1948. In America, such 
grades constituted just under 12% as early as 1909 and 20% by 1939 (Gospel 
1992: 48; Florence 1965: 139). In mining and manufacturing, the numbers of 
managers and administrators grew by 130% between 1921 and 1951 (Routh 1965: 
22,23)3. And membership of professional institutions for engineers, many of whom 
will have exercised management fimctions, grew rapidly even before the first world 
war (McGuffiel985: 111; Buchanan 1989: 107)4. 
It is harder to trace the growth in numbers of those engaged in other engineering 
management fimctions like progress chasing or rate fixing. Although British 
professionals seemed to have an Institution for just about everything, there was no 
Organisation to represent those engaged in activities associated with rate fixing or 
time and motion study until three bodies were formed in the closing years of the 
second world war. Time and motion study was an important consideration for the 
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Institution of Production Engineers, but it is a comment on the slow development 
of work study in Britain that a viable organisation. took so long to establish. 
Yet there seemed to be no shortage of new personnel. In 1924 a foreman in 
Leicester complained that his department 'was overrun with progress chasers, cost 
clerks and other minor officials in search of information' (Cassiers March 1924). A 
faint reflection of the growth in their numbers may be traced in the membership of 
the Foreman's Mutual Benefit Society, established by the Engineering Employers 
Federation after the 1897 lock out with the aim of ensuring the loyalty of foremen. 
nere were no rate fixers recorded as members until 1905 when the number stood 
at just 9 compared with 395 foremen in engineering departments, 10 office staff 
and 3 works managers. On the eve of war, there were 266 rate fixers, inspectors, 
office staff, draughtsmen and works or departmental managers, 9.3% of the total 
FMBS membership. In 1923, there were 2,287 members in the same categories 
constituting 16.7% of the membership (eef237/3/l/97,2)5. 
Production Engineering 
The war increased the number of what we might call production personnel and 
drove some of them towards trade unionismý. But it was the founding of the 
Institution of Production Engineers in February 1921 reflecting 'the growing 
understanding that the organisation of production was now as important as the 
technical operations themselves! (Jefferys 1945: 204), which was the logical 
outcome of the changes in workshop methods and management which had been 
developing over twenty years. T'he production engineer, argued E. W. Hancock, 
evolved fr6m. jig and tool design to become the man charged with wider 
ibilities to get the best from men and machines (1926: 69). Ilere were five responsi 
hundred members by 1926 and by 1939 membership had reached 2,008, rather 
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more than the estimated 1,800 industrial welfare supervisors and labour managers 
employed in industry and considerably more than the 759 practising members of 
the Institution of Labour Management (Proceedings, Production Engineers Oct. 
193 9; Niven 1967: 8 1). 
The production engineers were cautious about scientific management as doctrine. 
They were shop engineers first and shop managers second, but there is no 
mistaking their acceptance of its basic premises. 'As to the objects of the 
Institution', said H. C. Armitage of the Austin Motor Company at the inaugural 
meeting, 'it should be seen that it did not concern itself with the pushing of 
scientific management, as it was familiarly known, but they did want their 
workshop methods run on scientific lines and in a scientific manner, and that should 
be one of the principal props of their platfornY (Proceedings, Production Engineers 
Feb. 192 1). Iley favoured the British method of introducing the science of 
management gradually, 'from precedent to precedent rather than by revolution' 
(Briggs 192 1). But they welcomed the second International Congress for Scientific 
Management in 1925 and included 'Scientific Mimagement and its Applications' as 
an examination option for graduate membership of the institution in 1931-32. 
The inaugural meeting had some difficulty defining the scope and aims of the 
organisation. Two things were clear. First, the new Institution aimed to cater for 
practical men'who could not get through any examination on paper, but who were 
the most practical men imaginable' (Proceedings, Production Engineers Feb. 
192 1). And second, it would distinguish itself from the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers which, argued J. D. Scaife, Works Manager at Ransome and Marles 
Bearing Company, 'deals more with the scientific side of engineering, and is not 
much impressed with we shop engineers who take their work and study its 
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Irnall"facture' (Proceedings, Production Engineers 1924-5). Beyond that, the new 
production engineering functions remained ill defined. W. I Hiscock drew 
attention to the lack of unfformity in the use ofjob titles in advertisements - 
production manager, progress chief and progress engineer were examples. In 
Ifiscock's view the progress department was'the first outward and visible. sign of 
the application of scientific management to the factory' but new posts inspired by 
scientific management had been grafted onto existing management structures 
causing confusion (Hiscock 1920) 
For Hiscock, the production manager was a head foreman, the man who actually 
delivered the product in the shop. The role of the progress chief was more 
fundamental. He was responsible forthe organising and administrative work of the 
factory as it affects production' (Iliscock 1919). Max Lawrence, on the other hand, 
limited the production engineer's role to 'providing the means but not controffing 
the personnel or the flow of worle. He should decide on the machinery and tooling, 
take charge of the jig and tool design and rate fvdng departments and decide on 
methods and processes in fitting and assembly shops (Lawrence 1921: 23). G. H. 
Hales, works manager at Druinmond Bros. in Guildford, added responsibility for 
the layout of the plant. 
r%-l- 
Others suggested that the production engineer was a sort of assistant works 
manager though opinion varied on the extent of his authority over rate fbdng, 
costing and estimating activities. Herbert took the view that the production 
engineer must ultimately give way to the designer but Austin's Works Director, C. 
K F. Engelbach, speaking after a trip to America, saw the production engineer as a 
useful check on the designer (Proceedings, Production Engineers 1927-1928; 
Machinery Sept. 1927). Engelbach followed Scaife in seeing the production 
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engineer as the man who took the engineers work and studied its manufacture. But 
in his more elaborate scheme, a production manager would give the production 
engineer'a priority list showing the sequence in which the tools, methods and 
appliances of the various details should be available'. The production engineer 
would then plan production, at which point'T'he production manager again now 
takes hold of the job and commences to feed the plant witli the necessary materials. 
He has to plan the times of what might be termed the speed of flow' (Engelbach 
1928). 
Typical lines of division in discussion of the responsibility of the production 
engineer and progress or planning departments formed around the issue of how far 
costing and estimating departments should be independent of production planning, 
and in particular, whether estimating should have some responsibility for layout 
before the production engineer got involved (Hutchinson 1928: 60; Satchwell 
1933)7. W. G. Grocock reflected the wide diversity in the actual practice of 
Plannin Departments when he noted that 'Unless we standardise the organisations 
in the various works these fimctions depend absolutely on what the works 
management wants their plannin department to do' (Proceedings, Production 
Engineers 1932-33). Nor were the production engineers able to resolve such 
differences even after seventeen years of practice and debate. Yet another paper on 
the fimctions of a planning department in 1938 opened the discussion with the 
observation that it was dMicult to decide just what should go into the paper 
because of 'the utter impossibility of deciding what any given firm would lay down 
as planning department functions! (Jenkins 1938). 
However, the question whether production pLmning arrangements were consistent, 
coherent and effective, ought not be confused with the question whether they had 
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developed at all. None of the production engineers were in any doubt about their 
own importance! Nor was there any quarrel in principle with Satchwell's 
description of the fimdamental change which had taken place in the nature of the 
production process: 'In the past the subtleties of production were to be found in 
actual manufacture; nowadays they are to be found in the layout or plan of 
manufacture. If we look upon production as an edifice, we may regard the planner 
as the architect and his job layout as the plan! (1933)8. 
The detail of the way in which this change was managed was, of course, important 
from a practical point of view. At Willans Works in Rugby in the 1940s, 
production engineers were in charge of operational planners, progress chasers and 
rate fixers. But M-r John Wallis, former GEC Production Director, recalls that 
though the management structure was modem enough, there was a lack of co- 
ordination: 'the designer would design something and chuck it over the wall to the 
manufacturing people who would regard it as a challenge and would make it at all 
costs' (Wallis 1993). Scientific management could clearly be more, or less scientific 
in practice, but the management structure it brought into being was more 
developed than has been commonly acknowledged. At Joseph Lucas Electrical in 
Burnley, for example, the Production Engineering Department occupied a key 
position in the organisation chart (BPC Case Studies) 
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Figure Management Structure: Joseph Lucas Electrical, Burnley 
Factory Manager 
Production Engineering Department 
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The Foreman 
PLanning and Tool Design 
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Process Planning Tool Progress 
Engineer - 
Plant Layout and 
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Engineer 
There was no obvious place for the foreman in this structure of management 
controL He became'more a transmitter of management decisions than an active 
participant in thenY (Child and Partridge 1982: 8). When the National Institution of 
industrial Psychology investigated the position in 195 1, they noted that while 80% 
of those questioned said that foremen were a part of management, the evidence 
from the survey ! hardly suggests that this gives a true picture of the situation if the 
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phrase is given a real meaning (NIIP 1951: 93)9. Put more bluntly, the development 
of management had left the foreman behind. 
At the turn of the century the foreman ruled the workshop. Nor was this simply 
because he was the immediate representative of the -employer on the shop floor, the 
person to hire and fire, to deiermine the pay of men and allocate the work. He was 
also the first among the craftsmen, the person who, with the leading workmen, 
would take the drawings from the design office and translate them into actual 
production (Herbert 1919)10. He managed both work and the worker and was an 
important man. In Feb. 1899 Mf Barker, one of the Directors of Forward 
Engineering in Birmingham, complained of the attitude of the foreman, Mr A. G. 
Scholes who, Barker maintained, 'did not show that respect to which he was 
entitled' (Forward Engineering 1899). Scholes was eventually dismissed in October 
but was initially defended by the other directors against Barker on the grounds that 
he showed great tact in dealing with society and non society men andwas a good 
man m his position'. 
Taylor's fimctional foremanship proposed a series of central roles for the foreman 
and initial. speculation about management in Britain drew the conclusion that 'The 
foreman now has to think for every man under hinY (Engineering June 1903). But 
fimctional foremanship was not the solution adopted. Instead the functions outlined 
by Taylor were allocated to others and the foreman's principal duty began to be 
defined as handling men rather than the production process. 'Slowly, almost 
imperceptibly, but nevertheless, certainly, ' observed Engineering, 'a change is 
taking place* in the characteristics of foremen in mechanical trades! (Dec. 1908). In 
the pre-war car industry the old style foreman and mechanic was rapidly 
disappearing (Pomeroy 1914). An account of the production system at the 
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Lanchester works at the end of the war noted that,, 'In this broad outline of the 
system, foremen do not appear very prominently. That is because the primary duty 
of all foremen is the execution (emphasis in original) of orders for work issued to 
their department by the works manag& (The Engineer Feb. 1918). 
The changing structure of management control became more apparent after the 
first world war as more elaborate systems of production control superseded older 
methods based on the foreman (Engineering Review 1919-1920). Ahnost every 
report told the same story. Sir Henry Fowler, chief mechanical engineer for the 
Nfidland Railway, observed that the foreman used to be in almost complete control 
of the shops, men, work and materials. Now, 
Men are engaged by the employment manager and allocated by him to the 
shops. The materials are ordered and allocated to the shops by the order 
office. Machines for carrying out the operations are purchased after 
collaboration between the drawing office and the works engineer, and they 
are fixed in the shop by the works engine6r's staft their feed and speed 
being controlled by feed and speed experts. Progress of the work through 
the shops is governed by a planning department, its heating, ventilation and 
lighting being looked after by the welfare department, and any disciplining 
of the men has to be dealt with by the employment manager. Piecework or 
premium pieces are set and controlled by timers under the direct 
supervision of a special departinea, etc. Any question of dealing with 
labour or shop conditions is dealt with in conjunction with the shop 
committee (Fowler 1922). 
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Fowler was overstating the position by a considerable margin. Few companies, for 
example, will have had employment managers as early as 1923 and even more 
rarely will they have had the powers attributed to them by Fowler. But his 
generalisations went largely unchallenged because the trend he identified was so 
C 34., lear to all. The old time foreman, wrote A Maplethorpe in The Foreman,, was'a 
Czar in his own department'. But changes to shop management, the introduction of 
employment managers rate fixers and planning departments tended to'separate the 
foreman from the employees, undermine his authority and remove responsibility' 
(Maplethorpe 1923). Mapelthorpe's view was already distinctly old fashioned in the 
early 20s. The foreman was more likely to be told that the planning department 
would'relieve him of worry (Marsden 1925). Not everyone thought the foreman 
should be the loser in this process. Max Lawrence, works manager of the Sterling 
Telephone and Electric Company, argued that the new staff should be subordinated 
to the foreman (Machinery Oct. 1923). But Engineering struck a more authentic 
note in suggesting a more modest role. 'ne modem trend, wrote Engineering in 
1926, 'is to plan down to the smallest detail, but there is no reason why the 
foreman should not occupy ia place in the scheme of things. Granted the desirability 
of pre-determined routing and tiane allowance, it can surely be left to the foreman 
to plan with a view -to carrying these into effect' (Oct. 1926). 
Tlis seems to have been the position at the Austin where, according to Perry 
Keene, 'all operations are completely planned, no resp onsibility devolves on the 
foreman to follow other than the lines laid down, as this automatically produces the 
desired cost'(Ward w/8/13 1930). And it was the case too, at much less well 
known companies like David Brown and Sons in Huddersfield where the old 
system of relying on 'the initiative of various shop foremen working in conjunction 
with the draughtsman'had long been abandoned in favour of new 
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production and planning departments (Engineering May 1930). It would be too 
much to claim that the Austin and David Brown were typical. nere is much to be 
said for Gospers point that the area of production management was weak and 
where practical managers predominated, 'foremen continued to enjoy considerable 
discretion and represented a traditional pattern of authority and control at 
workplace lever (1992: 49). In 1943, when Herberts were experiencing problems 
with machines obtained from Sentinel, it was the Sentinel foreman who was called 
in by Herberts so he could be shownhow we avoid troubles similar to those which 
Sentinel have experienced' (Herberts Minutes March 1943). 
But such a prominent, technical role for the foreman was already an anachronism 
by the second world war. At least it was for most rank and file foremen. The MIT 
post-war survey divided supervision into four categories. Senior supervisors or 
shop superintendents would have wider responsibilities for planning and 
supervising the work of others. Foremen were categorised as level B supervision. 
Their pay differential with operatives was around E2 a week, though in 13% of 
cases operatives' earnings were the same as their supervisors, and in 61% of cases 
the best operative could earn more than the foreman in any one week (NUP 
1951: 25). In interviews level B supervisors placed responsibility for the volume of 
production, discipline and morale higher than planning or methods of production. 
Of the three most important aspects of their job, 42% rated human relations first, 
20% technical and 15% administration (1951: 27,32). Interestingly enough, their 
perception of the importance of human relations did not bring them into conflict 
with the developing personnel function, but there was conflict with the functional 
departments which believed they did the foreman! s job for him (1951: 83). Despite 
all the talk of foremen as part of the management, the NIUP found that'most of the 
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supervisors seen during the enquiry spoke of management as something distinct 
from themselves! (19 5 1: 94). 
Coopey (1985) uses oral testimony to underline the ways in which the foreman 
remained a powerfid figure'. He was the person who represented the management 
to the men and was bound toappear powerfid in their eyes. in some cases the 
foreman continued to set piecework rates. More often he would arbitrate in 
disputes between rate fixers and operatives about times already allocated. He might 
have the power to give extra time for contingencies like hard material and he 
certainly made a difference in allocating good jobs and bad ones. It was even 
possible for such power to be exercised in a brutal way. Tliompson (Snr) tells the 
story of a craftsman sacked by his supervisor from a car body shop between the 
wars for arguing about his earnings. Challenged for standing over the worker while 
he packed his tool box, the supervisor threatened to knock him down. A shop mate 
recalled that'... he knocked him down. And I did see that, and that was Bobby 
Jones, he was a proper autocratic bloke'(1988: 53). But in all these, things, he was 
carrying out the instructions of others, delivering a management service at the end 
of the line, without being part of the management that generated the tasks he 
suin ervised. It was small wonder that he felt that he got 'aH the kicks and none of K- 
the hapence'(Bums Morton 1944). 
Nor, despite protests to the contrary, did the Engineering Employers Federation 
treat foremen as part of management. Federated companies gave little support to 
the Forexnanýs Mutual Benefit Society (eef237/l/l/2. i; eef237/3/l/104). In 1947, an 
EEF circular designed to assert that foremen were an essential part of management 
only succeeded in demonstrating that they were not. Regular meetings between 
foremen and management were recommended to give foremen a pride in their job 
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and ensure loyalty. It was recognised however, that 'much work previously covered 
by foremen, e. g., time study, planning, rate fi)dng, production control, is carried 
out by separate departments! (EEF April 1947). The EEFs answer was that the 
foreman should be educated in the work of these departments and that to maintain 
his position, prestige and keenness, 'any instruction from the management to 
I 
workers should be given by the foreman in charge to the workers concerned'. Such 
an arrangement was designed to maintain the appearance of a tradition of authority 
and control which had been transferred elsewhere. 
The content of education programmes for foremen similarly testify to changing 
structures of management control. It was not just that certain management 
fimctions previously exercised by the foreman were being displaced. 7he old type 
of foreman was found to be increasingly unsatisfactory. 'Modem conditions and 
scientific management methods demand modem managers! wrote Machinery, and 
the old type of promoted foreman would not do any longer (March 1919). A 
particular point of attack for the modernisers was the'deeply rooted tradition of 
the autocratic foreman' (Simons 1923). Someone altogether more fleýdble was 
required to implement plans from the office. Mie old type of foreman is far from 
being ideal in a modem factor)ý, wrote Engineering (May 1923). Tayloes scheme 
had proved too complicated but change was needed. The old type of foreman was 
too resistant to change from above. Where resistance was justified, he was 
insufficiently analytical to explain why such plans would not work. Simple 
acquiescence was not any good either since intelligent implementation was 
required. 
With the separation of the preparation from the execution section of the worle,, 
remarked one observer in 192 1, much of the forenian! s job was now in the planning 
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department and his real role was one of 'patrolling supervision! (Cassiers Jan. 
1921). A report on education for foremanship in 1923 pointed in the same 
direction. The job of the foreman was to give instruction to the men, not 
'instructions' which now came from specialist departments (The Foreman July 
1923). The focus was increasingly turned to the management of men, to morale 
and the leadership role of the foreman, whose study'gives him a deep knowledge 
of men and enables him to approach them in a definite manner for the 
accomplishment of his aims' (Gillespie 1943: 5). When the NIIIP considered training 
for foremen, it devoted a couple of pages to technical and administrative trai ig 
and seven pages to human relations (195 1). 'Probably seven-tenths of the value of a 
foreman or supervisor, wrote T. H. Burnham in his Modern Foremanship, 'rests 
on his ability to handle men and get good team work'(1937: 68). 
BurnhanYs evidence is important because he ran some of the earliest training 
courses for foremen at the South East London Technical Institution from 193 1ý 
and collaborated with Bums Morton, Bramley and Brech in producing a new text 
book for the foremen's training scheme set up by the Institution of Industrial 
Administration and the Ministry of Labour in 1941 (Rose 1954: 97,109). Despite 
BurnhanYs criticism of Taylorism (1930: 160) he was convinced that the key to 
modem industrial methods wasthe conveyorizing of production and assembly and 
the separation of the planning of the work from its execution!. He advocated time 
study %ecause it is necessary to have a scientific measure of work and to know 
what is the best output that can be expected' (1937: 6,115). One of the defects of 
Taylorism identified by Burnham was neglect of the human factor and it was in this 
sphere that ihe foreman could make a real contribution, though interestingly, this 
was expressed in Taylorist language. The foreman should consider himself as 
'doing an engineering job on material which consists of human beings! (1937: 55). 
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What is most interesting in Burnham is the manner in which the foreman! s 
contribution to the management of men is reconciled with the imperatives of the 
new structures of management control. BurnhanYs foreman training was as much 
about reconciling the. foreman to his diminished role in production as it was to 
encouraging his responsibility for managing the worker. On time study and rate. 
fixing the foreman was advised that'He must be prepared to admit that previous 
standards of performance which he may himself have set, based on experience .... 
are not necessarily right'( 193 7: 106). On progress and planning departments, 
Burnham recognised that the foreman loses part of his job but thought that 'the 
foreman, realising the vital role of these brain centres of the fmn, will co-operate to 
the utmost possible extent so as to assist the smooth running of the worle (p 149). 
As to the employment department, the foreman 'will undoubtedly find it to his 
benefit to co-operate with his own employment officer as My as possible' (p8l). 
The argument of this section has been that the rise of production engineering, 
matched by the changing role of the foreman points to a significant change in the 
structure of management control of production along lines consistent with the i 
thrust of scientific management prescriptions. We discuss below the evidence for 
how the new management operated in practice between the wars. 
Management Practice Between the Wars 
In chapter 2 we saw how scientific management reached a peak of influence in 
1921 even as British industry, released from the pressures of war, reverted to pre- 
war patterns of development. We noted too, the argument that Taylorism 
continued to influence management practice in two distinct ways: the use of time 
study and in the planning of production operations. In chapter 51 will discuss time 
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. study and payment by results, including the Bedaux system. In this section I will 
consider the influence of Taylorism. on production management and show that, 
while the range and unevenness of management practice defies simple 
generalisations, production management existed in sufficiently developed form 
across a range of industries to justify spealdng of the influence of scientific , 
management whether any particular Taylorist scheme was in operation or not. 
Glucksman (1990) deschibes as'assembly-line methods! the management of the 
food processing, ready made clothing, domestic appliance, motor components and 
electrical engineering industries". Oral evidence from five factories producing 
biscuits and electrical goods showed that there was a high level of mechanisation, 
extreme fragmentation of tasks, an extreme sexual division of labour with skilled 
men servicing a predominantly female production force, strict supervision and the 
widespread use of the Bedaux system- At Morphy Richards, for example, each job 
was timed to take about a minute (1990: 133). 
In the motor-industry production was also organised along scientific management 
lines. At the Austin in 1934 a master order originating in the production 
department was sent to the Efficiency Department 'which is thus enabled to see 
what new parts are coming into production and to decide what route they shall 
take through the various shops! (Ware 1934). The financial controller at Austin, 
Perry Keane, claimed that the volume of work produced in 47 hours in 1933 was 
seventeen times that produced before the war in 54 hours, and that 'This great 
difference has been brought about by scheduhng, measuring, and re-measuring 
every single operation contained in the days work, though we have 157,000 
different types of operation! (Ward w/8/29-34/12 June 1933a). Austin employed 
the services of an industrial consultant, A J. Brandt, to advise on the logical flow 
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of work and the elimination of unnecessary processes (BT56/44/CIA/1884/2). 
Morris, apparently, did not even employ a standards engineer or an experimental 
engineer until 1949 (Overy 1976: 82). But Morrie methods were 'Tayloristic' 
(Tolliday and Zeitlin 1986: 38) and the time for tasks carried out by workers 
entirely in the hands of employers (Whiting 1983: 3 1). With F. G. Woollard at 
Morris, and C. R- F. Engelbach at Austin, both companies employed outstanding 
production engineers. 
Ile picture was not uniform across the whole of the industry. According to 
Tolliday, even after the war'Jaguar were still making pre-war quality models by 
pre-war methods' (1986a: 219). And despite using Bedaux at the Tysley plant in the 
1930s, Rover only introduced assembly line methods in 1946 (Whipp and Clark 
1986: 70). But the largest producers, Austin and Morris, were leading practitioners 
of scientific management methods. WooUard's paper to the institution of 
Automobile Engineers on British methods of continuous production 'created quite 
a stir among production engineers! (Machinery Feb. 1925). In it he argued the case 
for flow production even where quantities to be _produced 
fell far short of those in 
the American industry. The key was the mechanical movement of the workpiece 
under time controL 'The mechanised movement is a metronome which beats out 
time for the whole of the works ..... If used wisely 
it sets a pace which in itself it 
helps to maintain; it discovers weak spots in the organisation, and shows up 
inequalities in method which, once visible, good management can quickly remedy 
(Woollard 1924). In a fiorther development of his ideas, Woollard argued that even 
producers of quite small production runs could take advantage of flow methods by 
grouping components to permit the layout of machines in operation sequence. But 
at bottom., efficiency, Woollard argued, 'is largely a matter of timing, and the virtue 
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of the flow line resides in the fact that it helps us to take control of the time we are 
buying' (1954: 42,85). 
Engelbach was just as concerned with time. 'Our efforts', he wrote, 'have been 
concentrated on reducing Operation times by minutes and seconds. New plant, new 
machines, new devices to save time in machining or, handling; new methods, new 
processes and new ideas on organisation have flowed unchecked from the brain of 
the engineer' (193 3). Engelbach was truly a man in the Taylor tradition. In 193 3 he 
conducted experiments to discover the difference between the weight of materials 
bought in and the weight in material finally delivered to the customer. In the case 
of a seven horse power saloon, he found that of 22lbs of paint drawn from store, 
only 21bs adhered to the finished body. The figures were probably produced by the 
Efficiency Department. 'Our Efficiency Department is really the works', wrote 
Enizelbach 'The department works out the principles and methods of manufacture C7 1 
of each article to the smallest detair (Proceedings, Automobile Engineers 1927- 
28). 
There is evidence of similar developments in the management of production in bus 
and tram construction, and in railway workshops and carriage building. At the 
Chiswick Repair Works of the London Central Omnibus Company in 1923, buses 
entered the works in a bus de-mounting department. In a highly organised 
operation the chassis proceeded down a line with component stripping and 
servicing bays placedat right angles to it. Assembly reversed the process allowing 
a fine division of labour between strippers, viewers and assemblers (Cassiers Dec. 
1923)12. At Short Bros. in Rochester where the bodies for the London Omnibus 
company as well as car bodies for Citroen and Renault were made, the standard 
bodies were all manufactured with jig processes, using little skilled labour (The 
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Engineer July 1923). The description of production methods at Short Bros. was 
4milar to that at the Derby Railway Coach works of the London, Mdland and 
Scottish Railway, 'two somewhat similar woodworking schemes both organised by 
engineers' (The Engineer Oct. 1923). Where the skilled body maker had once 
marked out every piece of timber individually, the use ofjigs and the machining of 
parts to accurate limits, now entailed the marking Out of only one part and the 
duplication of the rest. Carriage parts were assembled on a locating jig, squeezed 
together with compressed air cylinders, and fixed by a screw driving machine 
(Engineering Oct. 1923). A visiting delegation from the National Union of Vehicle 
Builders reported that they had been'impressed beyond measure as they saw the 
sldll of the hand craftsman carried through by jig and machine in minutes that once 
represented hours of skiffed labour' (NUVB Oct. 1923). R- W. Reid, the chief 
carriage and wagon superintendent, claimed to have reduced the time taken to 
build a carriage body from six weeks to six days. An even more streamlined 
operation was run at Derby in the construction of railway wagons, with the wagons 
moving between work stations on the assembly line principle (Engineering Dec. 
192-3). 
Drummond has argued that the post-war re-grouping of railway companies 
brought railway workshop re-organisation in the 1920s (1989: 25). Certainly the 
London, Midland and Scottish Railway was said to have abandoned pre-war 
traditions in railway workshops as well as in carriage construction, a view 
supported by the claim that the LMS was 50% cheaper than continental railways 
(Engineering Aug. 1930). At the Crewe locomotive works in 1928 the work was 
moved to the man, again on the assembly line principle, with engines hauled down 
the shop by electric winches through eight work stations. T'he layout of the works, 
said one commentator, was designed to process the work with as little movement 
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and labour as possible, 'and that a time had been fixed for the various operations, in 
accordance with modem ideas in manufacturing shops'(Beames 1928). Similarly at 
the Acton works of the underground railway the progressive system was given a 
trial in 1924 with work moved through successive stages on bogies (The Engineer 
Feb. 1924). 
Substantial accounts of the structure of management control and its operation, 
whether at the level of an industry or company, are rare. But there are numerous 
references throughout the periodical literature to elements of a systematic, if not 
scientific, management. In 1920 the AEU reported that Harper Bean in Tipton 
were'trying to introduce mass production methods as in America(AEU Reports 
April 1920). At the heavy engineering company, Davy Bros. in Sheffield, where 
there was virtually no repetition work, there was a works planning department, 
charts and progress cards, predetermined feeds and speeds and a rate-fudng 
department (Machinery Aug. 1923). At Herbert Morris in Loughborough in 1927 
some progress had been made in standardising drawings, there was a progress and 
tracking department and a system ofjob cards provided by the planning office 
(Engineering June 1927). At David Brown and Sons in Huddersfield 'the sequence 
of operations was laid out by a staff of men having works experience' in planning 
and production departments (Engineering May 1930). Anne Shaw, the motion 
study expert who trained with Lilian Gilbreth in America, worked at Metropolitan 
Vickers in Manchester, and 75% of the boys being trained were given six weeks in 
the motion study department to encourage orderly arrangement of work (Fleming 
1937). 
How far such scattered examples provide a reliable guide to management practice 
is difficult to say. But as early as 1923, P. I Pybus, managing director of English 
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Electric claimed that 'The whole of the internal organisation of many of our largest 
factories has been revised and in many cases entirely changed .... In the best type of 
factory in Europe or in the United States many of the plants so nearly resemble one 
another as to surprise the expert of any one particular nation or class of producer. 
who visits both', (AEU Reports Aug. 1923). Visits organised by the Anglo 
American Council in the 1940s confirmed a comparability among larger plants,, 
though they still found significant differences in terms of the extent of mechanical 
handling. Differences in levels of mechanisation and managerial sophistication were 
more marked in the smaller and medium sized companies. But not all such 
companies can be written off as a managerial dead loss. Those associated with the 
Management Research Groups, like Baker Perkins and Imperial Typewriters, had 
production plannin and rate fixing departments and a number, like Venesta, Ifigh 
Duty Alloys and British Xylonite had used consultants to establish standards of 
production (Ward w/2/5 June 1937). 
Case Study Contrasts 
Littler' s argument that 'the history of scientific minagement in Britain in the inter- 
war period is largely the history of Bedau)e (1982: 108) provides far too narrow a 
focus. There were no Bedaux engineers in the big car companies nor at the 
Rowntree Cocoa Works where, according to C. 1-1 Northcott, scientific 
management had been testedwith the workers educated to accept it as a 
procedure, philosophy and idea'(1937)13. At companies like Manders Paints and 
Lucas, Bedaux was part of a wider process of management reorganisation. At icrs 
metal companies, Bedaux was grafted onto inadequately developed management 
structures. in this section I will illustrate something of the range and unevenness of 
production management as it developed between the wars. 
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Manders Paints in Wolverhampton signed an agreement with the TGWVs Ernest 
Bevin in 1932 which introduced the country's first forty hour week 'concurrently 
with the introduction of a scientific planning system! (Mander p255). The Bedaux 
company provided the scientific planning, in the first instance in the Heath Town 
Paint Department, where work was to be 'timed and controlled by a system known 
as work units! (Mander p207). A year later the system was installed in the paint 
factory, warehouse and despatch departments, and the dry colour works, and plans 
laid to extend it to the office (Ward w/8/29-34/12 June 1933). Despite the 
company's claims for it, Bedaux seems to have been a mixed experience. Geoffrey 
Mander told the Management Research Groups that calling in an outside firm, of 
advisors had been 'a first class blunder' because they were a red rag to a bull for the 
trade union movement. According to the local TGWU official, less than half the 
productive workers were on the forty hour week in 1935 and an attempt to spread 
the system provoked a strike (Lab2/206 I/IR1441/193 8). But Manders remained 
terribly proud of their 1932 agreement which attracted national attention. 
In 1935 Geoffrey Mander was the UK spokesperson at the sixth international 
congress for scientific management in London. His interest in scientific 
management can be traced to the work of the National Institution of Industrial 
Psychology14. Tbough critical of American efficiency experts he had long been 
interested in what the comp any sj ournal called 'the new science of the p sychology 
of industry', the study of fatigue and rest periods and'the economy of movement', 
as well as vocational selection and'general factors determining efficiency of worle 
(The Green Can Oct. 192 1). Manders! managers (and employees) were regular 
participants at the Oxford management conferences and Eric Farmer, the time and 
motion study expert from the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, conducted a 
series of experiments in 1922 in the can department Vith a view to reducing 
142 
fatigue to a minimum! (The Green Can May 1922). In the case of Manders, 
engaging Bedaux in 1932 was entirely consistent with longer term developments. 
Bedaux was introduced at Lucas in 1931 but ten years earlier a management re- 
organisation. was undertaken which aimed to increase ý4e degree of specialisation, 
set up a planning and progress department and meet the need for a more scientific 
procedure. A works accountant was appointed to improve the flow of information 
and to provide a week by week wage analysis breaking down labour costs for 
different operations for each shop, and an outside consultant, Robert Stefling, was 
engaged to prepare a report on the introduction of a planning department (Lucas 
Minutes June, Sept., Oct. 192 1). Stelfing may have demanded too radical a re- 
organisation. He had been critical of British managers for half- hearted 
implementations of the Taylor systeni, including so-called planning departments 
consisting of one clerk in a progress section (Steffing 1919). At any rate, his 
preliminary report was received early in 1922 but does not seem to have been acted 
Upon. 
It is clear nonetheless that Lucas was making efforts to streamline its management 
- and apply the lessons of the American experience. Ille managing director, Peter 
Bennett, defended the level of non-productive wages in 1921 aspart of our 
deliberate ainL As we express it "we intend to spend money at the front end of the 
job" and to cut out work in the later stages! (Lucas Minutes Nov. 192 1). Trips to 
la. America by Oliver Lucas and other managers kept the American example 
constantly before the company. Following one such trip in 1926 the Board noted 
that 'it will be readily understood that it is quite impossible to take any ready made 
system, but what we can and do expect is to apply the principles which have been 
successful m the light of our own requirements! (Lucas Minutes Sept. 1926). 'Me 
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first conveyor was installed at Great King Street in 1924 and new production 
methods were'developed in the factory by a new department of methods engineers 
started by K G. Purcell, adding up to the beginning of mass production of 
components to keep pace with the expanding motor industr. V (Nockolds 
1976: 186). The company Was sufficiently confident in its own methods that when 
CAV was taken over in 1926 shop floor layouts, office, works and cost systems 
were completely re-organised along Lucas lines (Lucas Minutes 1926). In 1927, 
another Lucas manager, Bertram Waring, installed a new open plan office with 
'Veeda. counters on the typewriter keys and a method of counting the number of 
ledger postings' (Nockolds 1976: 209). 
Management methods were clearly well developed before Bedaux was called in and 
though Bedaux was important, it was in the stimulus to more thoroughgoing 
mmagement re-organisation that Bedaux made the biggest impact. Albert Sidall, 
head of the process planning department, described how the Lucas Point Plan 
System (the successor to Bedaux) and the time-study department led to a 
fundamental change which found expression in a new Process Planning 
Department. His description is worth quoting at length: 
Tllis was the beginning of a modem management system distinct from the 
old Lucas system- The technology, instead of being organised on the shop 
floor, was decided by people working outside the shop who determined 
how things should be made and what equipment should be used for making 
them. Ile previous system was based on the shop foremen or 
superintendents. They were the manufacturing management, men of all 
work - and some of them were damn good, I must say - they decided how 
the job should be done, they decided what equipment would be needed, in 
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many cases they actually made the equipment themselves in their own small 
toolroom, or they told the main toolroom. what they wanted; they fixed a 
time for the job, and dealt with the social problems of the people - they 
dealt with every aspect of the manufacturing scene. The Process Planning 
Department started with two or three, people, and gradually built up until it 
became quite powerfiiL It really made decisions on how things should be 
made and what equipment should be used, and that had quite a 
revolutionary effect on the manufitcturing times and the overall efficiency of 
the plant and its profitability. In the early stages manufacturing times were 
reduced by half on a big scale, and the tools were made differently (they 
were designed on the drawing board instead of ad hoc, as it were). By 
introducing a professional body of engineers to look after the technology of 
manufacture, the process planning system was really the beginning of a 
modem production engineering system. It also had a big effect on the 
overall management structure, because you couldn't make a change like 
that, without taking in the whole of the manufacturing system, which grew 
from a complete line management to a line-and-staff management (quoted 
in Nockolds 1976: 209). 
Sidaff s testimony brings together many of the themes we have been discussing 
including the changed position of shop foremen, the new role of design office staff, 
professional engineers and production planning. It also suggests a perspective on 
the contribution of Bedaux. Time study was actually the crucial element, Bedaux 
the form it took. Both were part of the broader development of production 
management. in 1944, Lucas provided an endowment for a Department of 
production Engineering at Birmingham University. Tlie Chairman explained that 
'the Management had been very conscious of the fact that in connection with 
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Production Engineering there have been no established principles for its basic 
functions and that the principles adopted by the company were either worked out 
within the organisation. or were introduced through Consulting Engineers! (Lucas 
Minutes March 1944). Britain needed the supply of trained production engineers 
that were produced in the technical universities in America,, 
Herberts provides us with a significant contrast. Herberts helped turn the tide of 
American competition at the turn of the century and grew to become the largest 
machine tool manufacturer in Europe. Its tools were at the heart of a 
mechanisation process, intimately linked to changes in the division of labour and 
management. One might therefore have expected Herberts to have adopted the 
American methods which appeared to go with the tools. But instead, a number of 
authorities have characterised Herberts by the firms paternalism and managerial 
conservatism (Davies 1986; Grainger 1988; Tolliday 1986a). Herberts represented 
an increasingly unhappy mixture of modem and traditional production practice with 
key changes in production planning and organisation coming very late in the day 
andz-at a time when the firm was already falling behind in machine design. 
Alfted Herbert was acutely aware of modem production trends, not only those 
coming from America, but trends generated by changes in technology and shop 
practice, the new role of the drawing office and the tool room and the need for 
standardisation. He was aware too, of the need for repetition methods to be 
employed wherever possible. Capstan lathes were being built for stock rather than 
to order in 1911 and efforts were being made to reduce'the number of different 
combinations in which our machines are offered' (Herberts Minutes Sept. /Oct 
1911). nere was already a substantial toolroom producing jigs and special tools in 
1897 when the works were reorganised by an American engineer, Oscar Hammer 
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(Engineering Dec. 1898; Saul 1960: 25). Towards the close of the war Hammer 
was preparing new plans for a range of machines which could be 'continuously 
produced' and those which were to be produced in batches, and the company was 
preparing to risk the loss of some business in order to reduce its reliance on 
American imports (Herberts Mnutes Sept. /Oct 1917). In 1918, prompted by a 
series of articles by Homer in Engineering, Herbert was pressing the Board to 
investigate'the possibility of developing a system of standardisedjig making' 
(Herberts Minutes Oct. 1918). The following year an article in Cassiers offered the 
company as an example of modem engineering practice. In particular it was argued 
that costs and production progress was assured because every operation was 
timed. Ilere were detailed instructions for the worker which told him 'exactly what 
to do, the method of doing it, and the time and cost involved! (Cassiers 
1918/1919). In the same year, the efficiency expert, R N. Casson, was called in to 
prepare a report and it was arranged that he should deliver a series of six lectures 
(Herberts Mnutes Oct. 1919). 
Herbert's market made continuous production methods more difficult than they 
might have been. In 1912 the Board decided that no more orders would be taken 
for jig boring machines but bowed to the pressure of demand and continued to 
produce them As late as 1920 Alfted Herbert was still arguing that even an order 
for one such machine could not be refused (Herberts Minutes March 1912; April 
1918; Nov. 1920). Similarly, in 1924 Herberts felt obliged to put back into 
production items insisted upon by large customers (Herberts Minutes Aug. 1924). 
But if the niarket constrained management choice it did not determine it. Nor could 
pressure justify the company decision in 1921 not to re-appoint a 
production engineer. The post was'suspended in the cause of economy and would 
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be reinstated as soon conditions justify (Herberts Minutes Aug. 192 1). Board 
minutes make no finther reference to this post until 1941 when it was recorded that 
the production department was being reconstituted under M-T Bromley, who was 
now back as production engineer, though still head of the sub contract department 
(Herberts Alinutes Aug. 194 1). What had happened to production planning and 
organisation in the twenty years that had elapsed? There are few clues. Oral 
evidence in Grainger (1988: 97) suggests that there was a planning department in 
the 1930s. But there is little doubt that modem production engineering practice 
was neglected with flow production methods hampered by grouping machines 
according to type (Machinery Nov. 1928). 
With re-appointment to the production engineering post efforts seem to have been 
made to streamline production by cutting out alternative machine models, and by 
introducing a piece-part system to facilitate 'the manufacturing of individual articles 
for stock and building up assemblies ftom those stocks! (Herberts Minutes Oct. 
1942). In 1944 the Board was finally discussing proposals for reorganisation. of 
machinery into a number of complete manufactuiing sectionseach capable of 
carrying out all the operations on a selection of units' (Herberts Minutes Jan. 
1944). Each section would work to a planned timetable, ensure that work flowed 
from one machine to another and to the fitters without accumulating anywhere, and 
the workers on each section would be expected to operate as a tearn, being 
prepared to carry out different operations. 
The records do not indicate whether this plan was implemented in detail but a 
Planning and Production Control Department was established in idie same year15. In 
1946 when the new department was criticised for creating extra work and paper it 
was defended by Alfted Herbert, but in terms which suggest that some basic 
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questions had remained unresolved. 'It is necessary, argued Herbert, 'to draw up a 
logical scheme of responsibility, and whether the appointment of a production 
engineer is advisable and whether he should be the same individual as the system 
man, combining both fimctions, is a most difficult problem to solve' (Herberts 
Minutes Feb. 1946). 
ICI and its Midlands group of metal companies provide another interesting 
contrast. ICI was, by the 1930s,. 'a modem decentralised corporation with a 
functionally specialised head office exercising overall financial control and 
providing managerial and financial services to the divisions (groups)' (Hannah 
1976: 94). One such service was that provided by the Chief Labour Officer, another 
the application of time study and efficiency systems, particularly after the 
employment of the Bedaux company in 1929, though some of ICrs policies were 
better received in subsidiary companies than others. 
The Delegate Board of the Metals Group must have been a source of constant 
fiustration for ICIPs Chief Labour Officer. In 1930 the group rejected the Labour 
Officer's invitation to increase the percentage of staff grade workers (May 1930); 
rejected the suggestion that the group produce a periodic labour report simil r to 
that in the Chemical group (June 1930); and suggested themselves that the Central 
Labour Office cease to provide reports on accidents and sickness absence (July 
1930). TIle following year the Metals Group expressed the view that there should 
be no changes in pension or redundancy arrangements if it increased costs (Jan. 
193 1); they were not impressed with a Labour Office suggestion that there should 
be a period of notice before termination of employment (Feb. 193 1) and were still 
resisting the policy of one weeles notice three years later (Aug. 1934). In 1935 the 
Board could not agree to accept ICIPs more generous holiday entitlements (Feb. 
149 
193 5) and the following year recommended that women be excluded from icrs 
new pension scheme (Feb. 1936). In 1937 the Board rejected Labour Office 
suggestions that pay increases granted by the Engineering Employers Federation 
should be augmented to bring the metal group more into line with other ICI 
companies and opposed proposals for improving fiictqry amenities (July and Oct. 
1937). Even by the standards of the time the members of the Delegate Board seem 
to have been hard men. 'Meir minutes solemnly record that 'no serious accidents' 
occurred in April 1934; those of a less serious nature included an employee 
unconscious for half an hour having been overcome by fumes and the amputation 
of the ring finger on another employee (May 1934). 
TIley were more sympathetic to Bedauxs system of labour management which was 
introduced into a number of the Metal Group companies, including Lightning 
Fasteners, Allen Everitts, Holfords and John Marstons in Wolverhampton. At 
Marston's in 1935, there were 289 workers out of a total workforce of 669 on 
Bedaux, the largest number being 122 in the machine shop (Marston Minutes 
1935). But in complete contrast to ICL and companies like Lucas, and even 
Manders Paints, production management at Marston's seems to have been 
primitive. In the same year that Bedaux engineers were at work, the Marston 
Board was debating 'the advisability of engaging a man experienced in works 
management'. One of the members, Mr Dalrymple, thought it unnecessary since if 
he had more clerical assistance he could concentrate more on the production side 
(Marston Minutes 1935). Two years later Marston's were considering employing 
an expert in the press shops and'it was considered that a cost man should be 
engaged with technical knowledge who would be competent to control rate 
fDdng 
and provide basic information for estimating and assisting 
in the control of 
production costs! (Marston Minutes 1937). 
150 
There may have been more progress for the metal group as a whole. A Metal 
Technical Committee was established in 1934 to be responsible for technical 
efficiency and changes in work processes (ICI Aug. 1934). Two years later there 
was a further reorganisation with new appointments to a Metal Progress and. 
Planning Department. 
In reviewing the practice of firms like Herberts and ICI, Lucas and Manders Paints, 
this section has sought to demonstrate that scientific management encompasses a 
range of experience that defies simple generalisations. Some companies that 
adopted the Bedaux system had developed production management structures, 
some did not. Herberts -a case of arrested development - moved away ftom 
production engineering at a time when its importance in industry more generally 
was growing. ICIPs sophisticated management structure and policy did not 
necessarily operate as it was intended to do in some of the devolved outposts. 
While we have concentrated on gathering and presenting the evidence to show that 
the development of production management and new management structures of 
control operated much more widely than is commonly allowed, it is clear that the 
development was extremely uneven, came very late in many cases and not at all in 
others. 
Scientific Management and the Management Movement 
John Child has argued that 'the new literature, and the activity of the management 
movement at the Oxford and similar conferences, continued to remain alien to the 
great mass of practising managers and employers! (1969: 103). Membership of 
management Institutions was minimal and there were continuing complaints of 
conservative individualism among employers and 
indifference to new ideas. 
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Focusing on the labour movement Price sirniuly concluded that Ile impact of 
scientific management did not establish a self confident and distinctive managerial 
identity. And although scientific management 'entered decisively into British 
industr_V it failed to disturb traditional social relations of production (1986: 180- 
181). 
This picture is overdrawn. it is true that elements of scientific management 
continued to be absorbed by a largely pragmatic management rather than 
management being transformed according to a definite body of principles. The 
uncertainty of production engineers about their role underlines the diversity of 
practice and suggests its uneven quality. And there is plenty of evidence for the 
conservative individualism to which Child referred. Production management was 
stilI substantially behind America when the Anglo American Council conducted its 
visits. but it was quite different from what it had been before the first world war. 
The changing structures of management control and production management 
discussed above are in themselves evidence of changed practice, and it is difficult 
to see how scientific management could enter decisively into industrial life without .. 
disturbing social relations of production. 
The first attempt to establish an organisation representative of management, rather 
than one or another of its particular fimctions, was a dismal failure. Ile Institution 
of Industrial Administration was founded in 1919 but by 1923 its work was at a 
standstill and it had collapsed altogether by 1924. Nor was industrial consultancy 
significant in the twenties. T. G. Rose, the historian of the IIA and an industrial and 
engineering consultant, could only add three names (one of them E. T. Elbourne) 
to a list of industrial experts being compiled by the Board of Trade in 193 1. Rose's 
efforts brought the Board's total to seven (BT/56/44/CLA/1884/5). However, there 
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was no shortage of organisations with a particular or sectoral focus for British 
managers, including a host of institutions for CK Mechanical, Electrical, 
Automobile and Production Engineers and Cost and Works Accountants to name 
only the most prominent. In 1927 Rowntree helped establish the Management 
kesearch Groups, as he had earlier established the Oxford Management 
Conferences. 
Interest in management grew in the 1930s. In 193 1,, the wel&re workers changed 
their name to the Institution of Labour Management and in the next two years 
associations were established for Works Managers, Purchasing Managers and 
Office Managers. In 1935, a Confederation of Management Associations was 
founded which attempted to link a number of these organisations and tried, though 
without much success, to develop its own examinations and professional standards 
(Rose 1954: 87). E. T. Elbourne's, Fundamentals ofIndustrial Administration 
(1933), was designed as a text book for the first stage of the Institution of 
Industrial Administration syllabus, which had itself been remodelled to fit in with 
the syllabus of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, and later, the Institution of 
Electrical Engineers (Rose 1954). There is a strong case for regarding Mourne's 
writing, with its advice on planning and process control from a central office and 
time study to find the best way of worldng and reduce fatigue and costs, as 
constituting a kind of conventional wisdom on questions of workshop management 
and organisation by the mid 1930s (Elboume 1934). 
If aH this activity only just added up to a management movement it was sufficient 
to command widespread support throughout industry and commerce for the Sixth 
international Congress for Scientific Management held in London in 1935, which in 
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turn led to the establishment of the British Management Council and eventually to 
the founding of the British Institution of Management in 1948. 
The 1935 Congress was not the first that attracted British participation. Twenty 
eight delegates from Britain had attended the second international congress in 
Rome in 1927 (there were 32 from the USA), where Urwick gave a paper drawing 
attention to the work of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board and the National 
Institution of Industrial Psychology (Engineering Sept. 1927). British preparations 
for the sixth congress were on a rather grander scale. Two hundred and twenty 
seven companies subscribed to congress fimds including Ford, Morris and Austin 
from the car industry; the major banks like Barclays and Lloyds; retailers like 
Sainsbury and Debenhams; and manufacturers from Bibby through Lucas to 
Mather and Platt, Raleigh and Vickers (mss/200/F/3/52/10/25). Participation was 
clearly no guarantee of commitment to scientific management. Courtaulds, whose 
management had been positively hostile to Taylorism, attended alongside Lucas 
where the Bedaux company had been called in a few years earlier. Nevertheless, 
the scale -of support is impressive and significant' Ifthere had been a derisory level 
of interest in scientific management it is unlikely that the organisers would have 
risked a London venue. Ile congress was a prestigious national event - opened by 
the Duke of Kent - and one that companies in the public eye were keen enough to 
support. It also suggests the degree to which scientific management had become 
synonymous with management itself 
A committee for the seventh congress was established immediately afterwards 
headed by Lord Leverhulme, who, as the designated president for the congress, was 
concerned that there should be a central co-ordinating body in Britain to mobilise 
support. After a good deal of in-fighting about the role of such an organisation a 
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British Management Council was formed in 1937 to ensure British partiCTation in ii 
international bodies. Although the Federation of British Industries had helped 
convene the early meetings, they took little fin-ther part and there were complaints 
that it was difficult to get the support of manufacturers. The various professional 
bodies were more interested but they had no money. Despite these difficulties forty 
one companies attended the seventh congress in America in 108 where Urwick 
presented his paper on The Development of Scientific Management in Britain. In 
1944, the British Management Council, the Institution of Industrial Administration 
the Confederation of Management Associations and the Management Research 
Groups, together with a number of professional bodies, took the first steps leading 
to the formation of the British Institute of Management (Rose 1954: 127) 
Scientific and Labour Management 
In remarks to Production Engineers, Baliol Scott, Leverhulme's Secretary on the 
Committee for the Seventh International Congress for Scientific Management, 
claimed that 'It is on personnel problems that this country has probably the greatest 
contribution -to make' 
(Proceedings, Production Engineers May 1938). It was 
always a dubious claim but its substance has been repeated many times (Merlde 
1980; Mant 1977; IPitzGerald 1988)16. There is in fact a widespread assumption 
that the crude notion of economic min in Taylors thought, and the unforgiving 
reduction of the worker to a defined task in Taylors practice, was displaced by 
more sophisticated industrial psychology and labour management strategies. It was 
just such an assumption that Braverman attacked so vigorously in describing the 
practitioners of human relations asthe maintenance crew for the human machinerý 
(1974: 87). 
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If Bravermaes comment underestimates the influence of human relations it is not 
mistaken about the complementary rather than competing nature of the relationship 
between scientific and labour management. Jacoby describes production 
management and human relations in Americas as two contending forces but notes 
that 'Several of the nation's first personnel departments were sited in firms with 
strong ties to Taylor. The Taylor Society itself was dominated after 1915 by 
people committed to 'combinin progressive social ideals with efficient 
management practices! (1985: 47,102). Indeed, in 1920 the Taylor Society endorsed 
collective bargaining by both trade unions and shop unions and the AFL in turn 
endorsed efficiency (Mechanical Engineering Jan. 1920; Nadworny 195 5). In 
Britain, welfare strategies 'were increasingly used in the newer industries in which 
Taylorism and Bedaux were strongest' (Jones 1983: 72). 
Scientific management was a 'progressive' movement17. Its enthusiasts denounced 
the conservatism of employers as well as workers. They attacked the lump of 
labour fallacy but also demanded high wages for productive work; criticised laissez 
faire and lauded planning. They offered a vision of social and industrial peace based 
on worker and employer co-operation in generating a surplus big enough to have 
no need to argue about its distribution. Scientific managers were more likely than 
others to welcome new ideas about human relations because they were seen, by 
Taylor's successors, as an extension of the science of management. There are few 
ideas more mistaken than the notion that scientific management was inconsistent 
with human relations, trade unions and collective bargaining, or with the host of 
management strategies that followed Taylor (Waring 199 1). 
Criticism of Taylorism for its neglect of the human factor was commonplace, but 
this phrase must be treated with extreme caution. It was used to refer to the 
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management of workers as machines rather than people and to the specific 
activities of welfare workers. But it was also used by motion study experts to stress 
the need to discover the most efficient motions in order to reduce fatigue. The 
neglect of the human factor was a slogan used as often by those urging their own 
special brand of scientific'management as it was by committed opponents. WeMll, 
examine briefly the inter-war development of the management of the human factor 
by welfare workers and industrial psychologists, and argue that the latter offered 
their own form of scientific management as an improvement on Taylorism, not an 
alternative to it. It is also argued that despite the efforts of both, labour 
management was more weakly developed than production management before the 
second world war. 
Inman records the following comment of a managing director of one armaments 
firm faced with the state's efforts to promote personnel management in the second 
world war: 'I do not quite understand the reference to "personnel management". I 
object to the word "management" and I do not have a personnel manager in my 
works. I do not see how anyone who is not responsible for production in any way 
can "manage". We do however, have supervisors or superintendents dealing with 
welfare matters' (1957: 263). Even among more progressive employers scepticism 
about personnel management was not uncommon. Personnel managers at Lever 
Bros. and Rowntree, observed one critic at a Management Research Group 
meeting, only thought they controlled matters that were really in the hands of the 
production men (Ward w/8/29-34/12 Jan. 193 1). Nevertheless, two overlapping 
developments between the wars were laying the foundations for the growth of 
personnel management during and following the second world war. 
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The move to establish the Welfare Workers Association was initiated at York in 
1913 and confirmed at a conference in Leeds in 1917, with interest in the 
movement significantly enhanced by the activities of the welfare department of the 
Ministry of Munitions and the reports of the Health of Munitions Workers 
Committee. In 1918 Robert Hyde founded the Industrial Welfare Society which 
became, in 1965, the Industrial Society. The Welfare Workers remained a separate 
organisation but was renamed the Institution of Industrial Welfare Workers in 1924 
and again as the Institution of Labour Management in 193 1, adopting the modem 
title of the Institution of Personnel Management in 1946. 'The turning from welfare 
by way of employment to labour management' (Niven 1967: 80) which took place 
in the 1920s was foreshadowed in early claims by the Welfare Workers post-war 
secretary, Miss E. B. Voysey, that welfare workers were a part of management 'on 
a par with the accountant, engineer and other officers! (mss/197/l/ec/l/1). 
The welfare work stream that fed the personnel management movement was 
distinct from scientific management but not inconsistent with it. Voysey told the 
Industrial-Reconstruction Council that the fimctions of welfare work and scientific 
management were complementary (1919: 11). The'marriage of welfare and 
management' (Whiteside 1980) was sold to employers as'a business proposition 
pure and simple' (The Engineer Nov. 1916). Companies like Renold were 
prominent in founding the Welfare Workers Association alongside Rowntree, 
WD&HO Wills, Vickers, Armstrong and Hadfields. Among the presidents of the 
organisation were C. H. Northcott who had educated Rowntree's workers to 
accept scientific management, and Anne Shaw, the prominent motion study expert 
at Metropolitan Vickers. 
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The immediate post-war years were marked by a heightened awareness of 
employment management. In 1918 Machinery called for a production man to be 
directly responsible 'for labour and its management as a specialist activity. He 
should be the paid representative of the men, his salary being provided by the 
management' (March 19 18). Po st-war labour disputes concentrated the mind. 'Our 
present method of handling libour questions', wrote Ae Engineer, 'reminds us of 
the condition of the art of steel making before the new science of metallurgy was 
born'. A new science of industrial sociology was required to understand the 
periodic disturbances and rebellions in industry fornot until we know the laws of 
industrial life can we hope to control it' (Jan. 1919). There was a need, thought 
Engineering, for an employment manager, someone who would probably be 
regarded by the superintendents as a revolutionary and by the men 'as a plausible 
fellow who is endeavouring to entice them into the parlour of the capitalist spider 
.... he is the head of what might be called the Industrial Relations Department' (Jan. 
192 1). In America, the personnel function grew slowly in the 1920s and fell back 
sharply in the depression after 1929. In Britain, the anticipated development of 
labour management fell victim to the earlier depression after 1921. Welfare 
supervisors and labour managers had to justify their existence. The movement was 
forced to mark time and in 1939 'there were still more welfare supervisors than 
labour managers! (Niven 1978: 71,8 1). 
Psychological and Scientific Management 
The second group of people focusing on the human factor were the industrial 
psychologists of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board (later the Industrial Health 
Research B6ard), and the colleagues and associates of Charles Myers at the 
National Institution of Industrial Psychology. Founded in 1918, the IFRB grew out 
of the work of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee. The board produced 
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84 special research monographs between 1918 and 1939 with its interests shifting 
in the 1930s from work methods, including time and motion studies, to vocational 
psychology (McIvor 1987: 167,169). The NUP, founded in 192 1, worked closely 
with the ffRB and was engaged in much the same field of work. The NUP also 
moved from mption -study to pay more attention to worlk 1ayout, promotion, pay, 
discipline and to questions of morale and 'atmosphere' in the 1930s (Machinery 
March 1930; The Engineer Dec. 1936). 
McIvor stresses the genuine health preoccupation of the psychologists and their 
contribution to the exposure of the scientific crudities of Taylorism citing Sir David 
Munro's 'vituperative attack on the efficiency engineers! labour management 
techniques' at the 3 8th Oxford Management Conference (1987: 174). Sir David, 
secretary to the ff", had told the conference that he did 'not believe that one can 
tick out the seconds of buman work Eke a clock ticks out seconds'. He was equally 
critical of payment systems 'cunningly employed as an incentive in speeding up 
production'. Whether this was a particularly vituperative attack may be a matter of 
_ 
judgement. But when chaflenged by Anne Shaw, 'who defended time and motion 
study, Sir David beat a hasty retreat. He readily agreed that such studies may not 
be doing any harm and that, of course, 'they were instituted entirely to save 
workers from making unnecessary movements - unnecessary effort. AR I did say 
was that they are very easily exploited' (British Management Review July/Sept. 
1938). 
The criticism offered by the psychologists did not concern motivation but the 
Gilbreth notion of the one best way and the way in which time and motion study 
should be used. Eric Farmer of the URB underlined the differences in reporting his 
study of sweet dipping in 1922. The Purpose of time study, he argued, was to 
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ascertain the time it took to complete an operation, not to set a time; motion study 
was used to identify the movements which, once learned, would be easiest for the 
workers to perform, not necessarily those which were quickest or involved the 
shortest travel. The aim was to see whether the combination of psychological and 
physiological research could alter and improve methods of working. In the. case of 
sweet dipping unproductive time was cut from 21% to 7.44%, principally by using 
a larger tray for the sweets and ensuring regular supplies of sugar (Farmer 1922). 
Charles Myers, who headed the NIIP and was on the Board of the H7RB, put 
forward a more systematic critique counterposing psychological to scientific 
managementI8. The latter, he argued, was a failure in Britain. The workers opposed 
it and management were critical because it failed to deal with the human aspect. 
Taylor was called in aid to prove that scientific management required an ox-like 
man who would be reduced to the level of a machine. Scientific management had 
made a great contribution to improved organisation but the merely mechanical 
innovations of the engineer or technical expert were fraught with danger. His 
solution was-not to dispense with Taylorism however, but to supervise it. 
'Scientific management', he concluded, 'needs to be supervised and controlled by 
psychological management' (1920: 773). In part it was a problem of the 'tactlessness 
of Taylors genius', though Myers critique did go deeper (1932: 13). Ile aim of 
industrial psychology'was not to speed up the worker directly, but to obtain 
increased output by discovering the most effective methods of work, eliminating 
the needless movements, wasteful energy and friction! (Cassiers Nov. 1923). There 
was no one best way argued Myers, since it was a mistake 'to force aH workers into 
a common mould'. And efficiency experts were attacked because their 'mechanistic 
attitude lead them rather to time study the worker as if he were a machine, to set 
hourly or daily tasks which an efficient worker should be expected to perform and 
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to devise elaborate systems of payment which, in their mistaken belief that 
prescribed tasks and proffered bonuses are the main incentives to production, will 
induce the worker to give his best'(1933: 29). 
The differences were significant. But it is doubtful if they were more fimdamental 
than the differences between Gilbreth and Taylor's successors over stop-watch tune 
study or other schisms within the scientific management church. It is ironic that 
Gilbreth should have been a particular target of Myers criticism since Myers had 
more in common with the Anne Shaw tradition of motion study than either of them 
did with scientific management consultants who placed payment systems at the 
centre of their activities. It is significant too, perhaps, that when the TUC 
investigated Bedaux it turned to Myers and the NIIP for advice. Although the TUC 
was itself increasingly receptive to efficiency systems it still distinguished the 
human-centred motion study of the NIT from time and motion studies linked to 
honus eamings. 
However, it is unlikely that workers with experience of the MIIP distinguished 
between Myers! motion study and that of Anne Shaw. Myers defined the primary 
I 
object of movement study as'to improve those movements of the worker that are 
necessary to the effective execution of a given operation, and to abolish those that 
are unnecessary' (1933: 78). He emphasised the importance of the workers! natural 
rhythms, and declared that 'no industrial psychologist would desire to force a 
worker to one method of work if the latter could demonstrate that another method 
was better suited to him! (1933: 98). Probably Anne Shaw wouldn't 
have either, but 
it is not clear how the worker would have demonstrated to either of them that an 
alternative was better than the method devised 
by the scientist. Myers cites the 
following examples of the successful application of industrial psychology. Workers 
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stalking raisins were taught a new method involving the use of both hands leading 
to an increase in output of over 11%; a new workbench was provided for workers 
packing chocolates so that output depended more on rhythm than voluntary 
decisions; workers in a sweet dipping department were 'instructed to carry out a 
simple wider circular movement instead of stopping the arm twice and changmigthe 
direction of movement. And in an assigument at a Lancashire coal mine that Taylor ' 
would have been proud ot 'The investigators trained the workers to wield the pick 
(wherever possible) in a continuous curved path! (1933: 88-90). 
If sweet dippers and coal miners missed the subtleties of industrial psychology's 
differences with Taylorism, so did many of their contemporaries'9. Cassiers 
reported the M. P., Mr T. Shaw, supporting continued funding for the ff; RB under 
the heading The National Value of Scientific Management (Cassiers March 192 1). 
Engineering reported the work of the IFRB at the Derwent Foundry as an 
application of scientific management, noting in particular that motion study was 
being used to split jobs into their elements and timin used to eliminate superfluous 
movement (Engineering Oct. 1919). Reporting the work of Charles Myers and 
others on the subject of fatigue, Machinery thought that 'These constitute a distinct 
branch of scientific management, which, however, can be regarded as apart, 
although bearing upon such questions as rates of pay, restriction of output and 
similar matters usually associated with scientific management' (Aug. 1919). 
Engineering made a common connection between the work of the NIIP on 
employee selection and Taylors concern to ensure that only first class men were 
employed (Aug. 193 1). 
Throughout the 1920s the WRB conducted a number of studies, some of them 
under laboratory conditions, some at the request of employers, 
including Eric 
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Farmer's work for Manders. The N-UP was more directly involved in the 
consultancy business and appeared to be moderately successK increasing fee 
income from around LI, 100 in 1921 to L21,480 in 1931 (Machinery April 1927, 
March 193 1). In 1932 the NIIP was called in by Lucas to investigate the position in 
the tool room, 'to find out the cause of friction there and to, report to management' 
(AEU Reports Oct. 1932). There is no reason however, to quarrel with the general 
conclusion of McIvor (1987) that the response of British management to the N`RB 
and NIIP was weak and that their impact was limited. The fact that much, if not all, 
the work of the N`RB on fatigue, the effects of monotony, rest pauses and 
incentives were conducted with women workers, suggests a limited scope for its 
operations. 
McIvor accounts for the limited itrq)act by the failure of the HTB to market its 
services', the financial costs, low management receptivity and employer cost cutting 
and preoccupation with economic problems after 192 1. But we might add that the 
very reservations which the industrial psychologists had about Taylorism, 
particularly incentive schemes, whatever their justification, reduced rather than ' 
increased their appeal. TIle work of the ffRB and the NIIP was criticised as too 
academic, being described as 'laboratory work by men of laboratory not industrial 
science' (Engineering Jan. 1923). When the WRB called for their findings to be 
tried out in industry,, Engineering disagreed. Ile ff" experiments had been 
carried out by scientists not industriAsts. What was needed was an enquiry into 
the success of Taylors methods in the United States (Engineering Aug. 1924). 
Conclusion 
Scientific management created new divisions of labour among managers as well as 
-I- shop floor workers. In this chapter we have seen how the growth of office services 
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generally, and the of the production engineering fimction in particular, created new 
structures of management controL institutionalising the distinction between 
conception and execution. In the process the engineer became more of a manager 
and administrator and the foreman a servant of the progress and planning 
departments now directing production. Evidence of the operation of these new 
structures of production planning and control is found across a range of industries 
from the new light engineering and electrical companies to railway workshops and 
was highly developed in the major car plants of Austin and Morris. 
Tbree important qualifications need to be registered. First, there was no common 
model to which the new departments or managerial fimctions conformed. X in 
Satchwell' s words, the subtleties of production were now to be found in the layout 
or plan of manufacture rather than in manufacture itseK the actual role and 
importance of planning departments still varied widely from one company to 
another. Second, modem structures of production management did not always 
operate efficiently, as testimony from Willans Works in Rugby shows. Nor, as the 
example of Marstons shows, did the use of an explicitly Taylorist scheme like 
Bedaux always signify a developed management. structure. And thirdly, 
development of the new management fimctions was far from universal. Among the 
bigger companies, Herberts was probably unusual in leaving vacant its production 
engineering post for twenty years as an economy measure, but in many small or 
medium sized companies, such functions will still have been carried out by the 
directors. 
Nevertheleis, it is clear that scientific iman agement in the sense of 'the planning and 
dis, )atching of operations on the basis of a prearranged time schedule' (Kimball jr 
1927: 293) became much more firmly established in the years between the wars. 
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Turning to the wider management question, the scientific management movement, 
and its advocates in the Management Research Groups and Institution of Industrial 
Admini ation, wielded considerably greater influence by the end of the 1930s. 
The founding pf the British Institution of Managemenfowed a good deal to the 
participants in the committee for the sixth international congress for scientific 
management and its successor, the British Management Councl 
Finally, it is clear that there was more to unite industrial psychologists and labour 
managers with Taylorism than to separate thern. The management of the liuman 
factor' would build on Taylorism, not replace it. 
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Notes 
This definition, or something close to it, is by far the most common. See for example, Sir 
William Ashley (1922), ýScientific management may be defined as the conscious application of 
directing intelligence to given manufacturing operations' 
McGuffie (1985: 114) seems to think that the system of premium apprenticeship played a 
role in producing hyper-qualified labour but the system was in decline from the turn of the 
century and is better seen as part of the crisis of workshop training which employers never 
satisfactorily solved. 
Routh (1965: 22) says that the proportion of managers does not increase as production 
methods advance, but figures in table 8 on p23 show the proportion of managers and 
administrators among all occupational classes growing from 3.43% to 5.53% between 1911 and 
1951. 
4 Membership of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers grew two and half times to 6346 
between 1898 and 1913; membership of eight national engineering institutions reached 40,000 in 
1914. By way of comparison, the Society of German Engineers had a membership of 6,900 in 
1890 
By 1923, the office staff were the biggest category, 879 office staff and 659 rate fixers 
and inspectors 
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6 Correspondence in Engineering detailed complaints of low pay and long hours for war- 
time 'officials' in the office and demands for trade union protection (Dec. 1918; March, April 
1919). In 1922 the National Foremen's Association had 3,400 members; the Amalgamated 
Managers and Foremen's Association, 3,100 members and the Scottish Foremen's Association 
'had 
1,000 members (mss237/3/l/97, I). 
At the GEC plant at Witton, the planning department provided'an advisory service 
relieving managers of much of the detailed investigation of Organisation and methods and leaving 
them free to attend to the day to day running of their department! (Gracie 1951: 195) 
In his English Journey, Priestly (1968: 13 1) described a modern manufacturing plant in 
these terms, 'You hardly see a sign of active supervision. The foreman class has been nearly 
eliminated.. Only one or two men in an office know exactly what has happened from beginning 
to end ... You never seem to see anybody telling anybody else what to 
do; the places have the 
dumb secrecy and uncontrolled orderliness of a beehive or ant hill .... 
(the) human element has 
been woven into a gigantic system of minute subdivision of labour until the whole place is really 
an enormous machine in which the workers are simply cogs and levers' 
Calls for the restoration of the authority of supervision whose functions have been taken 
over by specialists, have been commonplace (Fraser 1952); but they have not been admitted to the 
ranks of management. Hales' (1982: 99) review of research into what managers do defined 
imanagee as any job above the level of the foreman. 
10 Littler (1982) overstates the importance of the survival of sub contracting in relation to 
the emergence of new managerial methods. In America, scientific management might displace 
the contractor (Buttrick 1952), but in Britain, in engineering at least, the system was never 
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widespread, being'confined to the machine and stationary steam engine making districts of 
Northern England, and a few locomotive centres' (Jefferys, M and J. B. Jefferys 1947: 4 1) 
11 G. D. H. Cole (1945: 
ý3 
5 7) described the new industries as 'the happy hunting grounds of 
scientific management and the efficiency engineei' 
12 At the Chiswick Works, everything had been done by hand in 1921. By 1928, engine 
overhaul time had been reduced firom 85 hours to 29 hours and 500 skilled engineers had been 
discharged (Hudson Davies 1928: 234). 
13 Managers at Rowntree's cocoa works at York included Lyndall Urwick, Oliver Sheldon 
and C. H. Northcott, and although Sheldon and Northcott are more often associated with wider 
management ideas, especially the development of the personnel function, all three derived 
inspiration from F. W. Taylor and practised what they preached at York. Sheldon (1965: 35), 
Rowntree's 'organisation manage" described Taylor as 'the incomparable scientist' and although 
he endorsed 'grave psychological' objections to the notion of the 'one best way he argued that 
"The principles of Taylorism have helped vastly in the task of formulating a science of 
management ... But they 
have not in the slightest degree detracted from, and rather, have 
enhanced, the value of the pre-eminently human capacity of the manager to manage. 
14 George Ryder at the Ministry of Labour thought there was so much room for 
improvement at Manders that even a modified Bedaux system gave extraordinary results 
(LAB2/2061/IR1441/1938) 
15 Grainger (1988a: 101) says machinery was still grouped by type, making flow production 
difficult, in the 1960s. 
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16 Devinat (1927: 83) and Brown (1977: 197) are closer to the mark in suggesting that 
scientific management took the form of industrial psychology. 
17 Barley (1932) attacked'unco-ordinated individualism' and advocated a National 
Advisory Economic Planning Department of government; Urwick (1029: 22) was scathing about 
the obsession with competition 
18 Sargent Florence (1924) also sought to theorise an alternative to Taylorism based on The 
rl- Economics ofFatigue and Unrest. 
19 Fenelon (193 9) records that research into music while you work by the EHRB found that 
one steps encouraged a greater output than quick or lively march tunes! 
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Chapter 4 Workers 
Introduction 
Chapter three examined changes in the structure of management and the influence 
of scientific management on management practice between the wars. In this 
chapter I trace the effects of technical and managerial change on workers using the 
engineering industry as a case study, and discuss associated managerial strategies 
and worker responses. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the meaning of skiR and the reconstitution of 
the labour process as the management of mechanisation from the office. The 
emergence of a more highly differentiated workforce is traced in the attempt to 
adapt the institution of apprenticeship, in the changing composition of the 
workforce, and in changes to the industry itself In the second part of the chapter I 
trace the history of the machine question from the turn of the century to the second 
world war in order to illustrate employer deskilling strategies, the impact of worker 
resistance on the shop floor, and trade union attempts to accommodate change by 
negotiating a grading scheme for engineering workers. 
SkiR and the 'Craft Mode of Production' 
Against an earlier view that changes in the labour process at the turn of the century 
undermined the labour aristocracy and radicalised the craftsman (Hobsbawm. 
1976), a considerable body of work now emphasises the continuing heterogeneity 
of the working class (Reid 1978); the ability of skilled men to retain a grip on their 
status and Rinctions , especially 
in industries like shipbuilding (McLelland and Reid 
1985); and that despite all the changes in technology, the skffi exercised by the 
craftsman on the eve of the first world war was 'genuine' 
(More 1980). In 
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engineering, it has been argued, employers failed to 'break the back of craft 
regulation, (Zeitlin 1983) and that as late as 1935 'The continued centrality of 
skilled workers within the division of labour was the basis of the resurgence of 
workplace militancy' (McKinlay and Zeitlin 1989). As evidence that the'deskilling 
pundits' got it -vyrong Penn cites the numbers of skilled men in the engineering and 
electrical industries in 1966, and draws attention to the Leyland tool room revolt in, 
1972 to 'remind us that skilled engineering workers are still very salient' (1983: 78). 
The first point to make is that differences about the extent of deskilling and the fate 
of the craftsman depend, in part, on the concept of skill. It is clear that at some 
points historians with confficting opinions are simply talking about quite different 
things. Zeitlin equates craft regulation with job monopolies. For example, he 
argues that the linotype, which demanded no more skills than those of a typist, was 
captured by union compositors'and subsumed under their framework of craft 
regulation! (1985: 288). By contrast, the important point for McGuffie is that 
'employers could regulate the actual skills required in the labour process!, not who 
did the actual work (1985: 40). It has even been irgued that craftsmen successfidly 
defended themselves and were marginalised at the same time. Cook argues that 
'Using their existing skill based workplace power, craftsmen, through "assertive co- 
operation" ensure their own future importance. An additional point is that 
industrial craftsmanship has become peripheralised (e. g. maintenance electricians 
and toohnakers! (1988). 
Many of the different ways of defining 'craft' and 'skiff were reviewed by William 
Form (1987) without finding any significant measure of agreement among the 
authors who had written on the subject. The definition of craft skill adopted in this 
study is that offered by Braverman, namely, 'the combination of knowledge of 
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'materials and processes with the practised manual dexterities required to carry on a 
specific branch of productioe (1974: 443). Like all definitions it can be stretched 
this way and that to cover different degrees of knowledge and manual dexterity 
that are, in reality, qualitatively different things. But it has the virtue of identifying 
clearly enough the key constituents of knowledge and practice in a way that 
accurately reflects opinion on the question in the period under discussion. C. G. 
Renold, for example, defined skill as'knowledge, dexterity, power of decision and 
judgement in combination! (Renold 1929: 157). 
This idea of craft skiR together with the processes which were undermining it, is 
represented in the diagram below 
Figure 2 The Decomposition of Skill 
Direction from the Office 
Mechanisation 
Knowledge of materials 
and processes 
and 
practised manual 
dexterities 
Fragmentation 
Division of labour 
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Formal definitions, however, do not get us very far. More's definition of skill as 
I some Combination of manual skill and knowledge, not necessarily very 
considerable, which is useful to industr_V (1980: 16) contains the same key elements 
identified by Braverman, but might be applied equally to the 19th century 
millwright and the 20th century radial arm driller. Wepould distinguish the 
'millwright and the driller by deciding how useful or considerable theiT manual skills 
and knowledge were, but this only distinguishes degrees of skill and does not 
reveal the qualitative nature of the change in the work of the craftsman. More's 
view that engineering craftsmen exercised genuine skill before the first world war 
depends, as he acknowledges, on a static view of skill seen asuseful attributes' and 
largely measured by training times. 
For Braverman, knowledge of materials and processes is the really critical element 
which enables the craftsman to exercise a substantial degree of control within the 
labour process. But, here too, it is important to emphasise that there are degrees of 
skill. Typically, the labour process at the turn of the century has been analysed as a 
transition from craft to class, from craft production to mass production. There is 
some question however, whether it is accurate to speak of a 'craft mode of 
I 
production! or 'craft contror as characteristic of the labour process at the end of the 
19th century. McGuffie has argued, convincingly enough, that the material basis of 
the crafts had been broken up long before the advance of mechanisation, that 
employers had achieved a degree of control and regulation of skill much earlier. 
The millwright's craft for example, was fragmented into specialities, principally that 
of fitter and turner. Millwrights themselves formed a constantly shrinking number 
of all'engine and machine makers!, from a little over 27% in 1841 to a little under 
14% in 1861 (Jones 1976: 49). As Berg (1979) has shown, skilled men fought a 
continuous battle against subordination to the capitalist 
labour process throughout 
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the 19th century. But by 1900, in engineering at least, direct employment and 
payment through the office was common and work was under the'contror of 
works managers and their foremen. 
Changes in the labour process in the early 20th century were, therefore, clearly part 
of a longer, more continuous process. If the turner at the beginning of the 1890s 
was a craftsman, he was not the craftsman he had once been (Burgess 196%, 1975). 
At the same time, if by the 1930s there was little left of 19th century craftsmanship 
for the turner in a modem works, he might nevertheless remain more skilled than 
the driller,, not only in More's sense of the term but in Bravernian! s too. The really 
important question is whether the changes at the turn of the century amount to 
more than a matter of degree, whether they constitute a critical moment of 
discontinuity in which the labour process is reconstituted more directly under 
main agement control In the following section it is argued that such a qualitative 
change did occur as a result of the management, from the office, of mechanisation. 
Taking A the qualifications as read, the change might still be usefuRy described as 
a shift from craft-type skill based on knowledge, to skill as a measure of defined 
competence. The key point is that attention should not be confined simply to 
divisions within the ranks of the workers but to see those divisions, and understand 
their meaning, in the context of the labour process as a whole; to see changes on 
the shop floor alongside a change in the structure of management control emerging 
from the office. 
The Reconstitution of the Labour Process 
Contemporary views on skill were near enough unanimous. The day of the skilled 
worker would soon be over, thought Ae Engineer in 1892 (July 1892). An 
exhibition of handicraft skill put on by the London Trades Council in 1893 
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prompted Engineering to rellect on the advance of the division of labour and to 
wonder whether pride in union might not replace pride in craft as a motivator of 
men (July 1893). Although America was more advanced than Europe, wrote one 
observer in 1896, 'The days of the good'all-round' mechanic are numbered, partly 
because there is little or no demand for his skill and labour. (Grimshaw 189-6: 532). 
In fact demand for his labour held up rather well in Britain. A more per ceptive 
comment noted that the modem worker was a product of a changing production 
system, ýhe skilled workman of today is as much a product of the times as the 
machines he is so largely occupied in tending ..... this machine-made workman, the 
ultimate product of the system of specialising the man to the work (Wansborough 
1896: 2561ý258). It was usually, but not always, the skilled man who was the object 
of such attention. Tlie signal triumph of improved machinery and better 
administrative methods,, wrote Francis Richards,, was the utilisation. of a vast 
resource which had previously been wasted, 'the energy -of the unskilled masses' 
(1900: 5 18). All discussion pointed to a more highly differentiated work force and 
one in which thinking would become the preserve of the few. There was still a need 
for hand skiR in the industry, argued Engineering, but nine tenths of ordinary 
operatives needed only manual dexterity, 'It is not necessary .... that the man who 
loads stone into the cart should know the geological order to which the stone 
belongs'(April 1901). 
It is significant therefore that much of the comment on skill. stresses the growing 
split between thinking and doing, between mental and manual labour. 'On all hands 
science is working to reduce skilL not to increase it', wrote The Engineer, 'and 
whilst we are adding enormously to mental ability at one end of the scale we are 
reducing at the other the value of manual dexterity, (Oct. 1909). Much of the 
discussion in Britain still had a technological bias. it was the development of 
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machinery which was seen as the driving force of deskilliag. But there was a clear 
understanding that machinery and mainagement,, mental and manual labour, were all 
bound up together. In a well staffed and well organised shop, argued Engineering, 
'all round skill in manual workers is now of minor importance, because the all 
round knowledge of the directional staff enables most of the manual work to be 
done by men of a rapidly acqWred single skiff. Specialisation and subdivision of 
work was nothing new. What was different now was the conscious pursuit of these 
processes as an end in itselý 'the difficulties that individual workmen had formerly 
to overcome for themselves are being taken away from them and grouped, to be 
dealt with by others who have no other fimction' (March 1918). 
Alfted Herbert's contrast of machine tools and workshop methods in 1919 with 
those of an earlier period pinpoints the critical shift in control. 
In those earlier days the amount of work done in the drawing office 
was much less than is customary today. Now the drawing office is 
looked upon not only as the "designing" department, but as the 
"thinking" department. In earlier days, the drawing office was called 
upon simply to produce designs; but the necessary detail involved In 
the carrying out of those designs was left very largely to the 
knowledge and memory of the foremen and principal workmen, 
guided by tradition of previous similar work. When new machines 
were introduced, detailed drawings of the most troublesome parts 
were, it is true, prepared, but very usually machines with which the 
shopý floor had become fitmiliar were built ftom the most sketchy 
tracings on a scale of 1.5 inches to the foot. The amount of 
information given on the drawings was extraordinarily meagre; gear 
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wheels, for instance,, being indicated merely by red circles with a 
note as to the number of teeth and pitch. The various classes of fits 
required were left entirely to the judgement of the works 
(1919: 283). 
At Herberts a large proportion of the production workforce continued to be 
classified as skilled but it is unlikely that such a classification was wholly accurate. 
Between the wars Herberts ran a 'vast apprenticeship system! with apprentices on 
piecework from day one, with the quality of training dependent on fanfily 
connections and persistence as much as ability. And Herbert's management was 
willing to'debunk the myth of Herbert "craftsmanship" when it suited their 
purpose' (Grainger 1988: 105,201). Where production engineering was more 
developed, change was more radical. 'The turner was no longer given a piece of 
steel and told to "make another like one like this", but the machinist was given a 
part-section drawing and a finished batch of work from the presses or foundry, 
performed his operation, had it inspected and passed it on to the niffier or driHe: e 
_ 
(Jefferys 1945: 203). McKinlay cites the North Weslt Engineering Trades 
Employers Association opinion that only a third of post-war fitters performed work 
as complex as their pre-war counterparts, and the AEU to the effect that only 30% 
of turners exercised any wide discretion when working from drawings 
(1986: 131,136). 
mcKinlays argument that Clydeside employers did not attempt to 'redraw the 
engineering division of labour' but to 'redefine the boundary between skilled and 
non skiRed work' seems to be a fine distinction. At best it descnibes only what was 
happening at one end of the labour process. The redrawing of the engineering 
division of labour involved more than the question of who worked on a given 
178 
machine and at what rate of pay. Much of the work now done by fitters and 
turners was skilled only in the sense that it required training and judgement not 
required of other workers. It was no longer a process conducted by craftsmen but 
one increasingly determined in the office and executed on the shop floor. 
The redrawing of the engineering division of labour created a more highly 
differentiated workforce. Formerly unskilled labourers, for whom work at a 
capstan lathe or a milling machine may have been experienced as an upgrading of 
labour, now worked alongside men still described as craftsmen, but whose actual 
work was only superficially related to that of a previous era. Ilie general result', 
Edward Cadbury told G. C. Renold, 'will be a class of semi-skilled workers, whose 
work wilI be highly specialised and monotonous, and which demands little or no 
nutlative, since thinldng and initiative are the fimction of management. We must 
remember that the trained skill and initiative which distinguishes an artisan from an 
unskilled labourer has a money value, and under Scientific Management this capital 
passes away from the workman to the innanagement'(1914). 
The reaUy skilled man, Renold replied, would move on to inspection, machine 
setting, time study and new opportunities in the drawing office, production control 
and the toolroorm If the personal experience of the skilled individual reduced to 
machine minding was degrading, the social process, he argued, was not nearly so 
dismal. Machinery was similarly convinced that the skilled man would be 
displaced onto more demanding work (April 1922). Craftsmanship had not been 
destroyed, 'It is merely transferred from the many to the few; in particular it had 
been transferred 'to the engineer and the trained Executive while the workman is 
free to specialise and become skiRed in his own sphere'(Aug. 1930). 
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There was truth in this, though the elevation of the few was small comfort for the 
many. But whether or not the optimism of Renold and Machinery was justified, the 
displacement of skill to the office finther underlines the changing nature of the 
labour process. At Metropolitan Vickers there was'a continuous migration of 
qualified trade apprentices to junior positions in the drawing offices, testing 
departments, and to rate fixing, inspection, and assistant foremen positions! 
(Fleming 1937). An analysis of 493 apprentices completing a five year 
apprenticeship at Metropolitan Vickers in the late 1930s produced the following 
information about destinations 
Table 2 Apprentice Destinations, Metropolitan Vickers 1937 
Type of Employment on Entrants Junior 
completion of Elementary Central Secondary Technical 
Apprenticeship Schools % Schools % Schools % Schools % 
Craft work on 74.5 40 23 10 
bench or machine 
Test Hands 7 7 18 28 
Works Staff, Production, 
Processmg 5 7 9 14 
Drawmg Office 
and Design 13 43 46 45 
Commercial Departments 5 3 4 3 
All types of post 
Apprenticeship I 100 I 100 I 100 100 
Employmerjt 
- 
I 
--- 
I 
Source: Fleming 1937 
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In 1935-36,26% of the apprentice intake had come from Junior Technical Schools 
and 23% from Central and Secondary Schools, so the leakage into the office was 
significant, so much so that in 1937 Metropolitan Vickers limited admission to 
trade apprenticeship to youths leaving elementary school at the age of 14. Nor was 
their experience unique. Responding to Fleming's paper, Mr ES Byng reported that, 
at his firm, of a batch of 200 boys, 70 had left the company and only 10 of the 130 
had remained as craftsmen. Few boys, observed another participant, A. E. 
Berriman, wanted to remain as tradesmen. 
Writing in 1929 GDH Cole also underlined the displacement of skill and its 
consequences for work and the workers. After the war industry had reverted to 
pre-war practices but mass production methods were spreading, he argued, from 
one industry to another. 
The consequence has been that, although the words "Scientific 
Management" are no longer often used, the worker finds himself a 
great deal more managed in his job than in pre-war days. More and 
more the machine sets the pace, and he has to conform to it. More 
and more the machine determines precisely how the job is to be 
done, and converts the man into a feflow-automaton bound to its 
service ....... 
.... more and more workers will pass under the new 
disciphne of 
industry. They will have less control than of old over the method of 
performing their jobs, less control over the pace at which they 
work, less to think about beyond the sustained attention and strain 
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involved in keeping on slogging away. rMey will need less skill and 
more slickness, less specialised trainin and more drill (1929: 95,98) 
Cole was particularly worried that, as the'logic, of the machine overtook the 
craft, qman', trade unionism, which drew strength from the common bonds of craft, 
would be weakened until built on new foundations. Even then the hold of trade 
unionism on the worker's mind would probably be permanently weakened since the 
'new technique of industry will put far less distinctive marks on the workers 
personality than the old craft systenY (1929: 101). ne new worker would be more 
instrumental in his attitude to work, more politically than industrially minded. 
Cole was at least partly mistaken on both counts. First, the 'craftsman! lasted longer 
than the material basis of his craft, even enjoying the sort of revival which 
Hobsbawm described as a 'last triumph of the Victorian trades' in the late 1930s 
(1984: 269)1. More importantly, in the longer run, craft unionism adapted itself to 
the new conditions. Always a sectional interest within the wider working class, 
'craft unionisnY continued to be effective where it was a vehicle for establishing the -- 
sort ofjob monopolies and job controls which the new layers of semi-skiUed 
workers eventually established for themselves, or where it succeeded in building a 
wider base of support in common action with the new workers. 
The latter built their own trade unionism and one which eventually succeeded in 
establishing job controls which could be as extensive as those once established by 
craftsmen. They did so in response to their own class and industrial predicaments 
(Lyddon 1983), and not through a diffusion of craft controls (Zeitlin 1980). 
Among the characteristics of 'craft' discussed by Scullion and Edwards, the notion 
of the autonomous workman, of the ability to sell abilities to employers which are 
182 
then exercised without close supervision, must carry considerable weight 
(1988: 119). Few manual workers could claim such autonomy on the basis of their 
craft knowledge, status, or position, by the late 1930s. The late triumph of the 
Victorian trades owed more to trade union action in a tight labour market than 
anything derived from the remnants of craft. 
Apprenticeship and Training 
rMe survival of apprenticeship as the principal form of skill training might be taken 
to suggest that the extent of deskilfing was limited. In fact, increasing 
specialisation, narrower training, and the growth of piecework, all indicate the 
'increasing proletarianisation of the apprentice' before 1914 (Knox 1986: 174). The 
essential problem was the need for a more highly differentiated system capable of 
producing engineering managers and new categories of office st4 men with craft- 
type skills, 'skilled' men and machinists of all kinds. Since the sort of elaborate 
training system built up in Germany was criticised on all sides and rejected (Ae 
Engineer Dec. 1890; Orcutt 1902), there were attempts to remodel the institution 
of apprenticeship to meet new needs. The North East Coast Engineers proposed a 
two-tier training system which would distinguish between tradesmen andthose 
destined to work in the higher branches of engineering and shipbuilding' (The 
Engineer Jan. 1904). Similarly, in government ordnance works, two distinct 
training courses were to be available, one for'upper managerial staff and the other 
for'trade lads' (The Engineer March 1905). The attempt was largely unsuccessful 
but an examination of apprenticeship and training serves to illustrate the ways in 
which skifled work was being reconstructed. 
A series of reports on apprenticeship in The Engineer in 1907-09 revealed attempts 
to differentiate among the 'trade lads! at the more advanced firms. At Clayton and 
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Shuttleworth in Lincoln in 1907, a new apprenticeship system divided boys into 
eight separate trades, with no movement between them The firm did however 
promise that 'keeping a boy for months on routine work, simply because he has 
become skffW at it,, will so far as possible be avoided' (Feb. 1907). At the British, 
Westinghouse 1ý, ompany in Trafford Park there were three grades of apprentice 
with the trade apprentices largely confined to one department (Jan. 1908). At W. 
H. Allen of Bedford, one of the few firms to retain premium pupils, those of the 
artisan class who did well in evening classes had'the privilege of spending six 
months of the last year of his apprenticeship in another department of the works in 
which he has not been apprentice& (Feb. 1908). Similarly, at Mirflees Watson 
apprentices remained 'in the branch of trade at which they commence' unless they 
demonstrated a serious attempt to improve their knowledge (May 1908). Three 
categories of apprentice based on age and qualifications at entry was common and 
it was also common enough for the lowest grade of apprentice to remain in one 
shop during the whole of their apprenticeship as they did at the Midland Railway 
Company (April 1909). The system of indentured apprenticeship was being 
replaced everywhere by informal or simple writtýn agreements, a new 
apprenticeship which was not one institution but many. 
Employers continued to rely on skilled labour of the craft-type where technology 
was stiff relatively primitive, where production management was underdeveloped, 
and for reasons of %usiness rationaW (Hobsbawm 1984: 253). All three 
I 
circumstances were present before 1914, but all were changing. Apprenticeship 
failed to keep pace. 'Our enquiries have to a great extent been disappointing', wrote 
The Engineer of its apprenticeship survey. Ve had uinagied there was some real 
general upward movement in the training of apprentices, 
but we are constrained to 
admit that with the exception of quite a 
few firms, the old indifferent system of 
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training-by-hazard, which came in when the factory system killed the 'master' and 
the home workshop, still obtains! (Jan. 1908a). T'he coincidence of deskiffing and 
widespread concem about training was, of course, entirely consistent. At the 
Baldwin Locomotive works in the USA, where a skilled man was taken to mean 
'one who is fmnffiu with the use of a tooL a machine, or a process!, a new 
apprenticeship scheme was. instituted because 'the general mecýanic has threatened 
to become practically extinct to the detriment of the manufacturing interest 
generally' (Converse 1902). There were concerns about the quality of off-the-job 
training for future managers but a greater fear that increasing specialisation and the 
decline of apprenticeship would rob industry of the craftsmen it still needed. 'It is 
more than ever important therefore', wrote Machinery, 'to readjust the methods of 
training artisans to suit the requirements of modem industry' (Nov. 1914). 
Education was commonly urged as a necessary antidote to the monotony and mind 
numbing routines of Modern work (Cadbury 1912: 20). It was necessary, argued 
The Engineer, to replace the intelligence which had been a bys-product of 
apprenticeshýp (Dec. 1905). -Many of thetrade lads! were now learning a single 
operation, a system which resulted'in the production of youths and men with 
stunted and limited -intellects - the very thing which the manager most dreads! 
(Feb. 
1906). Following a conference on apprenticeship in 1909, The Engineer noted 
bitterly that 'when we discuss the technical traimng of boys and girls, we absolutely 
must not lose sight of the fact that, whilst on the one hand we talk of improving 
their intelligence,, we are on the other tacitly degrading it'. The process of modem 
manufacturing depended for its successupon the degradation of the 
intelligence of 
the operator' (Dec. 1909)2. 
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War-time production underlined the difference between teaching and learning in 
AM training. Apprentices learned to flat file in about a year, reported Engineering, 
but women could be taught to flat file in a tenth of that time (March 1917). It also 
underlined the demand for differentiated training to meet different demands for 
s1dH. 'The fimctions of the engineer and the craftsman are entirely different', argued 
'Michael Longridge in his address to the Institute of Mechanical Engineers in 1917, 
and their training must be different also. Moreover, differentiation is needed in the 
training of the various classes of engineers and workmen' (1917: 412). When the 
Ministry of Labour reported on apprenticeship and training in 1928, it was 
Engineering that asked the key question - what training was needed and for 
whom? No reform could be effective 'until means are provided for defining the 
intended skill more accurately than is the case at present' (July 1928). In some 
cases training was being wasted, in other cases it was insufficient. In the mid 
thirties, some production engineers were complainin of the tendency for men 
'who have had the necessary training for craftsmanship to get absorbed in the 
manufacturing departments, where much of their early trainin is wasted!. Others 
were. more concerned with the difficulty of obtaining first-class toolroom men, 'the 
direct result of allowing the previous generation of super-skilled mechanics to die 
out' (Proceedings, Production Engineers 1934-35). No systematic solution to the 
training problem was ever attempted however. Some firms tried to adapt 
apprenticeship to provide for such differentiation. Elsewhere the system produced 
uncertain and highly variable results. 
The lack of clearly defined purpose in training made it possible, Engineering 
argued, for the 'Nicious practice' of counting work turned out on automatic 
machines as skilled. There was a similar implication in the reaction of The Engineer 
to the Ministry's report. Employer satisfaction with existing training levels, despite 
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the report's findings that insufficient boys were being trained, was explained by the 
fact that 'in many cases the standard of skill is so low that no previous training of 
any kind is required, and that satisfaction with the present system indicates a falling 
off in the general all round quality of workshop labour' (Aug. 1928). 
Training also took place outside apprenticeship. The EEF, while in favour of some 
form of apprenticeship, thought 'alternative methods of training may be adopted as 
the development of the industry may require'. The EEFs committee on the supply 
and training of apprentices found that 'large numbers of boys and youths, not 
apprenticed, are learning skilled work and eventually taking their places in the 
skilled categories in the same way as apprentices! (EEF Minutes March 1928). 
Fewer apprentices were trained in the larger companies, it was the smaller firms 
where the bulk of apprentices were trained. Indeed, McKinlay suggests that 
apprenticeship more or less disappeared from the mass production industries in the 
1920s and that where there was apprenticeship training in engineering, its content 
was solely determined by the needs of individual firms (199 1: 100). ý 
The connection between this sort of apprenticeship and its craft history was 
increasingly remote. From one side, semi and unskilled labour was being trained to 
operate a range of new machinery, some of them eventuafly'taidng their place in 
the skiRed categories!. From the other side, skiRed men engaged in the 'vicious 
practice' of claiming skilled status on semi-skilled work. Nor was there a defined 
threshold of skilt dividing one kind of work from another. it is no longer 
appropriate to speak in terms of 'craft' in this situation. However, the failure to 
substitute some other, more systematic, form of training for apprenticeship had 
wider implications. The association of skill and apprenticeship remained strong and 
reinforced the claim of time-served men to work of a particular kind. 
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The concept of 'socially constructed skff might have been a useful way of 
understanding how archaic structures like apprenticeship helped to perpetuate 
patterns of occupation and pay where the conditions which once justified them had 
disappeared. But, in the first place, all skill is socially constructed to one degree or 
another, though the technical, material base of such skills may be stronger or 
weaker. Secondly, the idea has been used to suggest that genuine skill was created 
as a consequence of employers adapting technology to suit. There may be isolated 
examples of this but there is no evidence, despite widespread propaganda about 
workers! restrictive practices, that the defence of skill has been a serious 
determinant of the mode of produCtion3. With few exceptions the struggle around 
skill has been about pay and jobs, little different in substance from the struggle of 
other workers. The idea of 'sociaRy constructed skiff can obscure rather than 
illustrate the fact that such a social construction is necessary precisely because 
deskilling has taken place. In some ways the question boils down to whether skilled 
workers who have secured skiffed pay and status on deskifled work have been 
deskifled or not? The argument does not seem worth pursuing in these terms. The ,- 
answer must be that they have been deskiNed but they have secured, even if only 
for a time, compensating advantages which are important in their own right. 
Occupational Change in Engineering 
The outstanding feature of occupational change in engineering in the first half of 
the 20th century was the growth in the numbers designated as semi-sldfled. 'During 
the last ten years!, the EEF noted in 1934, 'the semi-skilled class in the engineering 
and allied trades has increased greatly in number and importance. Particularly in 
machine operations the semi-skilled man has assumed a status, while it does not 
rank with that of the tradesman, is of such importance that it can be said to emulate 
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the tradesman, and in many establishments his earnings are greater than those of 
the tradesman! (EEF Mnutes Nov. 1934). 
Figures for the changing proportions of sIdUed, semi and unskiRed engineering 
workers can be found in the records of the EEF. Such figures clearly have their 
limitations. They do not measure the more fundamental change in the position of 
the craft worker consequent upon new ways of organising and directing 
production. Moreover, they are compiled from returns made by enVloyers who 
had not adopted any common standard by which to judge skilL and were 
presumably based on the numbers that were paid the skilled rate. And as we shall 
see, the rate paid for the same work varied from one establishment to another 
according to the judgement of the employer and the success of the employees in 
influencing such judgements. They may nevertheless reflect underlying processes 
sufficient to tell us something about the direction of change. 
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Table 3 Skill Composition of the Engineering Workforce, 1914-33 
SkEed % SemimskiRed % Unskflled % 
1914 60 20 20 
1921 50 30 20 
1926 40 45 15 
1933 32 57 11 
Jefferys (1945: 207) 
Yates (1937: 32) 
On these figures, the changing of places of the skilled and semi-skilled could not be 
clearer. And Jefferys provides supporting evidence in the form of an analysis of 
new entrants to the AEU showing the proportion of turners stationary at around 
13%, and the proportion ofmachinists and others rising from 30% at the be iig 
of the 1920s to 45% before the war. Over the same period membership of the 
skilled sections of the union fell from 75% of the total to just over a hW and 'the 
proportion of total entrants to these sections had decreased from approximately 
one half in the early'twenties to just below one fifth in the late'thirties! (1945: 208). 
If the figures for men only are taken, the rate of change in skiR composition slows 
significantly 
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Table 4 Skill Composition in Engineering - Adult Males 1914-34 
Skilled % Serni-skilled % UnskiRed % 
1914 58 21 21 
1921 50 29 22 
1931 42 44 14 
_1934 
41 47 13 
Source eef237/13/3 
These figures do however, indicate a similar trend and may well overstate the 
numbers of sIdRed4. Engineering noted in 1924 that an apparent increase of 20% in 
the numbers of skilled men was'due to a process of dilution rather than any 
increase in ability. Semi-skilled operators on automatic machinery were being 
classified as skilled on account of the their rate of wages (Sept. 1924). 
Another way of looking at the industry is to note the shifts in geographical location 
and industrial sector. The inter-war period saw a decisive shift in the location of the 
industry to the Midlands and the South, the areas where the newer industries were 
growing fastest. Ile percentage of the workforce employed by companies affiliated 
to the EEF in Birmingham, Coventry and London, rose from around 40% of the 
total before the first world war to more than 55% by 1939. By 1935 more than half 
of all engineering workers were employed in electrical engineering or the motor, 
cycle and aircraft industries. In 1935,, 65% of engineering workers in the London 
area were employed in motor vehicles or electrical engineering. The corresponding 
figure for the Alidlands was 83% but for Lancashire and Yorkshire only 33% 
(jefferys 1945: 199). As early as 1933, over 48% of the EEFs wage bill was 
191 
accounted for in Birmingham, Coventry and London, compared with less than half 
that amount in the North East, the North West,, Manchester and Sheffield 
combined (eef/237/13/3/28-30). 
Ile Midlands and London employed a much higher proportion of women, and 
more of every kind of labour on piecework than engineering centres in the north. 
Table 5 Employment of women in Engineering and the numbers of all 
workers on piecework in 1931 - by Area 
% of Women employees % of all classes PBR 
Birmingham 22 68 
Coventry 16 75 
London 21 53 
Manchester 11 58 
North East 4 37 
North West 2 36 
Sheffield 3 35 
Source eeF237/13/3/5 and 22 
James Hinton notes that the proportion of semi-skilled workers in general 
engineering in Coventry in 1914 was already very high and that ýhe traditional 
aristocracy, whose wartime trauma underlay the emergence of the movement in the 
engineering centres of the North, hardly existed in Coventry or Birmingham! 
(1973: 218)5. If those workers emerge as 'skilled' after the second world war, it is 
not because the labour process was re-sbUed. 
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A further clue to the restructuring of the engineering workforce from the tum of 
the century is the fate of the 'machinemen'. Sometimes classified together, 
sometimes detailed separately, the machinemen included all the new machine trades 
from drillers, millers and grinders to turret and capstan lathe operators and borers. 
Some were regarded as skilled - about 25% according to a rough division by the 
EEF. In 1924 the ratio of men to apprentices for a number of trades was as follows 
Table 6 Ratio of Apprentices to Journeymen 1924 
Men Apprentices Ratio: I 
Fitters/Erectors 43849 20030 2.19 
Tumers 21364 8465 2.52 
Sheet Metal Workers 4523 974 4.64 
Joiners 2752 476 5.78 
Machinemen 34078 5778 5.90 
Welders 229 32 7.16 
Source eef/237/13/3/6 
Ile difficulty with the category of 'machineman' is that it stretches A the way from 
the turner to the handyman-labourer. In that sense it ought to serve as a definition 
of semi-skilled but the problem of arbitrary classification of individuals and jobs is 
at its most dangerous here. In 1924 the Industrial Court refused the skilled rate for 
two time- served tumers because they had taken work turning axles below the 
skiffed rate and on work which did not require their craft skili At the same time 
five machinists, two of whom had served apprenticeships as turners, one as a miller 
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and one as a machineman, all received the skilled rate because they had skill 
I commensurate with that of the fitter/turner(AEU Aug. 1924). In all likelihood, 
the machinists will have been classified as skilled and the turners as semi-sldlled, 
for the purposes of the Federation's statistics. 
In 1897 James Nasmith told the Manchester Association of Engineers that 'One , 
J... curect consequence of the adoption of the newer methods and appliances was such 
a subdivision of some operations as to involve a fresh organisation of labour, and in 
this way there had been silently worked a revolution which was not always MY 
appreciated even yet' (The Engineer Jan. 1897: 7 1). At Armstrong Whitworth that 
silent revolution had produced a pre first world war workforce in which fitters and 
turners had given way to machinists 
Table 7 Categories of Employees at Armstrong Whitworth in 1913 
Machinemen 1316 
_ 
Fitters - 1261 
Apprentices 706 
_ 
Handymen and Labourers 631 
Machinists (girls) 119 
Tumer 396 
Source eef/237/3/l/205 
This may be an extreme example. In any case it is important to remember that the 
category of machinenian covered a shifting group of occupations so no figures 
relating to machinemen should be taken too literally. Nevertheless, it seems clear 
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that by the 1930s, as an occupational group, machinemen were twice as important 
as turners and not far off the numbers of fitters. In 193 1, for example, there were 
40,266 fitters, 16,716 turners and 33,710 machinemen (eef/237/13/3/22). The big 
companies, particularly in the motor industry, all had large numbers of 
machinemen; ahnost a thousand at the Austin in Birmingham, 740 at Morris and 
1,045 at Metropolitan Vickeis in Manchester. 
The term disappears from the records in the 1930s by which time some of the 
machinemen have been classed as semi-sid1led but others, as the 'machine question' 
rumbled on through the inter-war years, will have been paid the skilled rate and 
classed as skilled. 
The Craft Union and the Machine Question 
As engineers distinguished themselves from'mere mechanics!, and craftsmen fought 
to distinguish themselves from machinemen, the status of the craft union underwent 
a profound change. For much of the 1890s engineering journals continued to sing 
the praises of the 'old unionism!. The Engineer still had confidence in the members 
and officers of 'guilds of higbly skilled labour' such as the ASE. Unlike the 
unskilled unions whose memberslacked intelligence' and whose leaders were only 
leaders for the hour, the skilled men could be expected to conduct their affairs 
honourably (Jan. 1890). Engineering described the ASE as'an industrial army of 
trained and skilled men, of whom any nation might well. be proud' (July 189 1). A 
report the following year described the ASE as'a union of self helpers, by mutual 
effort and mutual aid ... a credit to itselý and to the great engineering industry with 
which it is connected' Sept. 1892). As late as 1896 this'self supporting worij: ing 
men's association' was admired for its unemployed and Superannuation benefits 
which kept 10,000 heads of families off the rates (May 1896). 
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The engineering lock out, and the struggle which led up to it, radically changed 
these perceptions of the ASE, and no journal ever referred to the union in such 
glowing terms again. The search for an explanation for the ASE's fall from grace, 
began with the Tediscovery of trade unionism among the, old unionists. Engineering 
now thought 'old unionism' owed its reputation to the softening effects of time, that. 
the ASE was the same as it was fifty years ago. 'In 1851 they snatched at the prize, 
and missed it, and the same thing has happened again' (Dec. 1897). More 
commonly the union! s stand in the dispute was attributed to the spread of socialism; 
a pact, as Colonel Dyer put it, between the advanced socialism of Tom Mann and 
the new unionism of George Barnes (Dyer 1897). The Engineer went so far as to 
identify the influence of the socialist, Prince Kropotkin (sic)! But, whether 
explanations were sought in traditions of the past or the politics of the present, the 
critical underlying issue in the dispute was the 'machine question!, and linked to it, 
the whole character of the labour process and the place of skilled men within it. 
Not even an extended period of social peace could restore the ASE's reputation. 
The basis on -which the union had built its formidable presence, its reputation and 
its respectability, was under siege. The revolution in methods of production, 
argued The Engineer, had made the ASE an anachronism, a fossil (Jan. 1898). 
The view of craft unionism as an anachronism came to be shared by at least a 
section of the engineering workers themselves. In the district committees and in the 
workshops, the 'guerrilla war' which Engineering predicted would follow the 
ASE's defeat in open battle, broke out almost as soon as the return to work had 
taken place. But, ironically given the outbursts about the evils of socialism, it was 
the socialists who quickly accepted that craft unionism could neither unite the 
workers nor protect the craftsman. The leaders on the Clyde tried to conduct the 
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struggles around dilution as a struggle for workers control and nationalisation 
(Hinton 197 1) while activists on the left, and officials at the head of the 
organisation, sought to open up the AEU to membership for the semi and 
unskilled. From Tyneside Tom Gillinder (1920) wrote about ýhe trend of changed 
methods of production under scientific management'to argue against thepraft 
outlook and for'the spirit of progressive unionism, void of the purely conservative 
idea of maintaining the craft to the exclusion of the logic of mechanical and 
industrial progress!. The next generation of the AEUs leadership entered the lists 
for industrial unionism 'Our lives are at stake', wrote Jack Tanner, in 1925, arguing 
that an industrial union 'must not be held back any longer by ancient traditions' 
(1925)6. In July 1926 the editor of the AEUjournal called on all members to make 
the new industrial section work, and in October he told his readers, 
'Standardisation and mass production wherever it can be introduced is the order of 
the day, and these new methods of manufacture are making interchangeability of 
work more possible - teaching us that the interest of all workers is identicar (Oct. 
1926). 
For the most part, however, such appeals fell on deaf ears. As membership of the 
AEU fell 30% following the lock out in 1922,, the craftsmen retreated to 
strongholds of skill like the tool room and fought a rearguard action 'to preserve as 
much work as possible for members of the craft' (Cole 1945: 354). All attempts to 
extend the membership foundered on the sort of attitude expressed by A. I Mckee 
in a letter to the union journal, rejecting 'any suggestion that craft unions should be 
submerged into an unskilled, unworkable and dissatisfied mass! (AEU May 1924). 
It was not until 1937 that the numbers of semi-skilled exceeded the numbers of 
skilled members (Carr 1979: 257). But if Jack Tanner failed to establish the AEU as 
an industrial union, A. I Mckee couldn't defend his disappearing craft either. The 
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result was a messy compromise, an industrial amalgam of upgraded machinemen 
and downgraded craftsmen, where skilted and semi-skilled production workers 
were distinguished by the rate of pay agreed for a given job, and skilted men on 
time work by their inability to match the earnings of production workers, whether 
skilled or semi-skilled. 
Guerrilla War in the Workshops 
Tlie'gueffifla warin the workshops following the unions! defeat in 1897 was soon 
underway. In 1898 the EEF was discussing a strike on the machine question in 
Halifax and 'encroachments! on the terms of settlement in Newcastle and Bradford 
(EEF Minutes Oct. 1898). In Hull, in 1900, an overtime ban was withdrawn after 
an unskilled man was taken off a capstan lathe; strike action was threatened, and 
then withdrawn, in Bolton over the employment of unskilled men on'machine 
tools' (EEF Minutes Jan., Oct. 1900). In May 1900 a strike broke out at Boddens 
in Oldham when a semi- skilled men was put on a turret lathe and continued 
through June (EEF Minutes May, Aug. 1900). The Emergency Committee of the 
EEF reports at least one strike on the machine question in every year between the 
turn of the century and 1913, except 1903. In 1904 a strike followed dismissals 
after alleged intimidation of machinemen; a hundred men were out for four days in 
Huff in 1905 when machinemen were put on horizontal boring, drilling and milling 
operations. In Burnley in 1907, one hundred and eight men were out for ten days 
trying to remove liandymen'ftom lathes. Between 1911 and 1913 the number of 
disputes on the 'machine question' accelerated significantly. In 1912 a strike in 
Blackburn led to the use of strike breakers and an alleged threat of an attack on the 
factory, with police reportedly advising the factory owner, Mr Henry Livesey, 'that 
his family would be better to leave their home for a time' (eef/23 7/l/160). And, in 
19 13 , the 
EEF Emergency Committee complained that, 'In several districts 
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questions regarding the manning of machines were raised by the unions, and from 
the circumstances present and the nature of the demand in each case it rather 
appeared as if the movement was the result of a pre-arranged plan' (EEF Minutes 
Feb. 1913). 
The ASE put forward its proposals for dealing with the machine question in 1897, 
before the lock out. Notwithstanding their claim to work any machine made or 
used by the engineering trade, the ASE offered to establish joint committees with 
the EEF, with representation from the Board of Trade, to which disputes about the 
wages to be paid on any machine could be referred. The committee would 
determine a rate which would be more or less than the fitters' or the turners' rate, 
'having regard to the class of machine and the quality of the worle (eeF237/l/160). 
Clearly the ASE representatives on any such committees could be expected to 
demand the skilled rate on almost all jobs. But three things should be noted. First, 
the ASE proposed to 'follow the machine'by defining a rate for the job. The 
question of defending a 'craft mode of production' or any form of organisation of 
production or division of labour did not enter into it. Secondly, the position of the 
ASE in 1897 was substantially in line with that of the EEF. The employers! policy 
was to pay a rate which reflected'the skill of the operator, the work being done 
and machine being worked', a formula which the unions formally acknowledged in 
1929 (EEF Minutes Oct. 1929). And thirdly, the ASE's position in 1897 was not 
simply a manoeuvre for position in the coming struggle. Over a period of fifty years 
the unions developed their demand to negotiate a grading of labour scheme to 
reflect changes in the nature of the work being done. What divided unions from 
employers over the entire period, on this issue, apart from the obvious conflict over 
the price of labour,, was the employers! refusal to negotiate. The consequence was 
that bargaining of one kind or another was driven down to the shop floor where the 
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changing nature of the work demanded a continuous stream ofludgements and 
decisions about machine staffing and pay. The EEF contributed much more 
significantly to the development of a tradition of shop floor representation and 
bargaining in engineering than any craft tradition did. 
On the shop floor conflict was shaped by the immediate pressures and I 
opportunities of the struggle. There were strikes to remove handymen and machine 
men from tools claimed by fitters and tumers as well as conflicts over the rate for 
the job. The ASE did not claim work on'fWly automatic machines!, but the 
definition of a semi-automatic was a broad one including any lathe that required 
'pulling round from time to time, every time the screw is finished and cut off, the 
bar slackened off by hand and pulled out to make the next length' (eef/23 7/l/160). 
And at the Vulcan Motor and Engineering Co. in 1913, the ASE objected to a 
driller being placed on a vertical boring machine which had been installed by a 
turner. The employer argued that it was a My automatic machine and the union 
would have had no objection if it had been installed by the manufacturer rather than 
the, company's own man, but the union took the view that, once a skilled man had 
been put on the job, it was skilled work (eeF23 7/l/160). The EEF was just as 
ready to seize any opportunity to further its own interests. The Chair of the Special 
Conference on the machine question told the unions in 1912, You say that a 
Gisholt lathe is a turret lathe and therefore a skilled man ought to work it. That is 
what you say, but we are saying instead of that - to put it very coldly - if a 
handyman can do the work up to specification, well, we let him do it' 
(eef/237/l/160). 
Much has been made of the success of engineering workers on the machine 
question in the years before the first world war. A contemporary account maldng a 
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similar claim was given in a paper on the claims of labour in the engineering 
industry by I R- Richmond. He told the Glasgow University Engineering Society 
that 'The position just before the outbreak of war was that,, by persistent disregard 
of the terms of the agreement, many of those provisions, although officially 
'effective, had become inoperative, and those inroads on the power of management 
in the shops had become so 'serious that, had war not intervened, the autumn of 
1914 would probably have seen an industrial disturbance of the first magnitude' 
(1917: 20). It is clear that employers could be persuaded, or coerced, to put skilled 
men on the new machines, or that they did so because they believed the work to be 
done justified it. A circular letter from the Manchester District of the Engineering 
Trades Employers Association in 1907 chided its members for putting skilled men 
on'turret, capstan, semi-automatic and automatic machines generally'. "Me 
committee are of the opinion that if the maximum advantages are to be obtained 
from these machines, it is most important that when first started they should be 
manned by youths or handymen who should, if necessary, be instructed by the 
foreman of the department or by an inspector from the maker's works! 
(eeF23 7/1/16 1). 
On the other hand it should be noted that the struggle was largely confined to the 
older industrial areas in the North East and Lancashire. There are very few 
references to similar struggles in the newer industrial areas. Moreover the challenge 
in the workshops assumed serious proportions only in the years of widespread and 
general labour unrest before the war. Louis Cassier thought that for the two years 
after the 1898 dispute Work has been carried on with good will (1899: 497). And 
on the eve U the great unrest, Benjamin Taylor, while attacking the boilermakers 
for sectional strikes thought that 'the engineers as a body have been loyal to the 
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agreement and that if it has not preserved unbroken peace it has at an events 
prevented actual war during the past twelve years' (1910-11: 64). 
When war did break out a few months later, the employers were certainly under 
pressure and giym*g ground. But the EEF also responded with considerable. 
sophistication. In many cases the EEF recommended caution and the exercise of 
discretion in considering any departure from existing practice. Their tactics, the 
Executive Board of the EEF explained in a letter to members, was to restrict any 
dispute to the shop in question and avoid a general lock out. 'So far', the Board 
assured members, Ihese tactics have been satisfactory and a general lock out 
avoided' (eef237/l/160). Failure to agree at Central Conference in 1911 on a 
number of disputes led to series of special conferences on the machine question 
the following year, winniag time for the employers, but without any general 
resolution being arrived at. Meanwhile the machine question was settled case by 
case, as the enq)loyers intended, even if it meant making concessions. On the North 
East coast, a five week strike was settled after'it was ascertained' that the man on a 
disputed machine was a turner and the firm agre6d. to consider the question of his 
wages. At Crossley Bros. in July 1914 it was agreed to pay the skilled rate when 
the machine was doing certain kinds of work without conceding the rate for that 
machine or its operator more generally. In September 1914 the EEF advised John 
Dickenson to put a turner on a Kearns boring and fitcing milL and advised Caledon 
and Co. of Dundee to use a machineman on a Kearns boring machine only for small 
work done in large quantities, 'but where a greater variety of work and in smaller 
quantities is to be done the machine justified the appointment of a turner, 
(eef/237/i/i/10). Had war not intervened I R- Richmond might have been right 
about an industrial disturbance of the first magnitude. But the ground captured by 
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. the skilled men in the years before the war did not reverse the radical changes 
underway in the workshops. 
Employer Strategies - Deskilling the Job 
Tlie war, as we have already seen, exposed the, vulnerabidity of skill to 'repetition 
methods! even where skilled labour was only displaced indirectly; but brought few 
lasting changes. When the 'industrial disturbance' came in 1922, and the unions 
suffered a second defeat, employers continued to manage the machine question 
much as they had done before the war. Some employers continued with their tacit 
agreement to union rates for men operating certain machines and the EEF 
continued to complain about it (EEF Minutes March 1925). The Federation itselý 
despite its overwhelming victory, displayed a certain 'constitutionar frame of mind. 
When Willan and Nfills sought EEF advice on replacing a capstan lathe with a 
semi-automatic Ward Capstan to be operated with semi-skiRed labour, they were 
told to run both machines together for a period and then give the required ten days 
notice of a change (eef/237/3/l/162). In 1926 the EEF agreed that Rover could 
continue to ýemploy women- on a number of trimming operations only after 
-checking that this had been the company's practice before the war (EEF Minutes 
March 1926). In general tenns, the EEF maintained'the line that in Engineering 
there are certain classes of work belonging to the skifled men, other classes of 
work belonging to the semi-skilIed men, and the unskilled work upon which 
labourers are employed'(EEF minutes July 1936). 
TIle interesting thing about such a formula is that it recognised continuing rights 
that workers had to work of a certain kind. Some work %elonged'to skifled men. it 
was just that employers claimed the right to decide what it was. They were 
sometimes prepared to go to great lengths to prove they were right. In a 
203 
conference on a disputed machine in 192 1, the employer brought samples of the 
machine's output to the conference table 'and it was demonstrated to the union 
representatives that a tumer's skill was not required for the work' 
(eef/237/3/l/162). When the AEU replied that the machine was capable of 
producing sldRed work, the EEF invited them to raise the issue again when the 
work being done was skilled. In the case of a 'snow grinding machine' at Brierly 
and Kershaw in Rochdale, 'the firm was advised to work the machine by skilled 
labour' (eef/237/3/l/162). But similar claims on Churchill Grinding machines were 
rejected at Mitchell and Shakleton in Manchester in 1920, and on universal 
grinders at Hacking and Co. in Bury in 1921 (eef/237/3/l/16 1). 
The EEPs'constitutionalism! and its recognition of workers! property rights in 
work provided unintended supports for'craft' claims but it should not be supposed 
that the EEF was without a conscious deskillin strategy7. Ile Federation was 
prepared to designate certain work as skilled and 'belonging' to the skilled man, but 
at the same time, advised every effort to be made to change the character of the 
work to avoid the necessity of so doing. Ile clearest expression of this policy 
came in a discussion of the problem of 'dilution' in 1936 in which the EEF 
distinguished between the introduction of semi-skilled labour, and dilution defined 
as the direct replacement of the skilled man. On a number of occasions the EEF 
had advised firms not to introduce women onto certain work, actions which would 
have raised the question of dilution: 'So far the Federation had advised that such 
dilution should not take place, relying upon the much broader and more important 
policy of penetration of semi-skilled male labour. The AEU would, of course, 
complain that semi- skilled labour took work away from the skilled men. 'As a 
matter of fact', the EEF continued, 'this must arise, but the dilution problem as such 
does not enter into the situation so long as managements introduce these semi- 
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sl-cilled men on suitable work provided through de-skilling the operations and by the 
supply ofjigs and tools!. And in case this was not clear enough, the Board went on 
to issue the following advice to firms on how to avoid the question of dilution 
arising in the case where trainees from government centres were involved. 'The 
Director appealed to members of the Council to use their influence in their own' 
areas to prevent such cases arising and to see that the penetration of semi-skilled 
men in the industry is carried on in the proper way - by de-skilling the work and 
making it a semi-skilled job before the semi-skilled man is put on it' (EEF Minutes 
July 1936). 
In some ways the EEFs distinction between dilution and semi-skilled penetration 
was a curious one. It was taken to mean, for example, that dilution involved 
substitution for skilled men where work was done by the same methods, that is 
'without deskilling the means or methods of production!. By definition it is hard to 
see how substitution by semi or unskilled labour could take place under such 
circumstances. In practice dilution was usually taken to mean the employment of 
women, and in this area the EEF was extraordinarily cautious. In 1919 Armstrong 
Whitworth were advised not to extend the employment of female labour 
(eef237/l/l/18), and in 1924 the EEF engaged in a lengthy investigation of a 
British Westinghouse plan to employ women onnew business! (EEF Minutes Feb. 
1924). A somewhat different, but just as cautious, response was received by 
Triumph who were told not to confront the employment of women directly but to 
let it develop and claim local practice (EEF Minutes Dec. 1927). In 1933 R. A- 
Lister dropped their proposal to employ women after the matter had been referred 
to the EEF Board who were concerned that firms showed a growing inclination'to 
give serious consideration to this subject' (EEF Minutes Oct. 1933). 'Three years 
later Harrison and Co. of Lincoln were told directly not to employ women on 
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moulding machines. This would be a change of practice and lead to conflict with 
the unions. Federation policy was to expand production by training semi-sldlled 
labour (EEF Minutes May 1936). 
Whether logical or not, the EEFs distinction was, of course, a way of-getting 
round the skilled man's property right in his job and the necessity to fight him over 
it; a way of reconstructing the labour process around him When the Firth, Brown 
Foundry in Sheffield was faced with claims from the National Union of Foundry 
Workers for the skilled rate on certain work, the firm turned to the EEF for advice. 
The Federation found that many of the jobs in dispute were skiRed but that with the 
right equipment they could be desldfled. Ile firm was advised to adopt the 
necessary changes in equipment and their attention drawn to companies which had 
successfidly adopted 'mechanical aids'. In the meantime they were also advised to 
increase the numbers of workers on the skifled rate (EEF Minutes Oct. 1934) 
The Machine Question - Pay and Staff"ing 
Throughout the 1920s and'30s the Federation conducted surveys on the machine 
question:, usuaRy in response to queries from members faced with trade union 
claims. In every case the surveys reveal a wide range of practice within and across 
districts for the same machine, sometimes staffed by skilled men, sometimes by 
semi-skilled, and with a range of rates being paid. In some cases the differences 
may reflect the fact that skilled work could be turned off on the same machine used 
for semi-skilled work. Sometimes they will be the result of a compromise between 
employers and employees. But the variations are so wide and systematic that they 
must reflect a substantial degree of success by employers in imposing a policy of 
paying for work according to the skill of the operator, the type of machine, and the 
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quality of the work. It was, after all, the unions! policy to achieve the skilled rate, 
the employers! to make judgements about degrees of skill. 
A survey on the staffing of Roby Smith Gear Planers in 1920 produced replies from 
various firms in Manchester showing handymen employed at 45 shillings, semi- 
skilled men paid 46 shillings, 'and skilled men paid 49 shillings (eef237/3/l/162). 
North West employers, asked to comment on staffling of Gisholt Universal Turret 
lathes on screwing work, found nine firms were using tumers or apprentice turners, 
six were using semi-skilled men and one firm, handymen. 
In Birmingham in 1925 one firm reported using skifled men on the Richards 
Turning and Boring machine who were paid between 37s and 46s depending on the 
class of work being done. In Leeds two firms reported using semi-skilled 
machinists paid between 3 8s and 44s (eef/237/13/4/5). In East Angha one firm paid 
a highly skilled man 6 Is 8d, another a machineman at 28s. In the East Anglian case 
there was probably a considerable difference in the work done. But in 1928 a firm 
in Birkenhead reported semi-skilled men paid 42s for using a Pearns No3 
Horizontal Boring and Facing machine for boring and facing'cylinders and similar. 
On the North East Coast a firm reported skilled men paid between 46s and 49s for 
boxing and facing valves and cylinders on the same machine. 
In many cases the range of rates paid to skilled and semi-skilled overlapped. In 
1933, on the Kendall and Gent Horizontal Boring machine, 15 firms paid sldfled 
men between 42s and 54s 9d; 4 firms paid semi-skifled or machinemen 34s 9d to 
45s. On Duplex Boring AUls in the following year it was found that 34 firms paid 
skilled rates from 42s to 48s, while six firm paid semi-skilled workers between 35s 
and 44s. This pattern is repeated for a range of machines; Churchill surface and 
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universal grinders, Herbert Turret lathes, capstan lathes and Archdale vertical 
millers, with the balance between the number of firms using skilled or semi-skilled 
labour shifting according to the machine. East Anglia summed up its use of vertical 
millers in 193 5 with the phrase, 'used by Tradesmen or labourers as required'. 
The structure of engineering wages was such, with war bonuses and nationany 
agreed additions topping up pre-war district rates, that differences in pay for the 
same, or similar, work was inevitable. Different practices in deploying skilled or 
semi-skifled labour on the same machine and at varying rates of pay finther 
bedevilled this already potentially chaotic payment pattern, to say nothing of the 
e-ir-ifiects of payment by results. Local custom clearly mattered too. In London one 
firm reported paying a grinder on a snow grinding machine'40s 1 Id plus ten 
shillings which we believe is the London grinders rate. He has since had some 
ability money added to his wages and his present pay is 48s I ld plus ten shillings!. 
It has been argued that the role of skBed men in domestic bargainin enabled them 
to maintain earnings differentials, even if the wake differential shrank (Hart and I 
McKay 1975: 39; Penn 1980). But in the circumstances described above, this can 
hardly be taken at face value as a measure of skill. Moreover, even before skill 
-I- shortages began to emerge the EEF was concerned that, 'in many cases the 
piecework earnings of semi-skilled operators are unfortimately greater than the 
time work earnings of skiffed operators! (EEF Mnutes Nov. 1934). Earnings 
figures compiled by Knowles and Roberston for 1948 seem to confirm this as a 
pattem. 
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. Table 8 Earnings of Turners and Machinemen 1948 
Occupation Average Weekly Earnings (Shfflkgs) 
Jan. 1948 
Time PBR. 
Workers Workers 
Tumers and Machinemen 
(rated at or above fitters rate) 
Tumers and Machinemen 
(rated below fitters rate) 
134.9 150.7 
115.3 138.7 
Source: Knowles and Robertson (1951: 83) 
Being paid a semi-skilled rate for a job is one thing. Being paid the semi-skilled rate 
when others in the same works or district are paid the skiRed rate is likely to prove 
intolerable in the long run. The exercise of the enVloyer's absolute right to manage 
had created 4 jungle of occupational categories and pay rates that was a constant 
source of irritation before skill shortages added new pressures. From being a 
rallying cry that united employers, the right to manage became an increasingly 
meaningless slogan that could not address the specific problems that the EEFs 
membership faced. In the workshops of the London and North East Railway AEU 
men could be transferred from grade 3 to grade I work, receiving the appropriate 
rate of pay for the work at each grade (AEU Aug. 1924). At the Austin a labour 
grading system was installed with three grades of semi-skilled labour defined 
(Engelbach 1928a). But the EEF could not, or would not, negotiate a grading 
arrangement for the industry. As the number and variety of machine processes 
multiplied, the Federation continued to insist that every case must be judged on its 
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ments. What had once been tactical flexibi1ity looked increasingly like a mixture of 
indecision and inflexibility. 
Unions continued to insist, where they were able, on the removal of semi-skilled 
workers and their replacement by their skilled members. But on the ground, the 
struggle mostly revolved around the rate for the job. At Siemens in 193 7 there was 
a strike after a labourer was put on setting milling machines worked by women, 
and paid 10d an hour plus bonus instead of Is Id plus cost of living. The first time 
the new setter went to work there was a strike, in which the setter, Brother 
Partridge, participated. The strike was settled when it was agreed that Partridge 
should be paid the skilled rate (Siemens Journal No32). It was impossible to 
bargain about the right of the skilled man to follow the machine or the employers 
right to manage, but there was room to do business on the rate for the job. The 
AEU's Birmingham organiser failed to persuade GEC to pay the skilled rate on a 
Richards Horizontal Borer used for a single purpose job. But the firm agreed to 
reconsider the question if the machine was used for general work, an advance was 
conceded to one man on a boring machine bringing him to the full rate, and it was 
agreed that the rate to be paid to capstan operators should be settled between shop 
stewards and management (AEU May 1930). In 1935 the AEU organiser reported 
a works conference at Armstrong Siddley in Coventry, 'to consider the question of 
the splitting up ofjobs in area engine fitting shop'. It was the union's contention 
that 'unreasonable reductions in prices had taken place during this arrangement' 
(AEU Feb. 193 5). 
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Trade Union Demands for a Grading System 
At the conference table the engineering union continued to pursue its demand for a 
negotiated settlement to the machine question. But if the employers were 
constrained by their insistence on managerial rights, the AEU was hamstrung by its 
refusal to co-operate with'other unions, a weakness of which the EEF took full 
advantage. 
Proposals from the AEU in 1920 essentially reiterated the rights of the skilled man 
but led, in November 192 1, to the appointment of a joint sub-committee with the 
EEF to investigate the question. In the event, the sub-committee did not meet until 
July 1923 when the union suggested that the employers put forward their own 
counter proposals, and the sub-committee arranged to meet again in September. 
Meanwhile the EEF agreed to meet the National Federation of General Workers in 
August, and the General Workers insisted that'their members who have the 
aptitude and qualifications shall not be restricted in the use of any machine in the 
evolution of the engineering industry (EEF Minutes Feb. 1924). Confronted with 
the outcome of the EEFs meeting with the General Workers, the AEU negotiators 
in September could only report the matter to their Executive Committee. In August 
the EEF had told the Derby Association that it could not respond to local claims 
for a negotiated rate for machinemen because this was now the subject of national 
negotiations. Ile Federation now responded to all general approaches, including a 
fiurther approach from the General Workers in September, with the statement that 
they could do nothing until they heard from the AEUs executive. In 1925, the 
AEUs request for a meeting to discuss pay for machinemen in the textile machine 
industry was refused on the grounds that the EEF was still awaiting the AEU ECs 
reply (EEF Minutes Sept. 1925). 
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In the same year, however, the EEF did concede the claim from the National Union 
of General and Municipal Workers for 2s on the rate for labourers in Lancashire 
and Cheshire who were put on machines, an agreement subsequently extended to 
Bradford with the clarification that it was 2s on the district,, not the workshop, 
labourer's rate (EEF Minutes March, April 1925). 
It took the AEU four years to get back into the game. It did so in 1929 by 
appealing for a fresh start to negotiations. The AEU would still not 'even consider 
the question of sitting down! with other unions but 'the union representatives had 
intunated that they were prepared to proceed with the discussions on the basis 
proposed by the Employers, viz. the skiH required of the operator, the machine he 
is worlding, and the work upon which he is engaged' (EEF Minutes Oct. 1929). 
This put the EEF in a difficult position and a special committee was authorised to 
discuss the machine question on this basis. But an excuse was soon found to pull 
out. Tlie government's proposed Industrial Employment Bill was said to offer such 
a threat to the liberty of employers that negotiations could only continue with the 
AEU when the whole of eýdsting working conditions had been reviewed and put, on ,. 
an economic footing. In May of the fbHowing year the NUGMW indicated that 
they would withdraw their 1923 demands for a removal of restrictions on their 
members, agree the same formula as the AEU, and to act jointly with the AEU in 
conference. The EEF delayed once more, this time awaiting a reply from the 
Workers Union and a report on working conditions (EEF Minutes May 1930). 
It may be dangerous to deduce too much from these manoeuvres at national level. 
There may have been many companies in the EEF who wanted negotiations as well 
as many skilled men back in the branches and the workplace who preferred more 
traditional methods. But arguably they do indicate the nature of the relationship 
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between the two. The AEU, implicitly from the turn of the century, explicitly at the 
end of the twenties, was prepared to pursue the interests of its members within the 
framework laid down by the employers. The latter clearly felt themselves in a 
sufficiently strong position to keep the unions at arms length. The negotiations also 
suggest that the AEU had long since ceased to hold out, any real hope that 
craftsmen could follow the machine. What was at issue now was the rate of pay for 
a hierarchy of skills, most of which bore only a passing resemblance to the pre-war 
'craft'. 
In 1936 the NUGMW and the TGV*rU cancelled the Lancashire Machine 
Agreement with the EEF as a preliminary to talks with the AEU on a new joint 
approach on the machine question. New proposals were subsequently tabled to the 
EEF late in the year. They were predictably ambitious with nearly all the new 
machine trades, from planers to capstan operators who set up their own work, 
being placed in the skilled category. More modest proposals were again submitted 
in 1937 but these did not find favour either. Two years later the negotiations were 
revived when the EEF agreed, 'fo r tactical reasons!, to a new joint sub-committee 
(EEF Minutes Oct. 1938). But despite agreeing arrangements for dilution in 1939, 
the EEF would not budge from its refusal to entertain any kind of grading'scheme 
to address the 'machine question, a refusal reiterated on a fresh approach from the 
unions in Jan. 1942. In 1944 there were signs that the EEF was more divided with 
some districts arguing that a machinists wage rate agreement would help to keep 
the machinists pay below the skilled rate, but the line held (EEF Minutes Jan. 
1944). Indeed, in August and December of the same year, the EEF also rejected 
proposals fiom. the unions for the grading of clerical jobs 'according to the nature 
of the work performed and the degree of responsibility carried! (EEF Minutes Dec. 
1944). 
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The unions were nothing if not persistent. New proposals for a three grade 
structure, 'engineering craftsman, skilled operator and labourer' were submitted in 
Aug. 1946 and a six grade scale in 1949, starting with labourers and moving 
through skilledto super skilled. All to no avail. The EEF established a committee 
of experts in 1946 which took evidence from members of the Federation. It 
concluded, predictably enough, that a national grading scheme was impractical 
given the endless variety of 'methods employed by individual firms making the 
same product'. The committee could not even agree that there should be a 
starting rate for labourers promoted to a machine, with periodic increases 
after that (EEF Mnutes Feb. 1946). 
That endless variety also makes it difficult to sum up what had happened to 
machinemen and skiRed workers between the wars. On one account in the AEU 
journal, 'the only people near the work who may accurately be classed as skilled 
being the foreman, chargehands, markers out, machine setters and tool makers! 
- 
(AEU Feb. 1937). Only at the periphery were th6re, skills to be found which could 
be compared to the pre-war crafts. Many of the machinemen had been absorbed 
into that part of the skilled workforce deployed in production. In 1946 the EEF 
Board found that 29 members of the Federation trained or apprenticed boys for 
between three and five years to become planers, slotters and shapers and that, in 
the majority of cases, paid the turner's rate after the training period. On the other 
hand the Board found that, 'notwithstanding the restrictions which the trade unions 
had been able to impose in certain districts and on certain individual firms, there 
were still extensive federated regional areas, such as the Midlands and the South 
and West of England, where men were promoted from the floor to such machines 
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as slotters and shapers, apprenticeships to this class of work being practically 
unknown'(EEF Minutes May 1946). 
In part the absorption of machinemen into the ranks of skiR will have been 
determined by the trade union action referred to above, and this wiH have. been 
made easier wherc- firms were engaged in the older sectors of engmieenng as was 
more likely to be the case in the North and the North West. It was also 
encouraged, as we have argued above, by the inability of the employers to create 
any systematic training alternative to the institution of apprenticeship and the 
refusal to create or negotiate occupational structures for an industry where 
employers were simply advised to exercise their rights. However, to see this 
process as one in which craftsmen successfidly defend their central role in 
production, or as a labour process in which employers remained dependent on 
skilled workers, is to mistake the forms in which the various struggles were played 
out for the substance. The machinemen were absorbed into the ranks of a hierarchy 
of skiR which they created, a process which had much more in common with the 
deskiUed labour on the 'execution' side of the conception/execution divide than it 
did with the craftsmen Who, together with the foremen, worked out how to make a 
product from the bare details provided from the office. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how the position of the pre-war craftsman was 
undermined by mechanisation and its management from the office. Skill did not 
disappear altogether. 17here was still a need for some workers to have a greater 
knowledge of materials and processes, and the associated manual dexterities, than 
others. Nevertheless, new tools, and the rise of new forms of production 
management, constituted a qualitative break in longer term trends. If we could 
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speak, in however highly qualified a sense, about a craft mode of production at the 
turn of the century, that notion is no longer applicable after the first world war. 
The better educated and more skilled workers found new jobs in the office or were 
increasingly located on the periphery of the production process in the toolroorn and 
maintenance shop. This reconstitution of the labour process was reflected in the 
(largely unsuccessful ) attempts to adapt the institutions of apprenticeship and 
training to the need to produce a much more highly differentiated workforce; in the 
changing composition of the workforce, including the new importance of the 
machinemen; and in the shifting location and composition of the industry itself 
Engineering employers pursued a conscious deskilling strategy. Their declared aim 
was to deskill the job rather than the man. They recognised that deskiffing the man 
was a necessary consequence of deskilEng the job but hoped, in this way, to hmit 
the scale of conflict in the industry, and this accounts both for a certain 
'constitutionalism! in the employers' approach and their extraordinary caution in 
cases involving the employment of women. 
There is a point of considerable significance here. We have noted on a number of 
occasions that, in Britain, the jig and tool designer had a greater impact on the 
skilled man than did the efficiency engineer. The EEF attempt to distinguish 
between deskifling the job and deskilling the man is consistent with this experience. 
Skilled engineering workers were more familiar with Taylorism. as the management 
of mechanisation than from the office than the reconstitution of the labour process 
through shop floor time and motion studies. This remained true throughout the 
1930s, despite the spread of Bedaux, with skilled men only drawn into the 
industrial engineering net on a significant scale during and after the second world 
war. However, by that time few of these skilled workers were 'craftsmen'. The 
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direct application of Taylorist schemes was only one element among a number of 
related developments reconstituting the labour process in similar ways. 
Sldfled men fought a stubborn rearguard action against aR of them But their 
successes have been wildly exaggerated. Ile -struggle was conducted fromjpb to 
job, around rates of pay and machine staffing, in ways which could only limit the 
rate of change. There was nothing resembling a struggle to defend a craft mode of 
production, nor could here have been, since the conditions for such a thing were 
rapidly disappearing from the turn of the century. The left appealed for an end to 
the craft mentality, but with only limited success, since so many members in the 
workshops set their faces against change. This was not, however, a sign of strength 
or of the 'continued centrafity of the skifled worker', but of narrow conservatism 
which appealed to a steadily sbrinkin section of industry. 
The union was forced to adjust more rapidly than its members. From 1929 the 
AEU was prepared to accept the employers! position as the basis for negotiations 
on the machine question, the aim being to secure a grading scheme to protect the 
position of the craftsman, or super-skilled, within aa new hierarchy of skills. 
Employer obduracy in the face of trade union realism prevented any such scheme 
being established. 'Me paradoxical consequence of the inflexible exercise of 
employer power was to create bargaining pressures and patterns at workplace level 
which were much more influential for post-war developments than any survival of 
19th century craft worker traditions. 
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Notes 
For America, Montgomery notes that, 'Paradoxically, machinists became increasingly 
craft conscious as their craft became harder to define' (1989, - 182). Hobsbawm (1984) makes too 
many concessions to the new historians in accepting that'sheer bloody minded shop floor 
resistance reversed the total victory won by the Eng; ineering Employers Federation in the 1897-98 
lockout' and that piecework was an alternative to Fordist strategies. 
2 The 'need to degrade the intelligence was universally understood. As the ELO put it, 'It 
would be vain, and even dangerous to re-introduce intelligence and initiative in workshops where 
the output depends entirely on automatic machinery. Rationalisation pre-supposes a great 
intellectual effort on the part of the "brain" of the factory - the central offices and research 
departments' (quoted in Devinat 1927: xi) 
3 That is to say, a force determining the design or nature of the technology and consequent 
deployment of labour, as opposed to'the attribution to workers of labels denoting them as skilled, 
semi skilled or unskilled, together with the differentiation of wages and status which usually 
accompanies such labelling! (More 1980: 16) 
There is an EEF file dating from the 1940s which suggests that there was hardly any 
change at all in skill composition for adult males (eef/237/13/3/44) but this is wholly at odds with 
the many reports in numbers of skilled and semi skilled workers for the inter-war period which 
all tell the same story. Excell recounts how ordinary labourers at Morris motors were re-classified 
as skilled when the second world war broke out (1978: 65). 
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Haydu says'Coventry suggests a pocket of American conditions in England (1988: 122); 
Butt (1960) makes much the same point. 
Frank Smith from the AEU Branch in Battersea wrote pointing out that, 'As the 
instruments of progress the operative engineers have been used first, to dilute and simplify the 
labours of all other workers. Parallel with this we have greatly simplified and diluted our own, 
and in the very nature of things this process must continue. Progress demands and insists on the 
simplification of the methods of production. (AEU Journal Sept. 1923). 
7 Zeitlin argues that even the EEF victory in 1922 was 'ambiguous', that employers were 
'reluctant to assume full control over the production process' which vastly overstates the case. In 
the circumstances it is not surprising that Zeitlin should conclude that'Great mystery surrounds 
the failure of British engineering employers to develop more effective mechanisms to control the 
recruitment and reproduction of skilled labour at local level' (1991: 74). 
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Chapter 5 From Premium Bonus to Bedaux 
Introduction 
Before the first world war premium bonus led the way in workshop reorganisation, 
spearheading t4e drive to extend piecework, providing new management tools and 
a focus for shop floor anger and resentment. In the years before the second world 
war the self-consciously scientific management efficiency system devised by 
Bedaux played a similar role. In this chapter I discuss the nature of the Bedaux 
system and its role in the development of modem work study and explore the 
relationship between, on the one hand, Bedaux and employers and their managers, 
and on the other, between Bedaux and workers and their trade unions. 
Bedaux was an exphcitly Taylorite system of labour management. But it did not 
operate in a vacuum. In keeping with the argument of this thesis, I locate the 
Bedaux system as part of a wider trend towards tighter time-study standards and 
discuss the relationship between Bedaux and other schemes of payment by results. 
Within this framework a number of other issues are addressed including the impact 
of efficiency systems on semi and unskilled men and women as well as on skilled 
men; the degree of management control of piecework; the tensions within the 
Bedaux company itself and their implications for managerial strategies and Bedaux 
applications; the impact of worker resistance and the speed with which the trade 
unions reached an accommodation with Bedaux and work study. 
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. The Spread of Piecework and the Dectine of Premium Bonus 
A Board of Trade estimate for 1906 put the proportion on workpeople on some 
form of payment by results at 28% (Richardson 1933: 192). Cole's survey of the 
position in a number of industries at the conclusion of the first world war found a 
similar pattern, and although he would not hazard a guess about the proportion of 
workers paid by results, he was in no doubt that the various systems were 
spreading (1918: 9). In fact, estimates of the numbers paid by results for the end of 
the 1930s do not show a dramatic change from the earlier period. In 1938 some 
25% of wage earners in all industries were paid by results, with a higher proportion 
of 33%. in manufacturing industry. Tlie numbers on some form of piecework 
probably increased at a faster rate during and after the second world war. Enquiries 
by the Ministry of Labour for 1961 showed a third of all workers, and 42% of 
employees in manufacturing industry, on payment by results (ELO 1967: 55; 
Marriott 1957: 49; NBPI 1968). But piecework was spreading faster in some 
industries and for some kinds of workers than others. 
Roughly a third of engineering fitters and turners were on piecework in 1906. By 
1914 nearly half the fitters and 37% of the turners in the ASE were on piecework 
and the numbers grew rapidly during the war. They grew fastest among the new 
'machine trades' and among the turners. By 1923 more turners than fitters worked 
piecework and by 1940 'the proportion of turners and machinemen on piecework 
was between 75 and 80 per cent'(Jeffreys 1945: 210; McLaine 1944: 630). Wide 
regional differences remained. In Birmingham and Coventry, between two thirds 
and three quarters of all classes of engineering employees were paid by results as 
early as 1931 (eef/237/13/3/22). Engineering workers had voted solidly against 
premium bonus before the first world war, and against piecework in 1920. By 
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1928, with so many members paid by results, the AEU National Committee 
resolved to seek a new national agreement to control it (Alilne Bailey 1929: 420). 
It has often been remarked, and with some justice, that it was difficult to apply 
piecework on highly skilled operations, but all the evidence suggests that 
piecework was more problematic in the case of unskilled workers than skilled. 
'Generally speaking, noted the ELO, 'skilled workers are paid more frequently by 
results than unskilled workers and women more frequently than men' (1967: 9 1)1. 
Semi- skilled workers headed the piecework league in engineering, but skilled men 
were not far behind. Knowles and Robertson identify payment by results workers 
as a percentage of engineering workers between 1926 and 1948 as follows 
Table 9 Payment by Results Workers as % of all engineering workers 
for three grades of skitl 
Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled 
1926, (Oct. ) 51.1 na 13.9 
1928 (Oct. ) 55.0 na 14.5 
1931 (Oct. ) 56.1 na 16.3 
1938 (July) 62.1 80.8 14.8 
1942 (July) 69.9 82.3 22.6 
1948 (Jan. ) 60.8 84.5 22.6 
Source: Knowles and Robertson 195 1p 189 
Ministry of labour figures for the mid 1960s show a smaller proportion of both 
skilled and semi-skilled on payment by results - 49.2% and 53.2% respectively - 
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with the gap between them much narrower but with the percentage of unskilled 
workers sffl at 21.6%. In 1961 across a range of manufacturing industries,, i11, 
transport, public utilities and some services and public administration, 44% of 
women were paid by results against 30% of men (NBPI 1968: 77,78). 
As piecework spread, premium bonus declined (Yates 1937: 86). In 1930 the 
Glasgow manufacturer, Sam Mavor, estimated that in the West of Scotland, where 
the Rowan system had been particularly popular, 19% of those on payment by 
results worked under premium bonus and 24% on some form of individual 
piecework (1930: 13). But elsewhere premium bonus probably accounted for a 
considerably smaller proportion. Straight piecework had come into its own since 
the war, H C. Armitage told the production engineers in 193 1, 'and has ousted 
premium systems, Rowans, and about three hundred variations thereof 
(Proceedings, Production Engineers 1931-32). The EEF ceased to collect figures 
for premium bonus in the 1920s, and in 1936 the TUC thought premium bonus 
systems were no longer widely used (tuc/292/112/1). But the new piecework 
schemes were not a reversion to earlier money bargains even if the language of 
'piecework prices! continued to be used. Tliey were usually based on calculations of 
time and with more carefid, if not 'scientific', rate ffidng. 
There is no doubt about the reason for the decline in popularity of premium bonus 
from the employers'point of view. Such schemes were now widely regarded as a 
provocation to restriction of output and an abdication of the employer's 
responsibility for rate fixing. A contributor to discussion among production 
engineers of a paper on payment by results was roundly applauded when he 
declared that 'the presence of the Rowan system in any shop is as good as an 
admission on the part of the management that they do not know anything about 
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setting times and rates! (Proceedings, Production Engineers 1930-3 1). Whether the 
move from premium bonus to piecework was always accompanied by more 
rigorous rate fL-. dng in practice is another matter. Sunbeam motors replaced 
premium bonus for a time-based piecework scheme in 1923 without any apparent 
upheaval in methods. Workers were guaranteed the whole of any time saved at 
their ordinary time rate and it was agreed that, 'Time fixed for each operation or 
piece of work shall be settled by mutual agreement between the management and 
the workmen concerned', though the commitment to mutuality did not last (AEU 
Feb. 1923; DSO/23/2 1). The question we must now consider is how far the shift 
from premium bonus to piecework, and the critique of the rate-fDdng practice 
associated with premium bonus, meant the adoption of time and motion study 
approaching a Taylorist model 
Rate Fixing and Time Study Between the Wars 
nere was certainly a new post-war awareness of the need for systematic time 
study to be carried out by a rate-fl)dng department rather than the foreman. In 
1919 Maxweff s paper on scientific management in The Engineer had argued that 
'without -accurate measurement of work payment by results is only a catchword! 
(Dec. 1919). And in the following year Cassiers and Engineering both called for 
more scientific rate fixing to overcome objections to piecework. But this was not 
as straightforward as it sounded. There are three aspects to consider; the degree of 
rigour in time study, the use of motion study, and the production organisation 
which forms the context for work measurement. 
We have already discussed the difficulties in distinguishing rate fixi: ng from time 
study when we discussed the origins of premium bonus (chapter 2). Rates could 
be set by guesswork, usually on the basis of experience; from records accumulated 
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over time, which amounted to a more systematic ordering of experience; from time 
studies aimed at measuring floor to floor times; or from a time recording of each 
element of the job. In practice A of these methods could, and did, eýdst side by 
side. Nor were they always distinguishable. A visitor to the Production Engineers 
in 1926 told the speaker that 'You have passed absolute condemation on the 
guessing ratefixer but it seems to me that it is a1l guessing'. To which the speaker 4;; F-- 
could only reply that 'It is a rather difficult subject. There are guesses and guesses. 
The trained man guesses, but he instinctively knows! (Proceedings, Production 
Engineers 1925-26). Engineering had called for careful time study done on each 
of the elements of the job but recognised that 'there are very few members of our 
staffs today who have become accustomed to subdivide jobs into their elements 
and to assess the correct time for the carrying out of these elements of work' (Feb. 
1920). 
A second difficulty lay in motion study. 'Briefly, ordinary rate fixing merely 
estimates the time an operator will take to do a job, leaving him to find out quicker 
methods himseK under the incentive of increased pay, ' a speaker told the 
Birmingham section of the production engineers.. 'Time and motion study work is 
different.. A study is taken to find out which motions are necessary, which are not, 
and what time they should take. The unnecessary motions are eliminated.. ' (Wilson 
1934). But this degree of integration was comparatively even less frequent than 
rigorous time study. In Britain, the split between Taylor and Gilbreth, between 
time study and motion study, was sharper than it had been in the USA- Motion 
study in Britain developed through the work of the Industrial Health Research 
Board, the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, and the work of Anne Shaw 
at Metropolitan Vickers and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Again, in 
practice, distinctions were blurred as motion study experts carried out time studies 
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and work measurement included an element of motion study. But when industrial 
engineers in Britain organised their own professional bodies they established one 
for motion study and another for time study. 
A third, and cfiýical,. consideration was the sophistication of the production 
organisation within which time and motion study was carried out. I E. Powell, 
author of the standard work on payment by results in the 1920s, told the newly 
formed Institute of Industrial Administration that inefficient output was largely due 
to faulty organisation and that payment by results could only be a stimulus to 
production not a substitute for efficient works organisation (The Engineer May 
1920). And he warned his readers that the right remedy for the production 
problems they experienced may not be payment by results at all 'Which, by 
inference, places the responsibility for low output upon the workers, but is rather 
the acquirement, by management, of efficient production knowledge and the 
exercise of suitable production contror. Payment by results in an inefficient works 
would simply build inefficiency into the job, 'what is called for more than anything 
else is production knowledge; what appears to b6 necessary is a revolution in 
production management' (1924: v, 10). 
Powell' s point was widely understood by contemporaries. Engineering coupled its 
caH for more scientific rate fixing with the strong advice not to introduce rate fixing 
or payment by results until'the methods in vogue in the shop are the best possible 
for the plant available' (Feb. 1920). This was advice repeated by production 
engineers in the 1930s and by the British Government in its evidence to the ELO 
after the second world war (ILO 1967: 167). It was, of course, one of Taylor's 
central themes and the cause of much argwnent with employers who engaged his 
services. It focused attention on the links between production engineering and 
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work measurement, and though clearly sound advice, was extremely difficult to 
carry out. Time and motion study, no matter how rigorous, would always be the 
subordinate element in the larger production plan if carried out according to 
Taylorist design. But quite apart from anything else, it was difficult to know what 
were the best possible conditions, and in any case, managers felt the need to act in 
the here and now.. Some of the implications for rate fl. -, dng were brought out by T. 
E. Pattinson, works manager at Associated Engineering, who argued that rates 
should be fixed on the assumption that the best machines were in use and a process 
allowance added to compensate for poor conditions (Proceedings, Production 
Engineers 1925-26). This may have been theoretically possible but was clearly very 
difficult and unlikely to be widely adopted as practice. 
Measured against exacting standards of time study, motion study and production 
organisation, British practice was limited and uneven. G. H. Nelson, works 
manager at Attercliffe -Common works in Sheffield, acknowledged that 'there are 
many so called rate-fixing departments in most works, but in many cases they are 
not sufficiently organised' (Engineering, March 1924) and L. Clayton told the 
production engineers in 1931 that time and motion study as he knew it elsewhere 
'is practically unknOWn in Great Britain, particularly with reference to engineering' 
(193 1: 3 7 1). In fact, the experience was more mixed as testified by a rate fixer 
writing in Machinery in 193 1. Claiming to present a representative selection from 
his own experience, 'SWH described carefid time study applied in one motor 
company on the basis of a system imported en bloc from the USA; in another there 
was no rate-fixing department and the foreman fixed piecework prices. In a motor 
car presswork plant he found detailed time study for assembly and machining; at a 
transmission chain makers, premium bonus and at a machine tool works on small 
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batch work, gangs worked to prices fixed by a combination of speed and feed 
calculations and rule of thumb (Machinery Nov. 193 1). 
But there are examples of developed time study systems, particularly in mass 
production plants. Whatever may be said about the post-war experience of 
payment by results in the motor industry, the pre-war systems were tightly 
organised and involved no suggestion of a surrender of control. At Austin's 
Longbridge plant, in EngeIbacWs account, the possible earnings of pieceworkers 
were worked out theoretically on the basis of the highest possible efficiency and 
ideal piecework earnings obtained. Actual performance was compared to the ideal 
standard and'operatives who were inefficient were weeded out and foremen or 
charge hands who were not up to the standard were removed to different work or 
dealt with otherwise'. Each job, it was clafined, was graded by the amount of skill 
required, an enormous task involving the review of 15,000 to 20,000 operations. 
'Even the toolroonY. wrote Engelbach, lias been placed on piecework, with such 
success that the output was increased by 24% and the number of operatives 
reduced by 19%' (1928: 5 10,5 11). Engelbach's colleague, Perry Keene, claimed the 
system extended to all kinds of labour in the plant, '.. they unpacked stationery, 
I 
carried out repairs, ran the whole of the internal transport of their company, and 
even the washing of offices, and the cleaning of windows on exactly the same 
system as the manufacturing of a car. They paid purely on time saved and nothing 
else'(Ward, wa/8/29-34/12, June 1933). 
At Lord Lever's Port Sunlight plant a standard unit per man hour was obtained 
'after careful measurement of times taken on various productions!, and a bonus 
paid, of between 60% and 75% of the value of the increase in efficiency over the 
standard unit. And at Rowntree's cocoa plant the job was reviewed before a 
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provisional time set and adjusted as a final rate after three months (Ward, wa/8/29- 
34/12, Jan. 1930). More generally, Child has pointed to a shift among Quaker 
employers during the inter-war period away from notions of industrial democracy 
and towards a more single minded concern with efficiency. Edward Cadbury had 
criticised the effects of scientific management on workers 'but by the later 1920's it 
was not infrequently being legitimised in terms of benefiting these self same 
employees! (1964: 303). The best known example of motion study was, of course, 
the work of Anne Shaw at Metropolitan Vickers where, as'chief supervisor of 
women and motion study investigato: e, she carried out extensive motion studies 
and conducted training courses for the whole of Associated Electrical Industries 
(The Engineer Sept. 193 3; Williams 199 1). 
There are also some interesting lesser known examples of advanced practice. The 
Rolling Mill Committee of the Iron and Steel Industrial Research Council thought 
that 'the use of time study in the heavy industries in Great Britain is, at present, in 
its infancy (Hohnes 1934-35; Engineering May 1938). It was not, however, 
unknown. H. T. Hildage pointed to the use of time study at the United Steel 
Company where separate staffs had been appointed to be responsible for 
production and fuel efficiency: 'The work of these staffs, in each case, is inspired 
and co-ordinated by an engineer, who is attached to the personal staff of the 
aging director ... Broadly speaking their methods are the methods of Taylor 
and his colleagues and successors, and are designed to suit the conditions of the 
works in which they are carried out' (Engineering May 193 1). 
Ile difficulty is that apart from scattered reports, little hard information eNists 
about the degree to which systematic time and motion study underpinned payment 
systems. Responding to enquiries about the use of time study from the HIRB in 
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1935, the TUC identified a Fist of 18 firms using Bedaux including Venesta, Taylor 
Bros., Manders, Rover, and Crosse and Blackwell. Information about other time 
study systems was more difficult to obtain. The Boilermakers replied that their 
members refused to be timed! The GMWU identified Pilkingtons and ICI plants in 
North Wales, Rowntree and Metropolitan Vickers; their Scottish region added 
North British Rubber in Edinburgh, a confectionery, works where the time study 
men had been trained at Rowntree and a number of others (tuc/292/571,1 /1,20 
May 1935). These lists suggest that, while the growing importance of time study 
was widely acknowledged, no one really knew just how extensive it was. Nor was 
there much more information available in the period after the war. When Seymour 
Melman enquired in 1950 aboutthe proportion of operatives in this country whose 
wages are based on incentive plans and standards derived from Time and Motion 
Study analysis of unit operations!, the TUC were unable to tell him Nor could the 
British Institute of Management, who confessed that they had no knowledge of 
where such information could be found (tuc/292/571j/,, 26 April 1950). 
Piecework and Efficiency Systems 
The evidence to the TUC from the AEU did, however, suggest that the stop watch 
was more familiar than the efficiency engineer. 'I have now received replies from 
our organising District Delegates in regard thereto', wrote the AEU, 'and in each 
case they report that they cannot supply any information on the lines suggested by 
you. Ile only knowledge they have of Time Study Systems is in respect to the use 
of the stop watch for the fi--dng of piecework prices. However, I am arranging to 
have sent to you, particulars of the motion study idea that is operating at Metro 
Vickers Ltd Manchester' (tuc/292/571,1/, 14 May 1935). 
230 
But in this respect, experience in Britain may not have been so far removed from 
that in America. Time study of the type inspired by Taylor was not confined to 
'efficiency systems% and piecework was more common than incentive bonus 
schemes (Northcott 1950: 136). A survey of 672 plants by the National Metal 
Trades Association in 1930 found that three quarters of all employees were paid by 
time. Of those paid by results, 50% were on relatively straightforward piecework, 
plans, 21% on premium bonus and only II% on %onus plans'. The use of time 
study was widespread. Of those reporting, 43% set standards exclusively by time 
studies and a further 3 1% by time study combined with some other means (Diemar 
1930: 51-52). But even in America 26% of companies in this particular survey 
based their rates on previous performance or guesswork. A more comprehensive 
survey by the National Industrial Conference Board in the same year produced 
comparable results. The numbers of all employees on payment by results in the 
establishments surveyed was higher at 37%. Of these only a little over 15% worked 
under 'the various specialised incentive schemes'while more than half were on 
straight piecework (1930: 8-9). Of those plants providing information on how piece 
rates were determined, 25% based their rates on estimates and 63% onanalysis of 
the standardised operation, including time study (1930: 47). 
Ile production engineers expressed a clear preference for piecework but were 
clear that time study was essential. Efficiency systems were continually being 
brought over from America, noted R C. Armitage from Austin, but he believed 
they would never replace piecework. The important thing was to base straight 
piecework on careful time study. Piecework was cheap and simple to operate, 
argued E. W. Hancock, but it must have good time study at its root and 
management should pay more attention to selecting time study engineers than 
devising elaborate methods of payment. Even more importantly, the right 
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production conditions must be secured. 'I have taken a considerable interest in 
incentive systems and in so-called scientific management for the best part of my 
life',, argued P. H. Lightbody at the Coventry section, but 'I am quite convinced in 
my mind that you will never get the answer to this problem of which is the best 
4 incentive system until you start with the other side of the equation and classify 
conditions! (1930). 
Sam Mavor took a similar view in a series of articles for the Institute of 
Engineering and Shipbuilding in Scotland. Without very good management', 
Mavor warned, 'payment by results is a snare'. It was worse than futile to try to 
introduce piecework until management had provided the proper organisation and 
facilities (1930: 27). Ford methods of driving the men were inappropriate in Brit i 
argued Mavor, '... in this country the procedure is more humane, less arbitrary and 
dictatorial, and psychologically is to be preferred' (1931: 65). It is important to note 
however, that Mavor's humanity did not prevent him adopting F. W. Taylors 
system of time study at Mavor and Coulson. Nor was this simply a matter of the 
rigorous use of the stop watch. 'After the workshop organisation, equipment and 
I services have been brought into line with the necessities of time study, it remains to - 
investigate every individual job before applying time study to it. The best technical 
skill in the establishment should be concentrated on methods planning and jig and 
fixture designing. The department is the thinking organ of the workshops, which 
directs the modes of applying manual labour and machinery to the achievement of 
the highest productivity (193 1: 7 1). Formerly, argued Mavor, no one knew what a 
fair day's work was, 'now the firm knows and the men know the firm knows' 
(1931a: 39). ' 
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Of course piecework schemes could lend themselves to a loss of managerial 
control. 'Lazy management', L. R Lightbody told the production engineers, 'relies 
solely on the incentive - leaves the worker to do most of the thinking and planning, 
and later attempts to reduce the prices! (1930). But there was no necessary 
connection bet,, yeen. piecework and a loss of control and no distinction of 
substance to be drawn between piecework backed by rigorous time and motion 
study and any of the more self consciously Taylorist efficiency systems. The key, as 
Taylor had insisted, lay in the degree of production control. In an interesting 
comment on the changing role of the rate fixer, I Hannay noted that there were 
now people who planned the work, estimated the costs and arranged production, 
telling the rate fixer, 'this is the operation, that is how it is to be performed, and the 
cost is so and so' (Proceedings, Production Engineers 1931-32). 
The production engineers who participated in the lectures and discussions about 
time study and payment by results were hardly typical of industrial managers. The 
newer industries and motor vehicles in particular, were heavily over represented. 
They will have been at the forefront of contemp6rary thinking and practice but 
their evidence is valuable nonetheless. It reinforces the view that slack rate fi)Cmg 
was under attack everywhere and the bonus schemes designed to compensate for 
such slackness were in retreat. It suggests that serious consideration was being 
given to the theory and practice of time and motion study and systems of 
production control, and that both were firmly located in the Taylor tradition 
however unevenly and weakly developed that tradition was. For the 1930s 
attention is inevitably focused on the more dramatic developments associated with 
Bedaux. That should not obscure the fact that systematic time study was making 
steady advances and would have continued to doS02. Bedaux does not stand as a 
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scientific management contrast to a reliance on piecework and rate fixing, but as an 
extreme manifestation of a trend already firmly underway. 
Bedaux 
When the production engineers addressed the issue of payment by results the 
Bedaux system was already known to them. In 1931 Bedaux t' ook on assigriments 
at Joseph Lucas and Wolsey Ltd and would soon be notorious, but with only 
around forty staff and a total of about fifty assignments behind them, the company 
was still in its infancy. In the USA Bedaux was more firmly established with more 
than 33,000 workers labouring under Bedaux incentives at the end of the 1920s, 
more than twice the number on payment plans devised by Taylor, Halsey, Emerson 
and Gantt put together (National Industrial Conference Board 1930: 8). The real 
period of expansion however, took place in the 1930s. 'So widely were they 
adopted then, that one might almost call the Bedaux system the Taylorism. of the 
Great Depression' (Montgomery 1989: 440). Bedaux grew most rapidly in Britain 
from the 1940s and most rapidly of all in the fiffl employment years after the war. 
But there is a sense in which Montgomery's judgement applies. Bedaux was rooted 
in the 1930s, it was unquestionably the advance guard of scientific management 
and seen as such, it- dominated struggles about the regulation of the labour process 
and became the standard by which time and motion study was judged. 
Ile first Bedaux assigment in Britain was carried out at Kodak in 1923 but the 
company was not formally established in the UK until 1926, in the name of Chas E. 
Bedaux, going public as the British Bedaux Company in 1936. Two years later 
British Bedaux set up two subsidiaries, Associated Industrial Consultants (AIC) 
and industrial and Business Consultants (Inbucon), the latter to serve largely as a 
telegraphic and cable address. In 1943 Inbucon was established as the holding 
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company but AIC was the main trading arm and continued to finance the whole 
group (Brownlow: undated). By the mid 1930s Bedaux was notorious for his 
friendship with German Nazis as well as his system of labour measurement. 
According to Norman Pleming, Managing Director in 1936, the name Associated 
Industrial Consultants was chosen because it 'would Apt roll off the tongue of 
trouble makers so easily (Pleming: undated). In 1987 Inbucon was in trouble of a 
different kind and merged with PE Consultants. 
Bedau)es reputation never recovered from the bitterness of the struggles which his 
system inspired or his association with German fascism. The Taylor Society even 
took the unusual step of 'tacitly sanctioning' a strike of textile workers in the 
American South against the system in 1929 (Nadworny 1955: 134). Kreis 
concludes that 'By the standards of Taylor, his immediate followers, and his 
intellectual heirs in the Taylor Society, Bedaux was little more than a quack or 
charlatan' (1992: 168). Layton too, argues that'Bedaux was an opportunist and his 
system was, in many respects, a perversion of scientific management' (1974: 382). 
Even. Livingstone, who concedes that'most modem work measurement has grown 
from methods proposed by Bedau)e, still describes him as a super salesman 
- peddling a time study system which misrepresented Taylor and was little better 
than a con trick (1969). 
However, neither Taylor nor modem work study can shrug off their relationship 
with Bedaux so easily. Bedaux refined Taylor's rather crude time study methods in 
the area of effort rating and rest allowances (Anson 1953; Williams 1955; 
Blackwell 1956), and even if his efforts proved to be no more scientific than 
Taylor's, his idea of a common unit of work underpins the modem use of 'standard 
minutes! ( Currie 1964). Bedaux himself was interested in only the narrowest 
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application of incentives to raise the level of exploitation, but the Bedaux company 
had broader ambitions and the Bedaux system, stripped of its connections with its 
founder, went on to exercise widespread influence within post-war management. 
Bedaux as System 
Bedawes own book on industrial management was, as Littler rightly observes, 
firmly within the scientific lonanagement mainstream Time study was described as 
ýhe foundation of practical efficiency and motion study as'the recording of the 
decomposition of compound operations with a view to determine and eliminate all 
existing elements of waste'(Bedaux 1921: 291). And, likethe masters of the new 
science', Taylor, Gantt and others, Bedau. 5es principles of efficiency covered 
everything from standardised conditions and record keeping to the planning, 
routing and despatch of work. 
The novelty of Bedaux lay in the, constmction of the Bedaux unit which was 
supposed to provide a universal measure of labour. Each minute was made up of 
varying amounts of work and rest which, once determined, could serve as a 
measure of labour for the purposes of payment by results and provide a 
management tool for comparing production costs across diverse operations. 
Precisely because the relationship between work and rest was independent of other 
characteristics of the work performed, the average worker ought to be able to 
produce 60 Bs in an hour. A pieceworker should be able to produce one third 
more, or 80 Bs an hour. 
In shortl B edaux claimed to have discovered the 'laws of strain! though he never 
actually explained what those laws were nor provided any data against which they 
could be assessed. Brownlow claims that'Bedaux engineers accumulated detailed 
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and highly secret lists of appropriate allowances for specific jobs. Todays more 
scientific allowances are not noticeably different' (Brownlow, undated). But such 
secrets were so successfidly kept that Anne Shaw noted in 1960 that it was 
impossible to assess the Bedaux system properly becausethere is no 
comprehensive published work on the method'(1960: 5ý The only indication of 
what constituted the laws of strain, which went beyond generalisationsabout 
combinations of work and rest, are three 'laws! identified by the National Industrial 
Conference Board; 
'For a muscular effort of a given power, the ratio of strain is directly 
proportional to the rapidity of motion and completion of the cycle. 
'Rapidity of motion is inversely proportional to weight handled, 
pressure applied and length of cycle. 
'For a muscular effort of a given power, the duration of work and 
regt penods is inversely proportional to the -rapidity of motion. ' 
(tuc/292/112/2/1933 wmb/fp/78) 
The only interesting thing about these otherwise common sense relationships is the 
claim that there is a direct proportionality involved. This of course, has never been 
proved. No satisfactory measure of the intensity of labour or associated notions of 
fatigue and rest have ever been established. 
That did not prevent claims being made that Bedaux was more than a payment 
system. Clayton told the production engineers that Bedawes 'chief merit is that it is 
a system of management or organisation' and that systems like Bedauxare really 
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very elaborate systems of scientific management. It is difficult to understand why 
they are regarded primarily as payment systems' (1930-32: 393-5). In America 
Bedaux was defended as a system which gave management the facts to prevent 
labour difficulties, a 'common denominator of constant value' for all human 
operations giving a true measure of human productivity (Mechanical Engineering, 
1938). More recently Sbimniin has repeated the view that Bedaux was more than a 
payment system; it was a'means of production contror throughout the factory 
(1959: 23). 
It is hardly surprising given the clafins to have discovered a new science of strain 
unknown to physiology, and the secrecy surrounding it, that Bedaux was not wen 
understood. The Times, inspired by the name, desczibed it as a French system of 
piecework (Sept. I Oth 193 0). More surprisingly, the IILO did not at first seem to 
understand how the system worked either. In a report on Bedaux for the TUC in 
1932 the ELO suggested that it could not be scientific if 60 Bs an hour was a 
scientifically established standard, and 95% of workers were expected to produce 
in excess of that standard. Tlie ELO concluded that 60 Bs. must be an artificial 
measure set up to be exceeded (tuc/292/112/2,9 June 1933). Littler repeats this 
argument, and suggests that it represented an 'important inconsistency common to 
most neo-Taylorite systems' (1982: 110). But this is a misunderstanding. Every 
piecework system depended on establishing a standard for a normal level of effort 
which a pieceworker could be expected to better. Bedaux was no different in this 
respect. But the frustration,, scepticism and hostility which the combination of 
secrecy and science encouraged is easily understood. It was best expressed by W. F. 
Watson whi) wrote that, 'After wading through a mass of literature couched in 
scientific terms, acconipanied by algebraic equations, tables and graphs, we are 
unable to discover the precise method by which the amount of time needed (to 
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machine the shaft), and the correct amount of energy thus expended, is assessed, or 
by what process the "laws governing strain" are applied to determine the amount of 
time necessary for rest and relaxation'( 193 2). 
In fact, there w, as no real mystery I about what the Bedaux, company was doing, 
though Bedaux did everything he could to make it appear so and historians who 
have discussed the question since have sometimes perpetuated that image by 
making the system appear more complex than it actually was. Asked to explain the 
basis of the B unit, C. I Carney, an American who served for a time as managing 
director of the Bedaux company, told his audience that it was based on experience: 
'Mr Carney answered this question by saying that Bedaux was an arbitrary unit 
which had been gained by use and experience, and from the information that had 
been collected in past applications. Allowance for fatigue was extremely difficult 
for anyone to measure directly, but certain methods had been developed to 
ascertain its indirect measurement' (Industry Illustrated,, Jan. 193 6). It would be 
easy to conclude that Bedaux was one of history's most spectacular confidence 
tricks, and in a sense it was. But Bedaux was addressing crucial issues; the amount 
of work, its physical demands, the speed at which work could be done, the amount 
of rest needed, and the relationship between them In other words, Bedaux was 
trying to develop a measure of the intensity of labour, something that came to be 
expressed through effort rating and relaxation allowances. And even if all attempts 
by post-war work study to validate effort rating failed miserably, there is no doubt 
that it addressed a fimdamental. problem in time study which had not been resolved 
by Taylor. 
Time study is concerned with establishing'a fair day's worle, not simply finding out 
how long it takes a worker to complete a given task. Were it not so, the slow 
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worker would earn the same, or better bonus, for saving time on a job which took 
four hours, as a fast worker who took only three hours to do the same work. To 
put the problem another way, the question is what standard of output could be 
regarded as normal or average, and therefore what level of output would attract a 
bonus. Every system of payment by results, whether based on rule-of-thumb rate 
fixing or scientific time study, operates with some notion of the average, whether 
this is made explicit or not. Taylor declared that he had, 'in almost all cases,, solved 
this part of the problem by fL-6ng a task which required a first class man to do his 
best, and then offering a good round premiunY (1947: 175). ne differential rate 
bonus scheme was based on this idea since it offered a reward for the first class 
man and no other. In an exchange with the chair of the House Committee 
investigating scientific management, Taylor defended his scheme on the grounds 
that everyone could be a first class man at something -a proposition greeted with 
deep scepticism. Gantt's task and bonus scheme offered a gradual build up of 
bonus to first class levels but the essential difficulty remained, of defining and 
measuring an average intensity of labour. 
Taylor's stature and reputation is such that it is all too easy to use his work as the 
standard against which others are judged and usually found wanting. in faa, 
Taylor's methods were fairly primitive, something which has been disguised by the 
flair for salesmanship which Taylor clearly shared with Bedaux. The famous tale of 
Schmidt and the pig-iron experiment, for example, has been shown to be largely 
fiction. The rest periods which Taylor supposedly instructed Schmidt to take 
consisted of walking back from the railway car without a pig of iron. According to 
Wregge and Peffoniý 'the rest periods that authors have been describing with such 
assurance for the past sixty years never existed' (1974). Bedawes attempt to find a 
systematic way of defining and standardising a measure of labour intensity was 
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therefore a refmement of Taylorism of great practical potential. Instead of basing 
times on the first class man, or more commonly, someone thought to be an average 
worker, Bedaux offered a universal standard. 'The standard of effort he set up as 
normar, wrote P. K Standring, a Bedaux engineer at ICL 'is that expended in 
walking about on level ground at three miles per houe (1934). 
Its practical potential lay in the way in which Bedai&s standard was used. Post- 
war investigations exposed the scientific pretensions of effort rating and fatigue 
allowances (Desmond 1962; Bruckhart 195 1; Belbin 195 8). But Bedauxs standard 
for normal performance was still taken over by modem time study and can be 
found in the ELO's, 'Introduction to Work Study, defined asSteady, deliberate, 
unhurried performance, as of a worker not on piecework', an effort corresponding 
to 60 on the Bedaux scale and 75 on the 0- 100 Standard. By comparison, a 
pieceworker giving abrisk, business like performance'is comparable to walking at 
4 miles per hour, and corresponds to 80 on the Bedaux Iscale and 
100 on the 
Standard rating (Grant 1983: 43). This was Bedau)es most important legacy, not 
the laws of strain or the 'mysterious chart of relaxation allowances' (Kreis 
1990: 271). 
A second important feature of the Bedaux system to which Standring also draws 
attention was Bedau)es %ase rate analysis. 'T'he hourly rate of pay for any specified 
job', argued Standring, 'can be fixed in relation to the standard rate of labouring 
pay which obtains at the time'. ne connection with the later development ofjob 
evaluation is obvious. In practice, and as a matter of policy, Bedaux engineers were 
usuafly careful to insist that rates of pay were a matter for the employer to settle 
with his workers or the trade unions. Base rate analysis was offered as an 
additional service which could be used to establish relativities, though it could also 
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be used to agree the basic wage itself (Ward, w/8/29-34/12,26 May 1932). 
Bedaux him el seems to have believed that equal pay for women was a logical 
conclusion. Tliere should be a standard rate of pay, he argued, for workers capable 
of 'fiirnikbin iz a standard daily production' and that this would 'demand %-I 
readjustment of a considerable amount of rates, particularly in industries where 
women have been exclusively employed in the past', (1921: 411 412). But Bedaux 
did not, as Downs seems to believe, provide 'a technical basis on which to abolish 
the old hierarchical arrangement of labour, by skill, age, and gender' (1990: 49). 
Measures of labour intensity for the purpose of bonus schemes, or base rate 
analysis for the basic wage, were still related to the class ofwork which would 
attract different levels of pay. 
In a critical appraisal of Bedaux, C. H. Northcott, Rowntree's personnel officer, 
noted that the claim to science rested on the calculation of a work-fatigue ratio 
which was, in turn, based on an unscientific estimate of effort or'speed rating'. He 
welcomed what he called the Bedaux point system for labour measurement but 
argued that other systems did the same thing by converting efficiency achieved into 
a percentage of standard. Tie Bedaux system!, he argued, 'is a time study system 
with little to distinguish it in its basis methods or results from any other system! 
(1932). Anyone who doubted this was invited to study the Haynes Mannit or the 
standard time system Northcott's point is an important one. Tlle B unit was no 
different in essence from the man-minutes or standard minutes of these systems. In 
the more famffiar language of post-war work study, standard minute values express 
the basic time necessary to do a job, adjusted for effort, together with allowances 
for contingencies, fatigue and personal needs. And they provide the same standard 
measurement of different kinds of work for production control purposes as the B 
unit. If we continue to refer to the 'Bedaux SystenY it is only because Bedaux 
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represented an early example of modem work study in which the elements were 
presented in a particular way, not because there is much to distinguish Bedaux 
from any other work studied payment 'systenY. 
Bedaux and Management 
Bedaux was a management system, in as much as the time studies which supported 
the payment system served as a key element in production monitoring and control. 
But how far did Bedaux reach beyond the immediate control of labour to the 
organisation of production, to carry out wider changes in management methods 
which Taylor's mental revolution required? 
The first thing is to put that question in historical perspective. Bedaux was 
operating twenty years after Taylor's death and in a context where much of what 
Taylor had demanded was coming about, abeit in a piecemeal, haphazard fashion. 
Companies without any conscious scientific management policy were planning and 
routing work from new planning departments, and had developed a range of 
management fimctions which had reduced or eliminated the autonomy of craftsman ,- 
and foreman. As John Lee's dictionary noted, on the broader definition of scientific 
management concerned with the organisation of industry, 'those features of present 
day management which, in weH organised establishments, are taken for granted, 
were conspicuous by their absence'in Taylors, day (1928: 1059). We would not 
expect Bedaux to be making the same demands for total reorganisation. that had 
got Taylor into such trouble. 
At the same time, we might expect Bedaux to have had rather more inVact on 
management organisation than the system seemed to offer. ne ELO report noted 
that 'the Bedaux engineer does not change the method of worldng in any way, 
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(tuc/292/112/2,9 June 1933), a point which the Bedaux company seemed to 
confirm in their pamphlet, Bedaux Measures Labour. The value of the system for 
monitoring costs, improving the utilisation of labour and establishing production 
control was stressed but so too was the pledge that 'B edaux involves no sweeping 
changes% The engineer'adapts Bedaux measurement ... to conditions as he finds 
them... Physical layouts are not changed and there is no interference with existing 
methods and processes. Bedaux measures the effectiveness with which labour is 
used in connection with existing facilities!. T'he Bedaux organisation, it was said, 
does not concern itself with manufacturing methods, Tie Bedaux field is labour 
measurement and the Bedaux organisation remains within that field' 
(eef/237/3/l/235). 
Catagorical as that statement sounds there is evidence that matters were not so 
simple. In June 1933 Leslie Orr was writing to the engineering employers on behalf 
of the Bedaux company to correct the impression given by the pamphlet that the 
company was only concerned with labour utilisation. and control; 'control is actually 
established by us in a number of even more important directions, covezing, for 
example, machine utilisation, reduction in overhead charges, better utilisation of 
primary materials, and also plant layout and planning' (eef/237/3/l/23 5,27 June 
1933). The Bedaux company had been shaken by the resistance of engineezing 
workers and Orr was trying to reassure employers who were backing away from 
Bedaux as a consequence. But Bedauxs own propaganda, as well as the experience 
of workers to whom it was applied, had firmly established the reputation of the 
company as being solely concerned with intensification of labour and'speed-up'. 
A Labour Research enquiry into Bedaux argued that the focus on labour 
intensification followed from the limited scope of economic rationalisation in 
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Britain. There were three forms of rationalisation. The first relied simply on the 
intensified exploitation of human labour power; the second on new methods of 
production, including new plant and standardisation, while the third form of 
rationalisation introduced modem, scientific methods of production characterised 
by conveyors a4d speed-up. Bedaux belonged to the first type which 'is most 
commonly used, especially in a country like Great Britain where the capitalist cl ass 
is not prepared to find the necessary amount of constant capital ...... (Glading 
1934: 3). T'his view of Bedaux was reinforced by the claims made for the systenYs 
effects on earnings and output. Figures produced by the National Industrial 
Conference Board (1930) compare the effect of a number of systems 
Table 10 Bonus Systems - Earnings and Output 
Ta or Halsey Gantt Piecework Bedaux 
Median Increase 
Production 25 40 32 30 50 
Median Increase Earnings 20 23 ýO 25 20 
Median Decrease in Unit 
Costs 1 17 __I 
20 1 20 1 21 120 1 
Interestingly enough, they show Taylor to be most generous with earnings at 80% 
of increased production, and Bedaux to be the least generous with earnings at a 
mere 40% of the increase in output. It has to be said that the National Industrial I 
Conference Board offered these figures'for what they are worth! since it was 
unclear what type of work had been measured and their accuracy could not be 
guaranteed. But the results for Bedaux would have confirmed the view which had 
been formed of the company. 
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Bedaux himself was largely responsible for this. Pleming has testified that the work 
for Lyons in 1926, extending throughout the company, to bakeries, laundries, 
hotels, tea shops and factories, was the first diversification into production planing 
and costing (Pleming, undated). But Bedauxs'Code of Standard Practice'laid 
down a firm policy of non interference with plant policies except where they were 
in direct conffict with fundamental Bedaux practices. In particular, the Code stated 
that 'B values to be set to provide the number of B's required to perform 
the operation with the facilities at hand, but no suggestions to be made as to design 
or redesign ofjigs or fixtures, purchase of new equipment, movement of any 
machines or re-arrangement of departments! (Bedaux 1928). However, there was 
opposition within the company from the beginning to such a narrow policy. Carney 
says he tried 'unsuccessfiffly to obtain Mr Bedaux! s approval to modify the Bedaux 
system to meet Britain's basic problem of high unemployment' in order to ease 
relations with labour (Carney, undated). 
But by the mid 1930s, according to the Bedau)es head of research, Mildred 
Brownlow, militant labour opposition to work study was forcing the company to 
diversify into 'less inflammatory' areas such as plant layout, quality control and so 
on (Brownlow, undated). In 1936 Bedaux, increasingly discredited after his trip to 
Nazi Germany and an embarrassment to the company, was persuaded to allow the 
Bedaux company to go public, and two years later, AIC emerged to provide a 
more acceptable public face. At the same time company policy was shifting. 'Up to 
the formation of AIC, wrote Pleming, 'progress in diversification of the company's 
work had been severely limited by Mr BedauYes insistence on a restriction to the 
so-called "Bedaux System! ', covering labour, cost control and incentive schemes. 
Proposals for change in method were frowned upon'(Pleming, undated). Progress 
was more rapid after the war and by the end of the 1950s, specialist divisions had 
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been established for executive selection, marketing, operational research, electronic 
data processing, and even industrial and human relations. 
Even before the war, according to Pleming and Mildred Brownlow, 'There had 
been escapes from the strict boundaries of work study into material economy, 
budgetary control, operator training, plant layout and prev6itive maintenance 
scheduling' (Brownlow, undated). According to the time study officer at Peak 
Frean, motion study did not form part of the Bedaux application at that firm, 
though conflict between local managers and Bedaux engineers about set-ups 
suggest that Bedaux advice was not confined to simply measuring labour (Ward, 
w/8/29-34/12,, 21 April 1932). At a number of firms Bedaux applications clearly 
involved extensive alterations to machinery. Coopers, the Glasgow biscuit 
manufacturer, instaRed L12,000 worth of new equipment on Bedau)es 
recommendation, and at Wolsey, expensive and extensive alterations to shop 
equipment were made in a shop 'already considered to be one of the best in the 
trade' (lab2/206 Ifir 1441/193 8,1 B. Gailbraith 3 Oct. 193 5; Ryder 14 March 
1935). Not that Bedaux attention to wider engineering questions always proved 
satisfactory. Wolsey's joint managing director's enthusiasm for Bedaux was 
- reported to be more subdued than it had been, and Coopers were positively 
dissatisfied. Despite claims made for the expertise of Bedaux engineers, 'a member 
of staff would often find himself studying work on machines he had never seen 
before, with materials whose characteristics were really unknown. One who was 
making a survey in a bakery was worried to see "rolts" going into the ovens, but 
only loaves coming out, not reahsing that the dough expanded to such a degree' 
(Brownlow, undated). At ICI Bedaux claimed to have special techniques for the 
overhaul of engineering maintenance work, focusing primarily on the scheduling of 
work, and only secondarily on incentives. Work begun in 1936 was abandoned a 
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year later when it became obvious thatthe Bedaux company had no novel 
techniques applicable to engineering maintenance, and relations with Bedaux were 
terminated in February 1937 (Faraday, undated). 
Despite such criticisms Bedaux continued to make ground, and ICI was one of its 
most important customers. According to Faraday time study had been used in the 
company from the early 1920s but received a considerable boost following the 
establishment of the Bedaux company. First employed in the explosives division in 
1929, the system spread to paper goods manufacturing in 193 1, and to the paints 
and dyestuffs divisions by 1933. A Bedaux engineers committee for ICI was 
formed in 1932 and by 1939 between 10% and 25% of payroH in the dyestuffs, 
leathercloth, lime, metals and Nobel and paints divisions, were on time-studied 
incentive schemes (Faraday, undated). And in 1947 ICI appointed R- M. Currie, a 
Bedaux. trained expert and the most prominent post-war advocate of work study, 
to be responsible for work study throughout the company. 
Bedaux was indeed theTaylorism of the Great Depression!, with a single-minded 
focus on increasing productivity by increasing the intensity of labour. Tlle chief 
means for doing so was installing a payment scheme in which rigorous time study 
screwed down as low as possible the time allowed to complete a job, backed up by 
close monitoring of results and published performance comparisons. As Bedawes 
personal grip on the company loosened, more broadly based and less overtly 
oppressive applications became possible, driven in large part by the need to 
accommodate worker resistance. Scientific management in Britain between the 
wars was not confined to Bedaux, but Bedaux was certainly the single most 
important example of a more general phenomenon. 
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The Influence of Bedaux 
Kreis says that Bedaux took Britain by storm (1990); Littler that with 250 firms 
using Bedaux by 1939, including many industry leaders, 'Bedaux became the most 
commonly used system of managerial control in British industry' (1982: 114). Both 
are wide of the mark but Batstone et al are not right either, -to disraiss Bedaux as a 
marginal development (1987: 9). 
Figures produced by Kreis from the Bedaux archive actually show that the post- 
war period is the key period for both the growth in number and range of Bedaux 
applications. The number of British firms using Bedaux, year by year, grew from 3 
in 1926 to 30 in 193 1, falling thereafter (with the exception of 1934), to a low 
point of II in 1936. Growth was fitirly steady after 1936, but the 1930 level was 
not reached again until 1945. The number of firms using Bedaux by sector shows a 
concentration in textiles, chemicals, and food, drink and tobacco in the period 
before the war, with a total of 178 applications in the period 1926-1939. In the 
period 1939-1949, the total number of applications grew to 388, and while textiles 
remained the most important sector by far, metal manufacture and mechanical ' 
engineering had assumed a new importance (1990: 344). 
This picture is confirmed by figures produced by Inbucon for the period 1923-1965 
-I- snowing company capitaL numbers of staff and assigmnents. Taldng one measure 
alone, the number of new assigriments, which doubled between 1931 and 1943, 
increased more than nine times before 1959 and one and a half times again in the 
next six years. 
The problem for Bedaux in the 1930s was the hornet's nest of opposition which the 
system encountered on the shop floor. Pleming descnibed the years between 1930 
249 
and 1940 as one of stagnation. The company had achieved an annual turnover of 
050,000 in five years of rapid growth to 193 1, but turnover remained at that level 
until 1939, doubling by 1943, and reaching one million pounds in 1955 (Pleming, 
undated). It was the backlash from the Bedaux labour troubles in America as well 
as strikes in Britain which, according to Pleming, 'caused a reduction in the volume 
of business we were doing'. ' 
Table 11 Bedaux (Inbucon) 1923-1965 
Year Capital Staff New 
Asopments 
Total 
Asognments 
1923 1 1 1 
1926 2 1 1 
1931 40 20 50 
1936 3001,000 50 30 280 
1943 100 40 540 
1959 6005,000 300 380 31,200 
1965 680,000 355 600 5ý500 
Source: Inbucon Ltd, Brownlow Papers 
But Bedaux was more than a marginal phenomenon in the 1930s. And its post-war 
growth testifies to its key position in the business. Twenty years after the name 
Bedaux was dropped, time- study journals routinely carried advertisements for 
Sedaux trained men! (Time andMotion Study, jan. 1958). ne influence of the 
company can be measured in other ways too. Bedaux engineers took up leading 
positions in industry, like II Gracie, director and general manager at GEC, 
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Witton; W. T. Rivitt at Kagan (Gannex) Textiles; James Whitehead at David 
Browns and R_ M. Currie who trained at AIC before joi i ICI. All the principal 11 InIng 
post-war consultancies had their origins in British Bedaux including Production 
Engineering Ltd (1934), Urwick Orr (1934), and Personnel Administration (1943). 
Together with Ipbucon, these four, with a thousand exp efienced consultants, 
worldng for them, accounted for 75% of all consultancy work in 1956 (Brown-low, 
undated; TisdaR 1982: 9). 
Piecework, Bedaux and Labour 
At Messrs Rees Roturbo in Wolverhampton in 1933, AEU members were resisting 
the reintroduction of piecework. 'Some time ago', reported the AEU Divisional 
Officer, Dempster, 'this firm discontinued piecework, a decision we contested... ' 
(AEU Dec. 1933). Roturbo's engineering workers may have seemed hard to satisfy 
but the particular form of payment constituted only the immediate issue. Behind 
that lay the larger questions of control and insecurity, of the amount and type of 
work to be done, the pace at which people were expected to work as well as the 
_ pay 
to be. eamed. There were post-war strikes a&: Rst piecework but the issue 
between the wars was much less frequently a root and branch opposition to 
piecework than a struggle around the conditions under which it would be worked, 
including the linked issues of deskil1ing and the machine question. At Ransome and 
Marles Bearing Co. in Lincoln in 1926, the AEU Protested that the firm refused to 
introduce a piecework scheme for toolmakers and maintenance workers who 
earned only 57/- while semi-skilled men on piecework were said to average around 
60/- with some getting as much as V (eef/237/3/l/23 1,10 June 1936). And in a 
classic reversal, the AEUs General Secretary, J. C. Little, who had himself been 
the shop stewards convenor at Elswick before the first world war, wrote to 
Vickers at Barrow in 1933 to protest the withdrawal of a premium bonus scheme 
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for shipyard mechanics and maintenance men, asIdng the conVany to furnish 
reasons forthis drastic move' (eef/237/3/l/206,16 Sept. 1933). 
One of the key issues was complaints of 'speed-up'Which were common to 
piecework and Bedaux schemes alike3. The focus of the 1929 strike at the Austin 
was the new grading scheme and earnings. Piecework prices were- again an issue in 
the 1936 strike, but on this occasion, according to the Town Crier, it was a revolt 
against sp eed-up, 'the logical expression of workers who for months have endured 
the effects of speeding up' (20 Nov. 1936). A student who had visited the plant at 
Longbridge wrote in similar vein, 'My real astonishment is at the time the Austin 
workers have stood imposition after imposition, and constant speed-up. 
Mechanical repetition of a few actions is the life of most of the Austin workers. 
Austin tries to make every man approximate as nearly as possible to the machine he 
works at'(Town Crier 27 Nov. 1936). At Dunlop 6,000 workers stmck in 1925 
over 'speeding up in various departments' (AEU Nov. 1925). And at Rolls Royce in 
Derby in 1938 a mass meeting held in working hours demanded the withdrawal of 
time and motion study experts, a halt to the introduction of boy labour and sub- 
contracting and the de-grading ofjobs. The Times reported the AEU official as 
denouncing the threat of the Bedaux system and'was loudly cheered when he 
declared his readiness to lead a strike against any fin-ther such attempts! (15 Feb. 
193 8). It is not clear whether it was in fact the Bedaux system which was being 
introduced, but that did not matter much to the convenor and shop stewards who 
'were unanimous in condemning time and motion study as being as bad as the 
Bedaux Syste& (Frow and Frow 1982: 124). 
Workers of all kinds were affected by time study and Bedaux; men and women, 
skiffed and imskilled. The duty of the rate fixer, wrote F Builo in Cassiers, was to 
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split a job up into as many operations as possible. Skilled mechanics in the new 
production processes would make the jigs and fixtures for others to use, 'the 
mechanics who do not have this advantage wK perforce, have to take their place 
amongst the semi-skilled operators! (1922: 156). Many of them did. Quarrels about 
piecework were often linked to complaints about deskilling in ways that were often 
difficult to unraveL At Howard and Bullogh Ltd in AcCnngton certain machining 
processes were reorganised in 1930 to eliminate some of the less skilled work 
which was then given to apprentices. Tlie job was retimed and the time allowed cut 
by 25% which, in turn, led to complaints about earnings and of inadequate training 
for apprentices (eef/237/3/l/214,12 Dec. 1930). At Boulton Paul in Norwich in 
1931 the Bedaux system of payment led to a strike and arguments about the lack of 
mutuality in fixing prices and failure to earn 33.3% bonus, as weR as the breaking 
up ofjobs. Ile engineers alleged that 'the Bedaux system arranges for a wide range 
of what are termed "operation rates", and the various classes of labour are split up 
into grades, each grade having its own base rate'. For its part the company 
conceded that'the improved organisation would involve the breaking up ofjobs, so 
that energies might not be dissipated'but argued that would happen with any 
reorganisation and would, in any case, increase the demand for craftsmen 
(eef/237/3/l/235, June 193 1). 
Skilled workers fought back in a variety of ways. 'Bench operations would become 
extraordinarily complicated and panels would be bashed as never before ... Rather 
more difficult to counteract than the obvious effort to impress, were problems 
involved in dealing with the co-operatively unhelpfid (Brownlow, undated). At 
Boulton Paul in Wolverhampton, in a long running fight about piecework earnings 
and dilution, AEU members adopted a tactic of using management's own 
organisation against it, 'That no man shall manufacture tools, fixtures or appliances 
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in connection with his work that are not indicated by the Planning Department, 
without first receiving instructions and due aflowance being made in connection 
with same' (DSO/23/22). In this case, management quickly conceded time and a 
quarter for maldng all tools. 
Employers were wary about the reactions of skilled, men. Piecework was 
introduced into a number of toolrooms, including those at Austin and Lucas, but 
the Engineering Employers Federation told its members in 1934 that, although they 
had a right to introduce it, 'the Federation would not advise the enforcement of a 
piecework system where the basis of mutuality appears to be entirely lacking'(EEF 
Minutes 19 Dec. 1934). In the same year, the London Association said they knew 
of only one firm'officially using Bedaux, and then only for semi-skilled and 
females, owing to the opposition of skilled men (eef237/3/l/235). In 1937 G. M. 
HaIL speaking on time and motion study, told an audience of production engineers 
that he had practically no experience applying time and motion study to sIdUed 
men. 1 our applications up to the present having been limited ahnost- entirely to 
unskilled labour - both male and female'(1937: 610)4. Even at Metro Vickers in 
Manchester, where Anne Shaw had studied men and women, union and non union, 
it was mainly applied to women and usednot so much on union men ..... We have 
an agreement with unions in our factory not to film members of the union without 
special permission'. And the company had never needed to ask for it (British 
Management Review July-Sept.. 1938). 
SkiRed men have occupied the limefight in the discussion of Taylorism because a 
real, independent, basis for skill constituted an obstacle to the reduction of all 
labour to general, abstract labour, and because the so-called craft mode of 
production could be seen as a denial of capitalist rationality and an assertion of the 
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di i of labour (Ifinton 1973; Montgomery 1989); because the skilled metal gnity 
worker has formed the backbone of socialist and communist movements 
(Hobsbawm 1984) and, perhaps, because'we find ourselves oddly attracted to the 
pre-industrial skilled artisan, and a little afraid to learn what contemporary workers 
really think and feer (Lynd 1988: 100; Monds 1976). 
- 
But a changing labour process changed the lives and work of women, and of 
unskilled and semi-skilled men, as well as craftsmen and managers. The new tools 
in engineering created opportunities for the labourer, and the new light engineering 
industries, new openings for women. If this was in some senses an upgrading of 
labour, it was not necessarily experienced as such, if only because the new 
occupations became an immediate target of the efficiency engineer. 
The assembly line workers of the new industries were 'ahno st, exclusively women! , 
their work as subdivided and mechanised as it was possible for it to be (Glucksman 
1990: 147). Women workers had long been the subject of work related research. 
The URB, and its successor, the IHRB,, devoted a number of reports to women ' 
workers from metal polishers to chocolate packers. And of nine motion study case 
studies reported by Anne Shaw in 1960, covering a variety of industries and 
occupations, seven involved women and while the other two did not specify, they 
were almost certainly women too. Taylor studied women workers as well, reducing 
by 50% the numbers required on final inspection at the Simmonds Company in 
1897 (Nelson 1980: 69). And if Taylor's first encounter with labour was his stmggle 
with his feflow machinists, his most often repeated stories concerned unskiRed 
manual labour such as loading pig-iron and shovelling. Taylorism was never a 
system designed exclusively to attack crail; it was always a means of organising 
production and directing labour of all kinds. 
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Women led the way in struggles against Bedaux. At Rover, in Coventry, women 
til rs struck against the introduction of the Bedaux system in August 1930, to 
be followed out by skilled trimmers after thirty four NUVB members had been 
disciplined for refusing the women's work (eeF237/3/l/235). Meanwhile, at the 
Rover plant in Tyseley, Birmmgham, AEU members in the grinding department 
reported the system working satisfactorily and despite subsequent complaints and 
reference of the matter to the Executive Committee,, no action was taken (AEU 
Sept. 1930; AEU March 193 1). At Lucas in 1932 women workers were reputed to 
have chased the Bedaux engineers onto the roof and threatened to throw them off 
When the system was temporarily withdrawn the company said the atmosphere 
'brought back recollections of Mafeldng and Armistice Day' (Lucas Minutes 17 
Feb. 1932). The Ministry of Labour noted that'T'he workpeople left the shops 
singing and maldng a good deal of noise but otherwise were quite orderly, although 
there was some talk of waiting about for the Bedaux engineers... ' 
(lab2/2061/irl441/1938 Ryder 30 Jan. 1932). ne AEU interviewed Lucas about 
Bedaux but took no action since few members were affected (AEU Jan. 1932). At 
Amalgamated Carburettors in the same year, 250 women and girls on machine 
work and assembling struck alongside 150 toolsetters and viewers against Bedaux. 
When the firm issued an ultimatum to return or be sacked, 'The men resumed work 
but the women and girls remained out' (lab2/206 I/irl441/193 8,4 Feb. 1932). 
Unskilled and semi-skilled men, very often unorganised and refusing the 
intervention of trade unions, also fought the new piecework systems and the 
emciency engineers. Ile Austin strike against the new grading system was 
conducted by unorganised workers under the leadership of an ex-miner from Wales 
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(Birmingham Post 27,28 March 1929). The 1936 strike against cuts in piecework 
prices and speed-up was similarly'unorganised! (Birmingham Post 13 Nov 1936). 
The bnpact of Worker Resistance on Bedaux 
Ile struggle copld be complicated and the result uncertain. At the ICI firru, , 
Scottish Dyes in Grangemouth, the workers were divided. Bedaux seems to have 
been introduced originally in 1931 against the opposition of local TGWU officials 
but with the co-operation of some on the works committee. Those working the 
system enjoyed higher earnings and the TGWU told the TUC'That while on 
principle the men objected to the systen: ý they desired to retain the Bedaux 
earnings and that the system was popular to that extent and acceptable to the 
majority of those operating it' (tuc/292/112/2,28 Dec. 1932). It was also pointed 
out that speed-up and reorganisation was taking place in departments not on 
Bedaux and without increased earnings. Nevertheless, hostility to the system 
continued to build. In February 1932 Bevin negotiated an increase in the Bedaux 
premium to 90% and, in return, pledged that the TGWU would not support a 
strike should -one occur. The following month 3 00 process workers struck, without 
union support, after the man leading the struggle against the Bedaux system was 
dismissed. Thirty men subsequently left the TGWU to join the break-away 
Scottish Transport Workers (lab2/2061/irl441/1938,10 March 1932). 
The balance sheet in the struggle against Bedaux showed considerable labour 
gains. At Henry Hope the defeated strikers returned to work with only a pledge 
that there would be no extension of the Bedaux system until local conferences had 
been held. But the firm found the situation unsatisfactory nonetheless, reporting 
that the fLfty men working on Bedaux'are working at only about half the speed 
they did before the strike, and in so doing are receiving the moral support of the 
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other men in the shop'(EEF Minutes 29 June 1933). The EEF estimated that 10% 
of strike days lost in 1933 were due to time study and work measurement and it 
was said that 'there was scarcely a Federated firm which has introduced the Bedaux 
system without having a stoppage of worle. A 1934 EEF report on Bedaux strikes 
noted a dozen major strikes across a number ofindustries between 1930 and 1933, 
involving more than 8,000 workers (eef237/3/l/235). The EEF promptly disowned 
Bedaux. 
The Management Board of the EEF, meeting in July 1933, resolved that the 
Federation could take no responsibility for trouble which arose from the 
introduction of the Bedaux system, since the Federation agreements demanded that 
any system be agreed directly between the management and its workforce and not 
by outsiders. This stance was not, however, entirely the consequence of strikes. It 
was also influenced by a certain conservative insularity which was increasingly the 
hallmark of the organisation. The EEF re-issued an earlier circular from 1928 
which advised members to resist inducement to 'institute in their works systems of 
payment by results which do not conform to the terms of the national agreements 
which are in existence or the practices observed between the Federation and 
various trade unions' (EEF Minutes July 193 3). Moreover, this attitude was 
sustained for more than another decade. In 1945 members were advised that 
consultants have 'on occasion failed to have regard for the psychology of the 
British workman, and have made ostentatious and unnecessary display of the stop 
watch in their assessment of times' (EEF Minutes 28 June 1945). While the EEF 
had no desire to limit the use of consultants, it was stressed that piecework times 
must be agreed with members of the firnYs own staff. 
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Where Bedaux was introduced against serious opposition the result was often the 
sort of modifications to the scheme which brought it closer to other piecework 
schemes backed by time study, where a degree of 'mutuality% that is mutual 
agreement between the worker and the employer, operated with respect to time 
allowed for a job. At Taylor Bros. in Manchester, the ! $TC reported that they had 
secured modifications Which are considered to give satisfactory results'; the 
Amalgamated Weavers claimed to have destroyed its undesirable features in the 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation Mills so thatthe scheme is not now the Bedaux 
system at aff ; and the Amalgamated Hosiery Union at Wolsey told the TUC that 
the system had been modifiedafter the strike at Wolsey in Leicester and now had 
some 'good features'. The Wolsey agreement provided that studies would be done 
on good, bad and indifferent work to find a fair average; that the premium would 
be 95%; and that values, once established, 'would be altered from time to time as 
conditions varied, by arrangement between management and the worker' 
(tuc/292/112/2). 
Will Thorne described the settlement of the strike at Venesta in 1933 as'one of the 
best in the countrý (tuc/292/112/2,22 May 1933). The Bedaux experiment in the 
tin-foil department would continue but a joint committee would be established to 
study the operation of the system and a worker was to be trained in the Bedaux 
system to act as a representative of the men. There would be no extension of 
Bedaux without the agreement of the Joint Committee and any difference arising 
would be referred to a conference of the company and the unions. In reality, it was, 
at best,, a qualified victory for the strikers who wanted rid of Bedaux altogether and 
who rejected similar proposals two weeks into the strike. But the Joint Committee 
achieved some modest concessions in the short run; surplus labour would be 
transferred to a lower rated job and any reduction in rates would be spread over 
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twelve months. In the longer run, a degree of control was conceded to the union 
and shop floor representatives and led to the permanent establishment of a Works 
Council at the company (Vanesta/mss97/5/17). 
The strikers at Venesta's Silvertown works were predominantly NUGMW which 
claimed 800 members, 40% of them women, among the thousand or so workers 
engaged in the production of plywood. But the strike took the union as much by 
surprise as it did the company. The local NUGMW official had feared a strike over X- 
Bedaux and was discussing his worries with the Ministry of Labour when a 
NUGNM shop steward acted after seventy men signed a 'round robin' demanding a 
stoppage if Bedaux was not withdrawn. Two weeks later, on 19th Apa Venesta 
offered a joint committee to review the Bedaux experiment and a guarantee that 
'no ffirther alterations in wages or worldng conditions shall be made pending the 
result of the work of this joint committee, or without its consent' 
(lab2/149/ 1 r404/1933). Put by the union without recommendation to a mass 
meeting, the formula was overwhelmingly rejected. Feeling was running high, 
fuelled by fears of speed-up and job losses. On 27th April the strike was stiU solid 
and on the 29th, after strike breakers were introduced by the company, po .e were 
caRed to disperse a crowd allegedly throwing stones and bottles. On I st May 
strikers slipped on board a train carrying scabs away from the works, the 
communication cord was pulled when the train entered a tunnel and a fight ensued. 
Police rushed along the track to intervene 'but several men were injured'. The 
following day mounted police were required to escort the scabs to the station, 
which was also under guard. 
While strikers battled police and scabs, the union was searching for a solution. T'he 
NUGMW president, Clynes, wrote expressing an interest in the dispute, offering 
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his services as a 'disinterested person! and seeldng a meeting with company 
directors. Early in May, according to Ministry of Labour reports, Clynes told the 
company that the NUGMW Were not definitely opposed to the Bedaux System of 
work measurement as sucV, and after further exchanges about the continuation of 
Bedaux time studies in the tin-foil department, a conference between the conipany 
and the union agreed the terms of settlement which were accepted on 15 May at a 
mass meeting, by 604 votes to 199. Seven hundred employees returned. Those 
who were displaced by strike breakers would be given preference for vacancies as 
they arose until reinstatement was complete. 
Following the strike relations between the company and the union, and the union 
and Bedaux, grew considerably closer. ne report of the joint committee 
established following the strike noted that there may be a difficulty in extending 
Bedaux to the packing case makers, but according to the Ministry of Labour 
official most closely associated with the negotiations, A. G. V. Lindon, the 
NUGMW was willing 'to supply the company with all the woodworicing machinists 
that- may be required in the event of the pacIdng case union withdrawing its 
memberg. As for Bedaux, the company had made changes to its system at Huntley 
and Pabner after discussions with the NUGMW, even though the union had no 
members there. 'As a matter of fact', observed Lindon, 'it does seem that Messrs 
Charles Bedaux and Company are prepared to do almost anything with the Bedaux 
system of work measurement in order to overcome trade union opposition and 
clear the way for an open market for themselves' (lab2/149/1r404/1933,25 Oct. 
1933). 
It is clear that worker resistance was an important factor in shaping the way the 
labour process developed between the wars. Even the dreaded Bedaux system 
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could become the subject of collective bargaining. These were real and substantial 
gains; elements of control over aspects of work without which the'dehumanized 
prisons of labor', which Braverman saw Taylorism creating everywhere, would 
have been a lot more oppressive than they actually were (1974: 233). But it is 
equally clear that the worker resistance which we have described, a struggle 
conducted for limited aims around immediate demands, was unable to change in a 
fundamental way, the capitalist labour process And this is true not just in the 
general sense that the process remained exploitative but true also of the particular 
historical forms of capitalist development. Bedaux, or more generally, the 
developing practice of work study, could not be rooted out. In the period after the 
second war those processes spread faster than ever. They did so precisely because 
shop floor struggles had wrung important concessions from the efficiency engineer; 
because social and economic conditions after the war were less threatening; and 
because work study now attracted the positive endorsement and support of the 
workers! organisations, the trade unions and the Labour party. We examine below 
the relations between the unions and Bedaux before outlining the post-war history 
of work study. 
The Trade Unions and Bedaux 
Laura Lee Downs has suggested that the TGWU was soft on Bedaux because the 
leadership was'enchanted by the prospect ofjoint participation in the project to 
revive industry through rationalisation' (1990: 62). The union would fight 
'unreconstructed Bedauxism' but were prepared to accept a coercive work system 
for the compensation of equal pay for women. This judgement is a little confused 
since it beg§ the question of how 'coercive' the system remained if it were to be 
'reconstructed'. At Rover the TGWU succeeded in ensuring that operators 
received the whole of the bonus, and'more iniportant, the union succeeded in 
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shifting the establishment of B allowances (effort norms) away from Bedauxs 
technocratic "experts" and back into the employer-employee negotiating arena' 
(Downs 1990: 63). The terms of settlement could not have been clearer on this 
point. It was stated that 'B values shall be treated as piecework prices and dealt 
with under the Tecognised rules of procedure' (eef237/3/l/23 5). Thelocal]ýEF 
official was outraged because women were guaranteed a payment of L2 
15s when the guaranteed time rate for women usually lay between 26s and 3 Is a 
week. Ile women might have been less than pleased to note that the point at 
which Bedaux premiums began to be earned was established at the output level 
previously averaged, that is to say, the previous piecework effort became the new 
base line. What Rover had agreed was a piecework system in which prices were 
established with the use of time study, and a high wage offered in return for 
demanding output norms. If the resulting work system was'coercive', and it could 
reasonably be described as such, that scarcely distinguished it from practice 
elsewhere. 
- 
ne TGWUs commitment to rationalisation certiinjy provided the union with a 
strategic orientation that made the adoption of such agreements easier. ne union 
had supported the resolution endorsing rationalisation at the Mond-Turner 
conference in July 1928 which included a commitment to the scientific organisation. 
of labour. And, despite some rivalry between Bevin and Citrine, it endorsed the 
position taken by the latter who argued that trade unions could no longer rely on a 
simple defence of trade union interests, much less a revolutionary policy. The 
unions, he argued, 'should actively participate in a concerted effort to raise industry 
to its highest efficiency by developing the most scientific methods of production... '. 
and seek for themselves a wider role in industrial administ ation and economic 
policy in return. On this view, scientific management opened up 'A wide field of 
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ftuitffii negotiation, with numerous possibilities of mutual agreement' (Citrine 
1927). The TGW-U agreement at Manders introducing the forty hour week seemed 
to fiffi this prediction. The Daily Herald welcomed the agreement as ýhe rational 
way of going about what is not merely a Wolverhampton problem, but a national 
problem and it deserves to have national influence, (Green Can Oct. 1932). 
. 
But the willingness to accept rationalisation, to seek an accommodation with what 
Citrine called the new industrial order, also reflected the fimdamentally pragmatic 
character of trade unionism, formed long before the vogue for rationahsation. 
Other than at the most extraordinary times, trade unionism is dominated by 
immediate issues and short term, limited, realisable goals. Even revolutionary 
members of the unions have been drawn into a reformist practice, concessions 
made, compromises reached, deals struck, because on a day to day basis this 
process was inescapable. (Hobsbawm. 1976a). Trade unions have sought to 
regulate the labour process not transform it; to identify and struggle for the discrete 
interests of the worker as worker, rather than as producer or citizen. Nor has this 
been only a trade union position. Communist party members led the fight against 
Bedaux and speed-up in generaL but sociahsts, of A kinds were receptive to the 
argument that scientific management, if scientificaRy managed, was progressive. 
Citrine only echoed the argument, put ten years earlier by Sidney Webb,, that 
scientific management was perfectly acceptable if its introduction was negotiated 
and agreed (1917). 
Richard Price's phrase about the way in whichthe labour presence in society has 
worked through a constant series of negotiations and accommodations' to create 
new social and political structures, which are themselves transformed in turn, 
descritbes this process exactly. But it ought not be taken to mean, as Price implies, 
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that 'a vision of the working class as the carriers of an alternative social and 
political organisation' is necessarily confining (1986: 12,3). Trade union struggle 
around the labour process has not been revolutionary but the constant series of 
negotiations and accommodations it has involved have only served to confirm the 
fimdamental and irreconcilable antagonism at the heart of the employment 
relationship, expressed in the struggle over a fair day's pay for a fair day's work. 
The forty hour week at Manders, equal pay at Rover, a works council at Venestal 
cleared the ground for an accommodation which was simultaneously a tribute to 
worker resistance and an Blustration of the limits of trade unionism (Anderson 
1967; Hyman 1971). 
If we return to the series of negotiations and accommodations as they developed, 
historically, concretely, in the 1930s, it is clear that the unions were shifting rapidly 
away from the view that Bedaux, or scientific management in general, was a 
fundamental threat to the worker. The general secretary of the Leather Workers 
wroteto the TUC about the introduction of Bedaux at Wood and Sons in 
Gunnersbury, describing the system as 'rotten, and designed against the worker ... 
At the moment we are advising some cussedness inside the firm. -'. The TUCs 
advice was to negotiate, 'As we understand it, the Bedaux system is simply a 
particular method of payment by results based upon a certain method of work 
measurement' (tuc/292/112/3,15 Feb. 1934). As such its precise effects would be 
determined by the outcome of negotiations. 
The TUC pamphlet on Bedaux, published the previous year, repeated the ritual 
criticism of payment by results involving the timin of operations, unlimited speed- 
up and overdriving, but immediately moved on to establish a modus vivendi with 
Bedaux. tNo support can be given to any method which reduces the worker to the 
265 
status of machines. Apart from this general objection, however, which applies to all 
such methods', it would appear that Bedaux is capable of being applied, in a 
manner, and with modifications, that may make it less harmful than many other 
systems! (tuc/292/112/2). The AEU also registered fundamental objections at the 
same time that a route to a negotiated accommodation was indicated. The editor of 
the AEU journal noted that Pedaux was'task work of the most obnoxious 
character, limitin freedom and individuality to the lowest possible minfinunY. But 
the next sentence opened up a different kind of perspective, Tie system of 
payment to which we refer allows of no mutuality in respect of the time allowed for 
doing any portion of the work, but is arbitrarily fixed by a time recorder' (AEU 
May 1932). 
The Bedaux company was delighted with the pamphlet, which they ought to have 
been since Milne Bailey at the TUC had worked closely with Leslie Off from the 
Bedaux company to ensure that the Bedaux point of view was accurately 
expressed. They were equaRy pleased, according to one Bedaux official, with 
Moulden -of the Hosiery Union and Ernest Bevin of the TGV; U, 
being'of the 
opinion that in any particular case they can satisfy the workpeople if Mr Bevin is 
concerned and that a bit of pressure from the union is rather a good thing in many 
cases because manufiicturers are rather too greedy ... ' (lab2/206 I 
Ar 144 1/193 8, 
Ryder 6 March 1934). In the changed conditions of post-war Britain, relations 
grew even closer. In 196 1, Ted Fletcher, the secretary of the TUC Production 
Department, joined AIC as a divisional director and became the Industrial and 
Human Relations advisor to the Inbucon group. And according to Brownlow, No 
fewer than nine trade unions employed AIC to advise on their administrative 
structures and internal procedures! (Brownlow, undated). Ironically, it was the 
struggle of the women and men on the picket hues against speed-up in the 1930s, 
266 
wringing concessions from employers and efficiency engineers, that laid the basis 
for this particular accommodation, though it is one they would have found difficult, 
if not impossible, to understand. 
Conclusion 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the inter-war experience of payment, 
by results schemes, and the Bedaux system, reviewed in this chapter. First,, if the 
modem techniques of time and motion study were not widely used outside the 
mass production plants (Hunt 1951: 60), more rigorous time study practice was 
spreading as criticism of premium bonus standards increased and premium bonus 
schemes declined. Moreover, companies like Austin, which combined sophisticated 
production engineering with time study and payment by results, were doing nothing 
fimdamentaRy different from Bedaux at Vanesta or ICI. Bedaux was distinctive in 
the rigour of its time study standards and methods, and more influential in Britain 
than any other variant of scientific management practice. Indeed, according to one 
Bedaux engineer writing in 1966, 'in the field of work measurement, and 
particularly, of time study, present day practice probably owes more to Bedaux 
than to Taylor' (quoted in Kreis 1992: 168). It is still important to see that it was 
only a variant and cannot be identified with scientific management itself 
Secondly, it is suggested that no general case can be made for the idea that British 
employers! reliance on piecework was either cause or consequence of a failure of 
managerial control. Indeed, it is quite clear that the inter-war preference for 
piecework over premium bonus was associated with a greater degree of managerial 
control over the effort bargain exercised through more sophisticated time- study 
techniques. Piecework could lead to a loss of management control but did not 
necessarily do so. Nor, incidentally, did Taylorist schemes like Bedaux guarantee 
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that control would last if it was established. Phillips introduced the Bedaux system 
into their Mitcham plant in the early 1930s but by the late 1940s there was 
increasing management dissatisfaction with the scheme. The catalogue of 
complaints included distortions to the wages structure, the creeping effect of small 
method changes in undermining work study values,. and. a tendency for supervision 
to rely on bonus incentives rather than looking for method changes' (Westwood 
1965). 
Thirdly, it is clear that the skilled man was not the only, nor perhaps even the 
principal target, of Bedaux. Women trimmers at Rover, assembly workers at 
Lucas, and chemical processes workers at ICI plants, all confronted the Bedaux 
scheme for labour management as well as the AEUs skilled men at Boulton Paul at 
Norwich and Rover in Birmingham Time and motion study, whether practised by 
Bedaux or any other efficiency engineer, tended to undermine skit But it did not 
liberate those 'upgrade& from labouring to semi-skiRed tasks. The reconstitution of 
the labour process was experienced on aH sides as an intensification of more 
regimented labour and resisted. In Britain between the wars, it was the semi and 
unskiRed worker who was first in line for the Bedaux treatment and who fought 
back hardest. 
Finafly, we have seen that worker resistance was matched by 'worker 
accommodation' to the new management systems and patterns of work 
organisation. Resistance was fiercest on the shop floor and accommodation more 
pronounced in the trade union office but both were present and influenced the final 
shape of thd labour process. Skilled men found it easier to bargain about the 
treatment of subdivided labour than resist subdivision itself Trade unions found it 
easier to address issues of speed-up and the distribution of bonus earnings than the 
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way in which systems like B edaux tended to reduce labour to 'the status of 
machines'. In itselt this should not be surprising. But the speed with which trade 
unions came to terms with Bedaux is noteworthy, if only because what began in the 
1930s as a cautious willingness to negotiate efficiency schemes, tumed into a 
posi: tive endorsement of work study in the years following the war. 
This chapter has shown how time and motion study in generaL and the Bedaux 
system in particular, became more firmly established in the 1930s. But the most 
rapid growth for both came after the second world war, with work study reaching 
a peak of influence in the 1960s. In the postscript which follows, the post-war 
history of industrial engineering is sketched to complete the picture of the 
development of scientific management in Britain. 
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Notes 
The Institute of Cost and Works Accountants commented on Nlinistry of Labour figures 
that 'It is interesting to observe that payment by results methods are in greater use for skilled 
workers than for unskilled workers, and that women are paid by such systems more frequently 
than men' (1954: 34) 
2 Fenlon says that scientific management was adopted more slowly and less extensively in 
Britain than in the USA but, writing in 1939, he believed that time and motion study had now 
"been very widely adopted (1939: 13) 
'Speed is the essence of present day industry' wrote the Chief Inspector of Factories in 
1936 (Branson and Heinemann. 1973: 94); an AEU shop steward at Henry Hope's in Birmingham 
described the Bedaux system as 'the survival of the fittest in the crudest -Azy; it was bloody cruel 
and it drove men and women macr (Jim Crump, quoted in Leeson 1973: 128); Barrett Brown 
(1934: 28) reminded contemporaries than unmechanised work was physically harder but drew 
attention to increased demands on nervous energy and an increase in nervous tension. 
4 Baron et al (1998) found that bureaucratic personnel practices and scientific 
management techniques were less common in American industries with craft traditions like 
printing, publishing and leather. 
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Fridenson says even the Marxist unions representing skilled workers rapidly 
accommodated themselves to Taylorism after the first world war (1978: 169); 'with the assembly 
line, the advance over older systems is undeniable; production is greatly accelerated and the 
workers do not complain, wrote L'Humanite (Casteele-Schweitzer 1986: 71); the French socialist, 
Albert Thomas was an e nthusiastic supporter of scientific managetheni (Devinat 1927); Biady 
(1933) says German trade union leaders were friendlier to Fordism than Taylorism, but trade 
union leaders on the Board of the Institute for Labor Physiology believed the poison could be 
drawn from Taylorism. through proper scientific study; the militant miners leaders, Robert Smillie 
declared scientific management to be a good thing, though he did not want it (or anything else) 
until the mines were nationalised. (Brown 1977: 197); G. D. H. Cole thought Cadbury been 
successful in 'adopting those elements in scientific management which tend to develop the 
worker's personality (Sociological Review 1913); the socialists at the National Council for 
Labour Colleges defended time and motion study as simply the development of craft skills 
adapted to the machine age, a means of cutting out tiring work for the worker (TSE July 195 1). 
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Postscript The Rise and Fall of the Work Study Engineer 
Introduction 
By the end of the 1930s the influence of scientific management on production 
organisation and management was firmly established. In chapter 5 we saw that 
more rigorous time-study practice was spreading in the 1930S9 in payment by 
results schemes in general, as well as in the form of the Bedaux system. But the 
most rapid growth in the use of time and motion study was undoubtedly in the 
years following the war, and particularly during the 1960s. However, the heyday of 
the industrial engineer was short lived. By the mid 1970s work study was being 
absorbed as part of a wider range of management services. 
In this postscript I trace the post-war growth of work study and the history of 
institutes founded to represent work study practitioners, indicate the scale of work 
study applications across industry, and outline the transition from work study to 
management services. 
The Growth of Work Study 
With the outbreak of war consultants were fisted as a reserve occupation and Anne 
Shaw was seconded from Metropolitan Vickers to work with the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production. But the lessons most often drawn from 'the people's war' 
concerned personnel management rather than efficiency techniques like time and 
motion study (Brech 1945; Brown 1945). An OEEC conference in 1951 on the 
utilisation and dilution of skilled workers was dominated by UK accounts of its 
successful war time dilution programme (mss/200/B/3/2/C848). But there is 
evidence to suggest that 'arbitrary juggling with rates ..... to avoid trouble when 
time and Supply Nfinistries pressed'tended to undermine time study standards 
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established before the war (MacIntyre 1957; TSE Apfil 1948). War certainly 
encouraged the spread of work study but its post-war growth built on what had 
been established in the 1930s. 
ICI led the way. By 1958 ICI was said to have 1,400 worký study officers,. 'four 
times as many as any other company in the world' (Dalziel 1956; WSIE Jan. 1958). 
In 1964 R- M. Currie put the number at 2,500 (1964a). Currie had been appointed 
at ICI in 1947 and quickly established a Central Work Study Section, which was 
made a department in its own right in 1953, after an investigation claimed to show 
that work study had made a net saving to the company of L2 mMion (Faraday, 
undated). Currie was an evangelist for work study, producing the only major, 
original British work on the subject (1964). And ICI carried the message to the rest 
of industry. In 1953 and 1954 conferences were held'to place the company 
knowledge before the entire British chemical industrý, and the exercise was 
repeated later in 1954 for the benefit of the British Institute of Management. At the 
request of Kipling from the Federation of British Industries, and Tewson of the 
TUAC, Currie organised a series of open days in the Central Work Study 
Department which Faraday, appointed Assistant Manager of the Production Group 
in 1957, claimed attracted over 3,000 visitors. It was Currie who inspired the 
attempt to deploy work study in agriculture; ICI that supplied speakers for a 
conference on work study in hospitals for the Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapists (WSIE June 1958). And ICI managers like Faraday and McDavid 
who went on to take senior posts in companies like BOAC and British Oxygen. 
The British Productivity Council, established in 1952 in the wake of the Anglo, 
American productivity CounciL also spread the work study message, and in 1953 
the National Union of Manufacturers set up a new work study unit to provide 
273 
advice for small firms (NUMAS). The BPC, together with the British Institute of 
Management and the Ministry of Education, also established the Work Study 
School at Cranfield in 1953. Cranfield offered a ten week course for senior work 
study officers as well as shorter courses in clerical work study (Organisation and 
Methods) and method study. 70 students enrolled in 1954 and 300 in 1958 (WSIE 
Jan. 1959). Work study education continued to spread'. By the second half of the 
1950s, City and Guilds courses in work study were available at 'twenty five 
colleges, and eight firms and other organisations! (Sutton 196 1). Even centres 
established for the study of human relations, like the Roffey Park Institute, ran 
courses on work simplification and production study, to address 'the techniques by 
which methods engineers and industrial psychologists can contribute to 
productivity through economy of effort, materials and time' (YMS April 195 3). 
Trade unions and Labour governments also encouraged the growth of work study 
(TSE Jan. 195 1; WSIE March 1965). Ve could never have achieved what we did 
at icr, wrote Currie, 'but for the increasing understanding and confidence of the 
British Trade Union Movement' (1964a). TUC co-operation with the post-war 
Labour government in the drive for production Was an important element in its 
recommendation that 'unions should co-operate in the -application of scientific 
management' (Carew 1987: 150; Hutton 1953: 49)2, but the roots of the TUC 
commitment went deeper. Germany had an enviable reputation for efficiency, but 
'there is no parallel in GermanY, wrote one industrial engineer, 'to the collaboration 
with trade unions which exists in this country' (Smith 196 1). The trade union 
position was simple and pragmatic. Ve accept the principle of work study, wrote 
David Basiiett of the General and Municipal Workers, 'but realise its limitations ..... 
This means that we consider work study, or rather the data produced by work 
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study, to be negotiable' (1956). This insistence on bargaining undermined work 
studYs claim to science but encouraged the wider deployment of its techniques. 
Work Study Practitioners 
The term work study was not generally used even at th e end of the 1940s and was 
not officially sanctioned until the B ritish Standards Institute published its glossary 
in 1959. Anne Shaw was still complaining in 1950 that people mixed up time study 
with motion study, and 'to make confusion worse confounded, time study is now 
often called work study (1950). Currie claimed that the close integration of time 
and motion study, and the international adoption of the term 'work study, was a 
predominantly British contribution to management science (1964: 8). If it was, it 
was the result of a long battle to overcome divisions among work study 
practitioners, not only between time study and motion study, but between the 
motion study of Charles Myers of the NUP and Gilbreth, and between time and 
motion study on the one hand and industrial engineering on the other. 
All the main -work study institutes were founded during the war. The Institute of 
Estimators, Planning and Time Study Engineers was established in 1941, changing 
their name a year later to the Institute of Economic Engineering and again, in 1953, 
to the Society of Industrial Engineers. They were followed in 1944 by the Motion 
Study Society, later renamed as the Work Study Society, and by the Institute of 
industrial Technicians in 1945. Final amalgamation created the Institute of Work 
Study Practitioners in 1964 which, after much heart searching, became the Institute 
of Management Services in 1978 (MS Aug. 1978; Bryant 1969). 
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Table 12 Work Study Organisations 
Origins and Development 
Year Organisation 
1941 Institute of Estimators, 
Planning and Time 
Study Engineers 
1942 Institute of Economic 
Engineering 
1944 Motion Study Society 
1945 Institute of Industrial 
Technicians 
1953 Society of Industrial 
Engineers 
1954 1 Work Study Society 
1958 Work Study Society 
(Society EE's and Works Study Society) 
1960 Institute of 
- Institute of Work Study Incorporated Work 
Study Teclmologists 
1964 Institute of Work Study Practitioners 
(Institute of Work Study and Incorporated WS Technologists) 
1975 Institute of Practitioners in Work Study, Organisation and Methods 
(following merger with O+M Society) 
L 1978 Institute of Management Services 
Source: Chronology of British Work Study Profession Work Study and 
Management Services; Work Study andManagement Services Jan. 1975; 
Management Services Aug. 1978 
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Each founding organisation had its own specialist orientation. The Industrial 
Engineers were specialists in production planning and control and merged with the 
Production Control Research Group in 1946. The Society believedthat the scope 
of work study practitioners should cover all activities involved in the planning and 
control of industrial production, and should not be limited to method study, motion 
study, and work measurement' (TMS March 19 5 5). 
The Industrial Technicians regarded themselves as time study specialists with a 
subordinate interest in motion study (TMS April 195 5). Membership grew very 
slowly. In 1948 there were just over 60 members in London, and 83 in 
Birmingham, and while Birmingham membership grew to 152 in 1952, there were 
a mere 70 in Manchester in the same year. The HTech explained their slow 
progress as a result of the stringent standards the organisation set for entry and it 
was this issue which wrecked merger talks in the mid'50s. The Industrial 
Technicians railed with increasing bitterness about the epidemic of short courses 
aHowing entry into the profession for the unqualified. Quality was now identified 
with-Bedaux, Ve entered the field'wrote the editor in Time andMotion Stuaý, 
'with the Bedaux trained engineers, and with this flying start we have been able to 
attain the results of today, even though most firms have not insisted on Bedaux 
training and many have accepted staff under a system of training that can only be 
described as slipshod' (TMS May 1957). By 1960, some in the Institute were 
beginning to recognise that a policy of rigorous examinations was being pursued to 
'a near suicidal degree' (WSIE May 1960). 
Ile Motion Study Society was infinitely more flexible and adaptable. Founded to 
'develop the technique of Motion Study as originated by Frank and Lilian Gilbreth! 
(ME April 1948) its magazine carried articles on work measurement by leading 
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American industrial engineers. Geoffrey Wade, who established the West of 
England Engineering Employers Association Work Study School in 1953, was a 
member of the AEI group which originally formed the motion study society. And 
Seymour Hills, who joined the Anne Shaw Organisation in 195 1, was on the Board 
of the Cranfield Work Study School, becoming its Director in 1956 (Williams 
199 1 a). Shaw herself showed only a grudging tolerance for time study and 
incentive schemes based on it, but the Motion Study Society attracted a wider 
group and changed its name to the Work Study Society in 1954 before fusion with 
the Industrial Engineers four years later. The society had a small membership to 
begin with - only 201 members in 1952 - but a number of companies affiliated, or 
had associate status, including GEC, Bibby and Sons, ICL Dunlop, English Electric 
and Metal Box 
Merger talks in the early 50s broke down but in 1958 the Work Study Society and 
the Industrial Engineers agreed on amalgamation. Complete merger of all three 
branches of work study was accomplished in 1964. Membership was then growing 
rapidly. The Institute of Work Study claimed 4,000 members in 1963. The 
combined total of the newly formed body was estimated at 7,500, made up of 
3,500 qualified practitioners and 4,000 students and graduates. 
Not a1l those engaged in work study were 'engineers!, whatever definition was put 
on that term. A membership audit in 1970 showed quite a spread, with one third 
classified as engineers and 20% as craft or skilled workers. About one third 
belonged to a trade union. In general, Institute members were 'less well represented 
at senior levels than at junior levels! (Minter 1970). Members of the Institute of 
Incorporated Technologists, with their Exation with professional standards, 
complained the loudest about the effect of short courses fiHing up the industry with 
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poorly trained men. 'Sausage-machine work study technicians! as one protester 
called them (TMS Feb. 1958). There were complaints that 'few employers seem to 
have heard of work study qualifications!. On the other hand, pay had improved with 
12% of advertised posts offering pay between X1,000 and LI. 300 (Randall 1962). 
This was considerably less than the L1,850 earned by managers in 1960, but a little 
more than foremen at LI 3ýO 15 and considerable better than skilled manu . al workers, 
at L796 (Routh 1965: 104). 
Work study in Germany and Sweden in the 1950s was more highly developed than 
in Britain. The German work study society had 15,000 members in 1957 (Carew 
19 87: 22 1) and a survey by the German work study organisation (REFA) in 195 8 
found that between 85 and 90% of firms surveyed thought work study was either 
essential or very useful (TMS April 1958). No comparable survey of British 
experience exists but a smaller scale exercise conducted- by the BPC's Aberdeen 
Productivity Committee in the North East of Scotland, reported in the same year, 
produced a stark contrast. Analysis of 152 replies found that'16% considered work 
study essential, 45% regarded it as useK while 39% committed themselves to the 
view that it was not applicable' (Gordon 19 5 8). Work study was also highly 
developed in Sweden where there was widespread interest in predetermined 
methods time measurement (MTM). A unified Swedish professional Association 
for Industrial Engineering was established in 1951 which deployed more than 3, OOQ 
practitioners in a third of Swedish engineering companies by 1965 (Korlingl963; 
WHE April 1960; Svensson 1966). 
But by the late 1960s work study in Britain was catching up. Certainly the interest 
in work study, as measured by membership of professional institutes, had risen 
279 
dramatically. The charts below trace the growth in the membership of the work 
study institutes and the circulation of their journals. 
F0 igure 3 Membership of Work Study Organisations 
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By 1967 the Institute claimed to be 'the second largest professional institute of the 
subject in the world, yielding first place only by 2,500 members of the American 
Institute of Industrial Engineers! (WSMS March 1967). When the European Work 
Study Federatign was founded in 1961 Russell Currie was elected its first 
President, and on his retirement in 1965, his successor at the Institute of Work 
Study Practitioners, J. E. Faraday took over as Secretary for the European 
organisation. Whether the Institute's claim to second place was accurate or not, 
expansion in the 1960s made the British more ambitious. They had helped to 
establish an Indian Institution of Work Study in 1963, and in 1968 Faraday 
established the World Confederation of Productivity Science with support from 
Australia,, South Africa, Ireland and India. 
Work Study Applications 
In many industries work study appears to have been introduced only after the 
second world war. Laundries and the boot and the shoe industry provide two 
examples. According to E. G. Phillips, who was tippointed Production Engineer in 
1949 and Production Superintendent in 1954 by the Institute of British Launderers, 
With one or two notable exceptions, work study was virtually untried in the 
laundry industry until 1946'(1955). Likewise, work study and incentive schemes 
had only made rapid progress in the dry cleaning industry since 1945 (Hulme 
1953), and W. G. Howes told the Footwear Productivity Conference that, apart 
from some engineering plants which adopted time study around 1914, we in this 
country'have only adopted these methods on any nation wide scale during the past 
twenty years' ( 19 5 2). 
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Such reports are important and certainly evidence of a qualitatively new departure 
in the 1940s. But claims about the origins of Work study' need to be placed in 
conteXt3. We noted earlier (Chapter 1) that elements of scientific management were 
familiar in the boot and shoe industry in Bristol before the first world war and that 
conveyors were in use in laundries in the 1920s, separating workers and designed 
to ensure that women worked with the fewest possible movements'and with no 
cross over of hands'. In 1934, fifteen years before Phillips took up his post as 
production engineer, the Laundry Employers Federation had appointed H. G. 
Maule as an industrial psychologist. He made studies of laundry operations and 
fibned a group of calendar feeders with the highest output, using the film. to 
instruct other groups of workers in the best methods. He also found operators in 
the folding team who had to walk a couple of paces to reach the table on which to 
place the sheet and worked out that one of them walked twenty miles, and spent 
five hours, 'on this quite superfluous walking tour. Of course, being a psychologist, 
he did not neglect to advise management to manage people with a smile, a friendly 
word and consideration (1948). Nevertheless, Phillips'work may not have been an 
ent irely novel experience for the laundry workers who were studied by Maule. 
In 1945 British Launderers established a production committee, and with the help 
of consultants, set up a Production Department with a staff of work study 
engineers to install an incentive scheme. According to Phillips, the scheme 
increased operator efficiency from 44 to 75 standard minutes per hour. In the 
footwear industry, two thirds of the male workforce was on piecework in 1967, 
28% of them paid under the new time study agreement (NBPI Report 14). At 
Clarks the cost of implementing work study was less than 10% of the savings 
accrued from it, and time standards were used 'as the basis for an incentive scheme, 
for labour control, for planning and for costing' (TMS Sept. 1953). 
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The cotton industry had been an area where Bedaux had been particularly active 
before the war and one where work study, disguised as 'redeployment', spread 
more quickly after 1945. Between 1948 and 1950 the number of mills belonging to 
the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners which usedwork study increased from 
84 to 119, or 24% of the total number of Association mills. By 1953 that number 
had grown to 184, or 38% of all mills. Nearly all the early applications had been 
carried out by consultants but the Cotton Board started its own work study school 
in 1949 and appointed a special officer who acted as secretary to the Federation's 
redeployment board (Jolly 1951,1954). Time-study methods were ffirther 
extended f6flowing a new wage agreement in 1956 (NBPI Report 34)4. 
Work study was making significant inroads in the public sector too. Two hundred 
and nine local authorities (out of 1,800) were said to be showing a lively interest in 
the subject in 1959. T11ree years later a survey showed 540 authorities using work 
study or O+M (TMS May 1959, Dec. 1962). In 1956 British Railways appointed a 
director of work study, and in 1961 the industry claimed to have deployed 34,000 
people on work studied jobs. Carriage cleaning, station stafý the parcels service 
I 
and maintenance work were all affected (WSIE Jan. 196 1; WSM April 1963; 
Walley 1963). In 1968 it was claimed that with more than 1,400 work study 
officers in the regions, productivity had increased between 1963- 1966 by 20% 
(WSMS Jan. 1968). In 1953 the National Coal Board set up an advisory service on 
efficiency matters and Currie claimed the NCB trained 296 work study specialists 
in two years and completed 120 studies a month. Similarly, the British Transport 
Commission established its own work study centre and work study schools (Currie 
1958). The army opened its new work study school in Wiltshire in 1963 to service 
the army work study group which employed about 
four hundred officers and 
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civilians (WSM July 1963). And the RAF appointed its first director of work study 
in 1955, centralising operations in 1965 in a unit about seventy strong (WSMS 
Nov. 1969). In the hospitals it was estimated that around 160 staff were employed 
on work study in 1963(WSM Aug. 1963). 
Work study was not confined to industrial processes, public or private'. Harrods, 
Sainsbury, John Lewis, W. H. Smiths and Marks and Spencers all operated work 
study. Marks and Spencers was among the most interesting. Recruitment was 
frozen and the number of staff allowed to faH by 20% and new, simphfied systems 
employed in the stores, purchasing and personnel. But in a move unusual for work 
study, the head of personneL M. I Glen, argued that everyone had to be involved 
to ensure that systems were necessary as well as efficient. To that end, the stock 
room was thrown open to all, time clocks were abolished as were all staff grades 
other than management and supervisor. In a distinctly modem phrase Glen 
explained that the guiding principle was that people could be trusted, 'Once this is 
recognised a whole host of accountancy checks and cross-checks can be thrown 
overboard' (1959). At Sainsbury, work study began in the30s in the warehouse .1 
and factory operations. But after the war it was more widely used, being the 
responsibility of a senior executive reporting to the Board (Turner 1963). 
Courtaulds had employed consultants in 1937 but as Coleman remarked, scientific 
management was anathema to the old school (1969: 455). Not so for their post-war 
successors. In 1953 the company was designing a special truck so that the 
operative's work cycle could be carried out with a minitnum of movement, 
advertising a vacant traineeship at its'Coventry Work Study Headquarters!, and 
offering advice on the industrial relations problems of introducing time studied 
systems (TMS March 1952; Cummings 1952; Gibbons 1954). 
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Further examples might be cited from a number of industries including 
pharmaceuticals,, printing,, steel and engineering, but perhaps enough has been said 
to establish the point that work study, though far from being in use in every 
industry or workplace, was growing rapidly in all sectors of the economy. Its use 
was not confined to incentive schemes. In a survey carried out in 1965, 'A. L. 
Minter, later head of work study at Longbridge, found the most commonly 
reported uses of work study as follows 
Table 13 
Uses of Work Study 
Incentives 
Planning 
Labour Control 
Costs 
Minter (1966) 
Work Study Practice 1965-66 
% of replies 
77 
61 
70 
77 
In the same year, the Institute of Works Management reported a survey'designed' 
to find out what proportion of the working force is paid on incentives, what sort of 
incentive, and how the work is measured' (1966). Ahhough the survey produced 
only 229 returns, the Institute claimed them to be reasonably representative of 
industry as a whole. Of the replies, 83% had some sort of incentive scheme and 
two thirds used some form of work measurement. 'Of the type of work 
measurement used, Time Study (65%) was the most popular, followed by 
Synthesis (40%). The surprising fact was how few firms used the post-war 
techniques of Rated Activity Sampling (14%) and PMTS (5%)'. A breakdown of 
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the use of work measurement by 68% of the firms reporting showed that while the 
largest single element set work measured targets, most used a mixture of methods. 
Table 14 IWM Survey 1966 
Method Number of fw*ms Percentage 
_ 
Rate Fbdng 18 9 
Targets/Work Measurement 63 33 
Lieu Bonus 6 
_ 
3 
Rate fixing and Targets 8 4 
Rate fixing and Lieu Bonus 26 14_ 
Targets and Lieu Bonus 39 21_ 
Rate fixing / Targets / Lieu Bonus 19 10 
None 8 4_ 
Spoilt 3 2 
A more comprehensive survey, based on figures from the New Earnings Survey for 
1979, showed a smaller, but still substantial proportion of firms using work study 
in connection with payment by results schemes. 4 1% of manufacturing plants, 
covering 27% of all male manual production workers, based their schemes on work 
measurement (White 1981: 70). But the use of work study was more widespread 
with 64% of plants making some use of work measurement. 
Although generalisations are dangerous because of the extreme unevenness of the 
experience, it would probably not be too far out to say, that so far as industrial 
engineering techniques are concerned, Britain had at last reached the point that 
America passed in the early 1930s. 
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Work Study and Management Services 
Even as work study applications multiplied, the ground was shifting beneath the 
work study engineer's feet as new management techniques came on stream and 
attention began to be focused on wider problems of orgamisation and managpnient5. 
In the process, the distinctive identity of work study, so recently established, was 
surrendered for a place within management services. 
In some respects, the work study profession demonstrated great fle. -dbility, 
particularly in its attempt to absorb the impact of new concerns with human 
relations and demands for the re-design ofjobs in the early 1970s. But the growth 
of work study also served to illustrate the limitations of its core techniques for use 
with payment by results and encouraged demands for a more sophisticated 
approach. In its evidence to the National Board for Prices and Incomes, Urwick 
Orr criticised British employers for operating with a preconceived idea of what 
their problem was, and a preconceived solution to it, which'stemmed in part from 
- 
the acceptance of the classical theory of scientifid m1anagement and, in part, from 
current management ideology (Urwick Off 1968: 7). 
the pre-determined problem has been how to measure what is a fair 
days work; and how to motivate the worker by means of a financial 
payment to achieve this standard. ne preconceived answer was felt 
to he in more accurate work measurement with directly related 
. r_ -- financial incentives. The concept of examinin the viability of 
payment by results schemes in a particular technology and in terms 
of managerial capacity and existing patterns of industrial relations, 
was quite unacceptable to many managements (1968: 7). 
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For the firm created by one of the British pioneers of scientific management 
(Urwick) and one of Bedau)es lieutenants (Orr) to criticise British management for 
being trapped by classical scientific management theory is rich with irony. It 
seemed that British managers had no sooner acquired a scientific foundation than 
they were told to move on.. 
It was not just Urwick Off, however. The work study profession itself was 
increasingly aware of its own need to change. Automation was an early cause for 
concern. In 1955 it was noted that 'automatic computing machines are wiping out 
office personnel far more efficiently than ever work study could hope to attain! 
(TMS June 19 5 5). More generally, the argument was more frequently heard that 
increased mechanisation and machine paced work narrowed the scope for 
traditional time study which reinforced the long-standing ambitions of work study 
for a wider role. In America it was said that new developments in operational 
research, data processing and automation were encouraging a new breed of 
industrial engineer emerging as a top level research and development person 
concerned with the design of new systems for management and production 
(Leherer 1959). In ! Europe too it was suggested that the focus of work study was 
shifting from method study as a corrective device to pre-production plannin (De 
Jong 19 5 8). At the same time, many of the fimctions carried out by work study 
people were also carried on in production study and operations research 
departments, advisory and planning departments (WHE Jan. 1959). And many new 
techniques were being developed which threatened to overshadow work study 
claims to be the key to efficient production. At the United Steel Co. Ltd, Stafford 
Beer, head of the Department of Operational Research and Cybernetics, regarded 
work study as suitable only for relatively simple systems (1958). 
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The combination of the spread of work study, some challenge to its traditional core 
in work measurement, and the development of new techniques aimed at achieving 
the same results, created pressures for change. In 1965 the Swedish Work Study 
Institute reorganised to create separate departments for work study and production 
'engineering, and work study and wage systems (WSM Dec. - 1965). In 1966 the 
European Work Study Federation noted with approval that various management 
techniques, including work study, had been brought toge&er at British Rail under 
the heading Productivity Services. When McDavid was appointed at British 
Oxygen in 1966 it was as head of Productivity Services. At BOAC Faradays job 
title changed in 1967 from Chief of Method Services to Chief of Productivity 
Services. And, in a further sign of the times, the Wool (and Allied) Textile 
Employers Council changed the name of its work study centre in 1967 to the 
Management Services Centre (WSMS March 1967). The future for work study lay 
with the wider management task rather than a specialist service for the design of 
incentive schemes. 
Discussion among work study practitioners began in earnest in the mid60s. Work 
study should be placed in the context of all the 'operational sciences!, argued C. T. 
Gould, including operational research, cybernetics, ergonomics and market 
research (1966). In similar vein S. Robinson nominated work study, value 
engineering, cost control and O+M as the core of co-ordinated management 
productivity services (1966). At the end of 1966 the IWSP issued a plan for the 
next five years with the clear purpose of steering the organisation away from an 
exclusive focus on work study. It was not just a question of the growth of new 
management services. The plan argued that'To restrict the Institute rigorously to 
those techniques that are agreed to belong exclusively to work study and nothing 
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else would not fulfil the aspirations of the more senior membership who would 
seek another focal point for their professional leanings' (WSM Dec. 1966). Andý 
since productivity was the theme of the 60s, it was proposed to rename the 
organisation The Institute of Productivity and Management Services. 
Ile proposed title reflected the particular advocacy. by Faraday ofthe concept of 
'productivity as the essential link between a number of management tools from 
systems analysis to ergonomics (Faraday 1967a; 1967b). In 1968 the Institute 
established a technical board to set up technical divisions covering Method Study, 
Work Measurement'. Social Human and Motivation, O+M, Ergonomics, 
Operational Research, Network Analysis, Value Analysis and Systems Analysis. 
Similar changes had been carried out by the American Society of Industrial 
Engineers. The IWSPs reorganisation was welcomed by some members as part of 
the work study engineers''productivity mission! (Freeman 1969). But it was 
denounced by others. Victor Smith argued that 'this is the age of specialisation. and 
if we try to do everything we end up by doing nothing. Unforftmately the signs are 
increasing that this is precisely what is now happening in the work study field! .1- 
(1970). And P. E. Randall expressed the bitterness of some members that'Tlie 
status-seeking Productivity Services people, not content with a profession that had 
been good enough for Frank Gilbreth, Anne Shaw and Russell Currie, sought to 
combine work study with a hotch potch of unrelated subjects! (WSMS Dec. 1970). 
But Currie had himself warned more than ten years earlier that 'there are still far 
too many within our ranks whose minds are pitiffilly tied to the stop watcV, 
something he described as a 'hand loom attitude' (195 8). At ICI work study had 
long been developed in depth to deal with improved deployment of manpower, 
labour costing, planning and the maintenance of production. In an amusing 
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comment on an early ICI application of method study, J. B. Kitchen observed that 
the company made the error of applying method study to the individual operator at 
his workplace, Ve ended with a number of men efficiently carrying out tasks 
which in certain instances the company did not really want performed at aff (Ireson 
and Kitchen 1960: 14). 
The Institute's leading fights wanted to 'raise the profession from its present 
technique orientation to a fimetional orientation'. But equally they wished to retain 
the core claim of scientific management, 'Ile systematic approach of the disciphnes 
in Productivity Science distinguishes them from others which may achieve the same 
objective by experience, intuition, ingenuity, trial and error, or other means' 
(WSMS Jan. 197 1). Faraday had resisted adopting the more general title, 
Management Services, because it was not sufficiently specific. He wanted 
Productivity Science as the concept and Productivity Services as the name for the 
relevant fimctions within an organisation (1967). But the IWSPjoumal was 
renamed Work Study and Management Services in 1967 and simply Management 
Services in 1975. The new journal, declared the editor, 'will of course continue to 
serve the various interests of our diverse membership, but at the same time will 
reflect the move to group disciplines like work study and O+M under the collective 
name of Management Services! (MS Jan. 1976). 
By 1978, when the organisation finally changed its name to the Institute of 
Management Services, it was argued that the new title was now appropriate, With 
only just over a third of members with work study and organisation and methods in 
their job titles it is clear that the traditional terms are no longer adequate' (MS Aug. 
1978). Work study had been absorbed into the productivity sciences, and 
productivity sciences into management services. 
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Conclusion 
This sketch of the post-war history of work study is obviously incomplete. There is 
no space to consider, for example, the limitations of work study science as theory 
and practice, the failure to insulate work study from bargaining in schemes of 
payment by results, nor to e4lore the development of post-war management more 
generally. Nevertheless, a number of provisional conclusions are suggested. 
In the first place it is clear that British industry did adopt Taylorist work study. By 
the late 1960s its influence was apparent in the public and pxivate sector, in 
manufacturing, and in retail. The argument that work study was only applicable to 
standardised mass production industry was still occasionally heard but carried less 
weight. At a clothing manufacturer investigated by the NBPI, Steinberg Ltd, work 
study was 'central to the operation of the wage system! but production schedules 
could hardly have been less standardised. Managers studied sketches arriving in the 
morning maiL together with the prices at which items were to be produced, before 
%reaking this down into component parts for the production lines! (NBPI Report 
26). Rowan 17hompson had declared that Taylors time study was magnificent but it, 
was not business. In the 1960s it seemed that work study was in business 
everywhere. 
However, it is remarkable that this form of Taylorist practice took so long to 
develop on a generalised scale. Britain was almost certainly thirty years or more 
behind America in this respect. But British practice was not much out of step (if it 
was out of itep at all) with developments in Europe. If the decline of the British 
economy relative to Europe during the post-war boom owes something to the 
backwardness of British management, neither backwardness or decline can be 
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attributed to a failure to adopt the techniques of time and motion study advocated 
so many years earlier by Taylor. 
The post-war rise and fall of the industrial engineer also suggests two rather 
paradoxical co4clusions. First, although work study spread rapidly after the. war, it 
is clear that the industrial engineers of the new institutes built on the foundations 
laid by production engineering, time and motion study, and the Bedaux system 
between the wars. It appears that conditions of fiffl employment and increased 
trade union bargaining power proved more conducive to the success of Taylorism 
than a weaker trade union movement and conditions of hardship associated with 
unemployment and slump. 
Secondly, the eclipse of the new work study profession was as spectacular as its 
rise. By the mid 80s, membership of the Institute of Management Services had 
fallen back to roughly what it had been in the mid 60s. It is almost as if the triumph 
of work study proved its undoing. In part at least, this has to do with the post-war 
- 
history of payment by results. But it also has to do ývith the changing character of 
management and scientific management. Taylor had been dead a long time. His 
system of time and motion study was deno unced by a trade union official as 
belonging to the horse and buggy era (WSMS May 1969). Even Russell Currie 
warned against a liandloom attitude'to the use of the stop watch. Time and motion 
study began as part of a broader programme for the management of production. 
Work study as a set of discrete techniques was ultimately absorbed into a more 
modem form of production organisation and management. 
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Notes 
The Times Review qfIndust? y (Nov. 1954) reported that 600 full and part time trade 
union officials had attended a one week course in production and production management in a 
period of three and a half years, and that the TUC had made arrangements with AIC (the old 
Bedaux company) among others, to provide further training in work study techniques for full time 
officers. 
Hutton quotes the TUC Report Trade Unions and Productivity (1950), 'Unions should 
seek to co-operate in the application of 'scientific management which, even if not an exact 
science, can make a valuable contribution to increasing productivity in industry' (Hutton 
1953: 49). 
Reviewing The Making ofScientific Management in 1945, J. A. Bowie described 
scientific management as 'a movement old enough to be interested in its parents' 
4 The Final Report of the AngJo American Council on Productivity -noted the increase in 
work study in cotton spinning and doubling since the team's visits from 84 mills in 1948 to 141 in 
195 1, amounting to 27% of the 525 mills in Lancashire. 
Among the more interesting of these developments was the concerns with quality 
management. The American trade union expert, Solomon Barkin, declared thatthe time study 
men must give way to the statistical control techniques of the quality control men ... Unlike the 
time study man, he is alert to the dynamic character of operating conditions. His tools are 
designed to measure variations and to police a defined permissible range of variations in 
conditions' (TUS Jan. 1956). Horn (1979) discusses the POst-war development of the behavioural 
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sciences and the growth of a new range of quantitative techniques. Williams (199 1) related the 
decline of work study to the growth of alternative techniques and the fall in the incidence of 
labour intensive work. 
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
The main arguments of this study were summari ed in the introduction together 
with a brief discussion of its principal themes. They include the relationships, 
between technology, busines. s and management as these emerged from the 
scientific-technical revolution at the beginning of the 20th century; the historical 
meaning of Taylorism and its slow progress in Britain in the context of the uneven 
development of the British and world economy; the effects of Taylorism on the 
division of labour on the shop floor and in the office; the effects of worker 
resistance and the role of the unions in accommodating Taylorism through the 
mechanism of struggle and collective bargahiing; and the inability of Taylorism, as 
ideology or practice, to overcome the fundamental antagonism of an employment 
relationship founded on exploitation. 
In this conclusion I shall try to state briefly what I consider to be the main 
contribution this study makes to our knowledge of Taylorism and the -development 
of management methods in Britain. But rather than repeat the general argument, or 
elaborate on conclusions already stated, I shall also attempt to look forward as well 
as back; to ask whether Taylorism has been superseded by changes in the labour 
process and to relate that question to the wider debate about 'post-Fordism! and 
flexible specialisation. No attempt will be made to deal with these issues in a 
comprehensive way, only to indicate the direction of change and suggest ways in 
which this study may be of relevance to contemporary concerns. It is argued that 
changes in technology, business and management in the 1990s have the potential to 
bring about far reaching changes in the way in which the labour process is 
296 
conducted but that some of the key players in 'post-Fordist' industry build on 
Taylorism rather than reject it. 
Scientific Management in Britain 
No very great claims will be advanced for this study. It does not propose. a new 
theory of the labour process and its account of Taylorism in Britain, while 
distinctive m some respects,, finds common ground with others in acknowled gIng 
the slow development of time and motion study and continuing weaknesses in the 
area of production control. However, more modest but worthwhile claims can be 
made in a number of areas. 
First, it has been possible to make sense of Taylorism, and reconcile divergent 
accounts in management, historical and labour process literature, by re-uniting 
scientific management with its historical context. It would be difficult to imagine 
Taylorism. without the technical and business changes which produced it, and 
which Taylorism. helped to define and develop. Yet in much of the literature 
analysis begins with a largely ahistorical'concept' of Taytorism (and/or 'Fordism') 
which reduces scientific management to a set of highly specific nostrums or even a 
time-studied incentive scheme of a particular kind. From this point it is easy to 
conclude that Taylorism had little influence in Britain. The trouble with such a 
conclusion is that it makes it all the more difficult to understand much else. In 
particular, the development of similar management structures, production 
engineering and division of labour, in industries and workshops which 
acknowledged Taylor as master and those that did not. Ford thought he was not a 
scientific manager; Taylor was quite sure he was. There is a sense in which they 
were both right. Fords achievement is not reducible to Taylorist principles but it 
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was condstent with them; Ford did not use incentive schemes, much less the 
differential rate, but he practised in his own way what Taylor preached. 
There is a danger, of course, that in locating scientific management historically, the 
specific character of Taylorism is lost in the development of 20th century 
management in general. TVs danger must be avoided but not at the expense of 
severing the connections between historical phenomena and misunderstanding the 
relationship between them We need to distinguish premium bonus from Taylor's 
more rigorous scheme but should see them both as variants of the same shift 
towards'task work'. We properly distinguish the Bedaux system from piecework as 
it operated at Rowntree's Cocoa plant but we ought to take Northcott's point that 
the Bedaux system was not fimdamentally different from modem practice 
elsewhere. The specific prescriptions of the efficiency engineers, whether out of the 
Bedaux stable at Lucas or from the efficiency department at Longbridge, differed 
from the less systematic practice of production engineers and planning departments 
elsewhere, but all were engaged in a similar process. 
A second, and related, point concerns the reception for scientific management in - 
Britain. Historians have tended to repeat, uncriticaIly, -the 
judgement of Urwick and 
Brech that engineers and employers were either hostile to Taylorism before 1914 
or ignored it altogether. In fact, there was considerable discussion of Taylo: es ideas 
even before the Eastern Rate case brought new publicity and notoriety. Perhaps 
more significant was the identification of Taylorism as an extension of 
specialisation and as a programme for the organisation of production which 
enabled the engineering press to make connections with British experience. 
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That experience was certainly mixed as a modern, mass production economy 
emerged only slowly and unevenly in Britain in the 20th century. British economic 
suprernecy had been based on a relatively primitive industrial technology. The 
decline of the British economy relative to its competitors was rooted in a 'slowness 
of adaptation! to changing conditions, something Phelps Brown has described as 
the'British predicament' (1977). Failure to adapt quickly enough has sometimes 
been attributed to structural constraints,, sometfines to the peculiar character of 
British class and industrial relations. This study has found evidence of British 
capitalist conservatism which limited the pace of change and, perhaps, the degree 
of thoroughness with which new methods were adopted. Even scientific managers 
like Mavor shrank from a complete endorsement of Ford! s methods while industrial 
'blimps' Eke Viscount Inchape denounced the mass production of ships as'the 
co of ship construction! (Hannah 1976: 148). Such conservatism was 
rooted in the early industrial experience rather than the survival of aristocratic 
values, and in the economic 'common sense' of employers who continued to make 
money using existing plant and old tools. Such conservatism was sustained more by 
an anti-theoretical empiricism and pragmatism (which so irritated the likes of 
Urwick), than by the pressure from craft workers'. Indeed, the empiricism and 
pragmatism of employers was matched by workers, craft and non-craft, and by 
their trade unions which were unshakably committed to he idea that everything was 
negotiable. if anything, trade unions, though not always their members, showed 
themselves to be more adaptable to changing industrial conditions than their 
employers. 
The difficulty fies, not in identifying employer conservatism, but in assessing its 
effects and the danger of exaggerating its influence. The development of the British 
economy, and of its industrial structure and management methods, was uneven but 
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it did develop. Conservatism did not prevent British employers from adopting 
Taylorism. in their own good time, and in their own way, and certainly did not mean 
they opted for a human relations oriented alternative as Merkle (1980), for 
example, seems to believe. The post-Braverman consensus in the labour process 
debate came quite close to saying that scientific management had little impact in 
Britain because employers did not want it and because worker resistance would 
not let them have it. Neither proposition, together or separately, is coffect. 
On the question of deskilling and managerial strategies, for example, it is clear that 
the direct application of specifically Taylorist schemes played a relatively minor 
role before the late 1930s. But it is equally clear that a deskilling dynamic was at 
work with the spread of mechanisation and the Taylorist forms of management 
associated with it. The 'subtleties of production' were reallocated to new 
management fimctions in planning and progress departments and time study 
increasingly underpinned systems of payment by results. nese methods were more 
evident in the newer industries but even in more traditional engineering employers 
made conscious attempts to deskill the job, the turner and fitter were overtaken by 
the newmachine trades', and the craftsman and foreman increasingly relocated on 
the periphery of production processes. 
What this study also suggests is that more attention should be paid to the effect of 
scientific management on women and on semi and unskilled men. The 
reorganisation of work and the imposition of detailed work standards and effort 
norms ensured that workers, who might have experienced semi-skilled work as an 
upgrading from labouring, often found themselves in the forefront of battles against 
efficiency engineers and speed-up. The degradation of labour in the service of 
capital was not confined to skilled men. 
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As long as we are careful not to share Taylors illusion of the finality of 
management 'science' (something Braverman is unjustly accused of), it is clear that 
worker struggles could not prevent the reconstruction of the labour process along 
scientific management lines. Nor is there any real foundation for the view that 
workers! struggles, including resistance to scientific management,, delayed or 
prevented the modernisation of British industry in ways which could account 
significantly for economic decline2. This not only neglects the unequal distribution 
of power between the two sides of industry, but also fails to notice the way in 
which the labour movement so readily absorbed change as long as change was 
negotiable. Tllis is most obviously true at the level of the trade union as an 
institution, but even on the shop floor British engineering workers fought for 
money and jobs, not the retention of a 'craft mode of production'. Politically and 
ideologically the labour movement was quickly persuaded to incorporate Taylorism. 
into its own version of progress. Shop floor resistance, real and effective though it 
was within limits,, was therefore conducted under a double handicap. 
One of the more curious ideas thrown up by the labour process debate is the belief 
that piecework was an employer labour strategy which surrendered control to the 
shop floor. Lewchuk goes so far as to argue that ']Piecework systems, as adopted in 
British engineering, resulted in a sharing of managerial authority and a crude form 
of industrial democracy, since labour was allowed control over the pace of worle 
(1984: 358). So widespread has this idea become that even so renowned a historian 
as Hobsbawm. (1984) repeats it. 
In fact, there is little, if any, evidence to support the idea. Firstly, the proposition 
usually depends on the misconception that Fordism. consituted a separate mode of 
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labour control based on machine pacing. Secondly, premium bonus and time- 
studied incentive schemes (to say nothing of Bedaux) were actually progressively 
more systematic employer attempts to secure tighter shop floor control over the 
pace of work, and this is clear both from the testimony of those who designed and 
implemented such schemes and of those who, worked under them. It is true, of 
course, that control did not always follow from the, attempt to secure it. What 
many British engineers and employers understood, as Taylor had so often insisted, 
was that no incentive scheme was worth a candle unless backed by sophisticated 
methods of production control - not so-called Fordist machine-paced labour 
strategies - but detailed production engineering and planning. Deficiencies in this 
area were more likely to undermine incentive schemes than the reverse. Nor is the 
fact that piecework schemes could 'degenerate' evidence that they involved a 
surrender of control in the first place3. Even schemes based on Bedawes version of 
scientific management proved to be vulnerable to 'decay, that is to say, the effects 
of their own internal contradictions and the effects of class struggle. 
Even in the 1960s, when it was believed that shop floor controls over incentive 
schemes were particularly strong, most shop stewards welcomed opportunities to 
get rid of them (Brown 1973). There would have been fewer stin to speak up for 
piecework between the wars. And this has to be odd, if piecework really did give 
labour a crude form of industrial democracy and control over the pace of work. 
The last thing employers in engineering or the motor industry were interested in 
was a sharing of managerial authority. The right to manage was the EEFs raison 
d"etre for more than fifty years. It was a principle which could be defended with 
great tactical sohpistication as it was in the early 
battles with the engineering 
unions, and was consistent with a 
limited recognition of the skilled worker's 
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property right in his own skill so long as its exercise was at the employer's 
discretion. But in principle the right of each individual employer to manage was 
absolute. Ironically, its character as fimdamental. doctrine served, in the end, to 
undermine its Purpose. Between the wars the right to manage justified an 
increasingly inflexible refusal on the part of engineering employers to negotiate 
labour grading arrangements with the unions. Employer power, relatively free of 
constraint, was used to impose judgements about pay and machine staffing in ways 
which created almost continuous argument and debate at shop floor level about 
new machines, new jobs and new processes. When the balance of forces in industry 
shifted towards labour, shop floor organisation, encouraged by the obdurate 
insistence of employers on their individual right to manage, asserted itself 
This brings us to a final point in this summary conclusion. This study tends to 
confirm the main thrust of Braverman's argument in a number of respects. 
Taylorism did come to constitute the 'bedrock of aH work design' (1974: 87) in 
Britain; the management of mechanisation in the 20th century did reinforce a 
capitaF& desIdIling dynamic and the labour process was, in this way, reconstituted , 
more directly under management control. But that 'contror was not something 
jr- -- unaRy established once and for alL Formal subordination of labour establishes new' 
conditions for old struggles, not the victory of capital over labour. The concessions 
labour extracted for its accommodation to the new regime were real and 
significant, sufficient to soften the experience of scientific management and sustain 
a reformist politics in the wider social arena. Braverman's narrower focus on 
changes in the labour process therefore has its hmitations. But a more complete 
understanding of the social organisation of production will build on its strengths. 
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I turn now to consider whether the labour process in the late 20th century is going 
beyond Taylor, and if it is, the extent to which any significant shift in the labour 
process is likely to build on or abandon scientific management. 
The Post-Fordist Argument 
Flexibility became one of the buzz words of the 1980s. Functional or task fle: %ibility 
was defined as 'the ability of firms to reorganise competencies associated with jobs 
so that the job holder can deploy such competencies across a broader range of 
tasks! (NEDO 1986). The flexible firm would combine fimctional fle)dbility with 
other forms of fleýdble organisation from an increased use of sub-contracting, the 
creation of a peripheral workforce of part-time and temporary enVloyees to match 
its core workforce, an increased use of shift work and performance-related pay. 
Such employment practices are not new. But the argument is that fleNibility has a 
new significance as the harbinger of a newly emerging form of production. ne 
economy of the post-war world is being transformed. Tlie large scale mass 
production industries with their standardised products (Fordism) are giving way to 
smaller scale, more specialised and more fle)dble forms of production. Computer 
controlled processes are the key, making more detailed control over production 
possible and providing the re-programmable equipment necessary to redesign 
products for more rapidly changing consumer tastes. Tlie crisis of Fordism arises 
from the saturation of markets with mass produced goods and the opportunities for 
specialised production for niche markets which new technology makes possible 
(Murray 1985). 
Labour relitions are reconstructed too. Unions are marginalised if not 
derecognised (Beardwell 1992) because the new, more fle)dble forms of human 
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resource management are incornpatible with a pluralist industrial relations (Guest 
1989). 
In most accounts Japan provides the model from which to learn if not imitate. But 
according to Piore and Sabel flexible specialisation off6rs even more, notIfing less 
than the chance to recreate a lost world of craftsmanship. Policy makers can 
choose one of two strategies. 'The first strategy builds on the dominant principles 
of mass-production technology ..... The second strategy veers sharply away from 
established technological principles and leads back to those craft methods of 
production that lost out at the first industrial divide' (1984: 10). Insomeversions 
change on such a scale reaches beyond the worker, the firm and the economy, so 
that post-Fordism links arms with post-modemism; the mass consumer, the big 
city, the big brother state, the sprawling housing estate and the nation state are in 
decline: flexatbility, diversity, differentiation, mobility, communication, 
decentralisation, and internationalisation are in the ascendant' (Jacques, quoted in 
Costello et al 1989; Harvey 1989). 
Critics have chaffenged the various accounts of the coming of post-Fordism on a 
number of grounds. PoRert has argued that continuity is more apparent than change 
in the fleNible uses to which labour is actually put. Talk of the flemble firm 
'conflates and obscures complex and contradictory processes within the 
organisation of work, and by asserting a sea change of management strategy and 
employment structure, fuses description, prediction and prescription towards a self 
fulfilling prophecy (1988: 42). Costello et al. point out that mass production has 
conquered the high street in the form of MacDonalds and (often Japanese) 
electronic goods, and suggest that 'The Post-Fordists have, in their enthusiasm, 
plainly over egged the pudding ... they have picked on some real trends and 
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generalised them out of all recognition! (1989: 30). And Fergus Murray has argued 
that for many workers of the 'TIfird Italy' flexible sp ecialisation. has led to 'the worst 
excess of industrial capitalisnY not a new craft workers utopia (1987: 92). In a wide 
ranging review, Hyman criticises the theoretical claims of number of post- Fordist 
theories. Such theory is understandable against thebackground of the historical 
diýuncture of the end of thi post-war boom but represents nothing more than the 
continuation of inherent capitalist instabi1ity, the ... uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions": a more elegant equivalent of the notion of flexibilisation' 
(1991: 282). 
Labour Process, Management and Unions 
At Vauxhall, during the 1989 wage negotiations, the unions were presented with a 
document setting out the company's aims for team working and related changes in 
working practices. Entitled Meet the Challenge, it proposed to phase out time- 
study methods of controlling work allocation in favour of the principle of 
continuous, improvement. A joint study by the Centre for Alternative Industrial and 
Technological Systems and the Merseyside Trade Union Community and 
Unemployed Resource Centre found that the unions were successful in preventing 
this, 
.. in the agreed version of the 
document, the unions were successful 
in retaining time-study measurements as a means of determining 
work targets employees are capable of Without this system, the 
unions feared they would be impotent if the company tried to 
inciease work allocations beyond reasonable limits (1991: 26). 
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The CAITS/*NITUCRC pamphlet was entitled New Union Strategies but this was a 
very old union strategy indeed, and invites parallels with the history of piecework. 
The image of employers trying to dispense with Taylorism, with workers defending 
it is such a strong one, it suggests something more fimdamental may be at work. 
One explanation is that new technology and associated changes in production. 
organisation have put a premium on worker co-operation and commitment, if not 
re-skilling, which makes the old ways of directing labour with detailed instructions 
for carrying out fragmented tasks no longer appropriate. ne argument is that 
'Sophisticated, flexible, expensive equipment needs sophisticated, flexible, 
expensive people to operate it. The effective and safe operation of these new 
technologies requires very careful attention to work design' (Buchanan, quoted in 
McLoughlin and Clark 1988: 18 1). New technology is employed most effectively 
where it complements rather than replaces human skills, argue McLoughlin and 
Clark, and managers who continued to act to reduce the human element 
'undermined the effectiveness of the use being made of the new systems and 
equipment' (1988: 168). 
But the fact that any technology has the potential to be used in ways which 
enhance the skills of labour is no guarantee that it will be used in that way 
(Armstrong 1988: 148). Elger's review of technological change and work 
reorganisation in the 1980s suggests'a recurrent juggling of competing priorities, 
involving the control of labour costs and worker effort, alongside some 
mobilisation of worker consent or initiative, and, through these,, attempts to exploit 
fresh technical possibilities for product development and cost reduction! (1990: 68). 
To some extent it is a matter of how change is perceived. Berggren recounts the 
opinion of one Saab consultant who thought Honda's operation was'a total new 
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work experience,, egalitarian,, dynamic,, uniquely productive'. The same experience 
was described by other Saab managers as'a frantic workpace, relentless attendance 
demands, unsafe production equipment, and heavy indoctrination in a quasi- 
totalitarian culture' (1993: 164). 
A highly critical account of Japanese production techniques by Delbridge et al also 
suggests that increased responsibility and accountability of workers in a just-in- 
time, total quality management environment, means 'a reversal of the trend towards 
a separation of mental and manual tasks documented by the de-skilling labour 
process theorists... ' (1992: 100). However, the same workers are said to be more 
completely subordinate to capital than ever because such regimes'demand and 
create a situation where management prerogative prevails and where there is little, 
if any, room for employees to exercise counter controls over the pace of work and 
task execution! (1992: 98). Mutiskilling turns out to be multitasking where every 
worker is interchangeable and none irreplaceable. At Toyota a worker allocated 
too much time was obliged to stand still and do nothing as a demonstration to 
others that too much time had been allowed4. 
In such circumstances the production planning that lies behind just-in-time systems 
retains its monopoly on mental labour whatever new demands are placed on 
employees. Klein observes that the elimination of buffer stocks reduces the 
opportunity for discretion in task execution and suggests that work group 
autonomy is re-directed towards task design (1991). But the worker participates as 
subordinate, not craftsman or political master, and it has to be doubtful whether 
such participation provides any meaningfid mental labour or increased control. As 
we noted in the postscript, Taylorism in the form of time and motion study coupled 
to incentive schemes belonged to the horse and buggy era. The more sophisticated 
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production engineering ofjust-in-time systems are a more advanced application of 
Taylor's Principles, not abandonment of them. According to Schonberger, 'the 
Japanese out-Taylor us all - including putting Taylor to good use in QC (Quality 
Control) Circles and or small-group improvement activities! (quoted in Dohse et al. 
1985: 127). 
If we turn our attention from the management of work to the management of 
people, there is fin-ther evidence of a significant shift in thinking which carries 
management away from the organisational formulas and structures of Taylorism. 
but evidence too, of the same difficulty in really overcoming the past. 
The convictions of classical mana ement theory began to crumble from the 1960s 
and all but disappeared by the 1990s. Contingency theory seemed to offer a 
saiffiCiently fleNible formula for a while but in the 1980s it was argued that, 'General 
theories are no longer adequate (if they ever were) to meet the demands of 
changing organizational environments. TIje theoretical work in this area has shifted 
away from the search for rules, and towards an analysis of managerial judgement in 
specific situational contexts' (Huczynski and Buchanan 1985: 445). A popular 
example of the new approach is provided by Peters and Waterman! s, (1982) best 
seller, In Search ofExcellence, which condemns the'rationalist approach to 
management' because it fails to celebrate informality, gives little place to internal 
competition and denigrates the importance of values. Adhocracy is advocated as an 
alternative. One would expect Taylor to have turned in his grave. Drucker 
described it as a book for juveniles (quoted in T'hompson and McHugh 1990: 23 3) 
but it is one of the most influential management texts ever. 
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Human resource management and total quality management is also presented as 
constituting a break with the past. HRM displaces an industrial relations-personnel 
practice which revolved around procedures and agreements, rights and obligations,, 
with an individual-centred employment relationship built on flexibility and 
co--- (Storey 1989). According to Graham James at the Work Research 
Unit, total quality management is about improving the quality of working life, a 
fear-free organisation in which employee involvement is vigorously pursu ed. It 
generates a high degree of reciprocal commitment, the individual to the goals of 
the organisation, and the organisation to the needs and development of the 
individuar (1991). For managers there was a price to pay. Organisational structures 
must be flattened and managers must give up power, pushing decision making 
downwards through the organisation. The 'de-layering' of middle management 
which this implied had been going on for some time. A million middle managers 
(one third of the total) lost their jobs in America in the ten years to 1988 
(Harrington 1993: 264). But it seemed to promise new possibilities of meaningful 
work. 
However, total quality management actually has two faces, the production 
oriented, statistical quality control systems, in which employee involvement is 
minimal, and the employee relations side which is finked to ERM and the drive to 
marginalise trade unions (WilMnson et al 1992). Managers that survived de- 
layering found themselves more and more often faced with performance-related 
pay (Casey et al 1992). Nor can the ideological appeal of human resource 
management and employee involvement be taken at face value. In its heyday 
Taylorism made its own appeal to progress and freedom for the worker with 
promises of an end to the zero-sum game of pay bargaining (Maier 1970). AR 
would benefit from the greatly increased production guaranteed by scientific 
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management. The pieceworker in particular would be freed from the dead level of 
mediocrity imposed on him by the trade unions and allowed to profit from his skills 
(The Engineer May 1905). Taylorism did not five up to such promises and the 
value-driven culture of excellence does not, in the end, get very far from the 
rationalist management it condemns. The central theme- that makes excellent 
companies great, argued Peters and Waterman, is the ability to combine 
McGregor's theory x and theory y, Taylorism and human relations. This less than 
novel prescription is advanced with a dash of pre-Taylor paternalism. Top 
managers loved the worker, but were as hard as nails,, 'Like good parents, they 
cared a lot - and expected a lot' (1982: 96). 
Trade union responses to the new management practices have been discussed by 
Lucio and Weston (1992) and Beaumont (1991). The latter notes that the TUC 
thought HRM individualised industrial relations and weakened membership 
co mitment to the trade unions. The former identified three positions within the 
TUC; business unionism which looked for a social partnership with government 
and-businiess; a coRective bargaining approach labefled 'making Donovan work' 
(the GMB and UCW); and those, like the TGWU, who were holding on to 
independence. It is doubtful if such distinctions had much substance, though they 
may have described differences in political emphasis and style. The GNIB/UCWs 
stillborn New Agenda (199 1) was probably closest to the authentic voice of official 
trade unionism, offering to negotiate 'an employers led agenda socialised by the 
unions!. The endless adaptability of trade unionism is again made clear. But where 
Bedaux was awidous for trade union collaboration in the 1930s, employers showed 
no signs of interest in partnership in the 1980s (Beardwell 1992). 
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Technology, Business and Management 
If we leave aside for a moment what they should be called, the real question is 
whether the changes that are taking place amount to a significant moment of 
discontinuity. The brief sketch above of changes in the labour process and 
management and trade union thinking suggest that real change has been limited. 
But this may be misleading and needs to be put in context. 
Hyman identifies the context of change to include, the end of the post-war boom, 
a re Fma of international capital, the devolution within the corporation of 
operational policy making, a change in the composition of the workforce, a 
political shift to the right and deregulation, new computer technology and new 
production strategies (just-in-time etc. ). The coming together of such a powerful 
constellation of forces is unlikely to mean a simple continuation of 'uninterrupted 
disturbance'. It is comparable in scale and significance to the changes at the end of 
the 19th century. All the elements are present, in new technologies, and changes in 
business organisation and management structures and practices, to suggest that the 
balance has shifted sharply from continuity to discontinuity. The difference is that 
by the beginning of the 20th century there was near unanimity, among advocates 
and critics alike,, about the basic shape of the future. The late 20th century 
anticipates a post-Fordist, post-modem, post-industrial society, the precise 
character of which remains uncertain. 
In these circumstances it is not always clear what survey evidence is measuring. 
Elger finds hothing that adds up to the claims of flem'ble specialisation. but there are 
'signs of significant innovations in the reorganisation and intensification of labour 
which go somewhat beyond established forms! (1990: 78). Fairbrother says that'A 
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major restructuring of work and employment relations is underway in 
manufacturing and the public services' (1988: 3). But there has been no 
transformation. There have been moves towards Japanisation, an incremental 
creep towards flexibility, but nothing to justify claims that we have moved from 
one method of producing goods to another. On the other hand, all the changes in 
working practices which are identified, and do not yet amount to a new way of 
producing goods, are examples of practice claimed by flexible specialisation; 
decentralisation of company structures, an increase in part-time and shift work, 
computerised stock control and moves to just-in-time production, job mobility and 
contracting out and so on. Both surveys might be read as evidence confirming the 
direction of change as much as evidence of its limited progress. 
The same might be said of Tomaney's survey of evidence from Japan, West 
Germany and the UK (1990). An IDS survey of major flexiibifity agreements is 
cited to show how limited change has been, but the core of the argument is less the 
question of how far change has gone than what it means. On one side new worldng 
practices. are -described as enlightened treatment bf jabour; reskifling and an end to 
division of labour; the re-emergence of the craft paradigm; flexible team worldng 
by skilled workforces. From the other side change means intensification of labour; 
increased monitoring and control of the individual; multitasking not multiskilling; 
and self subordination. Tomaney makes a convincing case for the second 
perception but because this is an extension of Taylorism, concludes'there is no 
evidence that the tendencies of the past one hundred years are being reversed. 
Rather what we witness is the extension and redevelopment of existing forms of 
labour control and efficiency maximisation'(1990: 53). 
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If Taylorism was only an extension of the process of transforming technology and 
the labour process familiar for more than a century (Brenner and Glick 199 1), and 
fle)dbilitY only an extension of Taylorism, then truly, a great deal has changed in 
order that things may remain the same. We might nevertheless take a legitimate 
interest in the particular form that the capitalist labour process takes. And it does 
seem reasonable to conclude that strenuous efforts are being made to reconstitute 
the labour process mi conditions of fundamental shifis in technology and business 
organisation even if these still fall a long way short of a transformation. 
Beyond Taylorism 
The problem with Vansformations!, in any case, is that they do not take place over 
night. Indeed, they may drawn out over half a century. Ilere is a parallel between 
the argument of Sabel et al that the American textile machine industry is held back 
by'the rigidities of the vertically integrated, mass production system and the 
market organisation On whom it depended' (1987), and the institutional rigidities 
which Elbaum et al identify as the root cause of British economic decline. If such 
rigidities are -read as the problem of adapting older structures 
in conditions of 
uneven development, the 'incremental creep' which Fairbrother identifies is more 
easily understandable. 
If that incremental creep takes the labour process beyond Taylorism, that is 
unlikely to mean that Taylorism is dispensed with. We have already noted that 
management is not reducible to Taylorism but the legacy of Taylor seems likely to 
find a secure place in a reconstituted labour process. A labour process which places 
more emphasis on mental skills does not necessarily have to abandon Taylor. 
Indeed, Drucker has argued that 'The need is to do for knowledge work and the 
knowledge worker what Taylor, beginning almost a century ago, did for manual 
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work and the manual worker' (1976: 27). Drucker's judgement may not be wholly 
reliable since in the same article he argues that Taylor would have regarded the 
assembly line as poor engineering and would have been a strong believer in'theory 
y'. Nevertheless, the assumption that information technology requires reskilling is 
demonstrably false. What is interesting in the present ferment is the attack on 
management, the spread of p erformance-related pay, 'de-laýering', and the 
ideological attack on managers for wanting and misusing power. Managers may 
find themselves studied with as much interest as craftsmen once were. 
But an attack on management does not necessarily mean new freedom for manual 
workers5. Taylorism has long since been absorbed by more sophisticated 
production engineering and planning in the office and is no longer needed in the 
crude form that it once took on the shop floor. As Waring puts it, 'Taylors 
bureaucratic and corporate successors transcended his techniques but not his 
premises! (1991: 203). The vision of a return to craft modes of production in 
computerised workshops linked by co-operative local agreements is a fiction of the 
imagination. In this sense the term neo-Taylorism or neo-Fordism would be more 
appropfiate than post-Fordism (Palloix 1976). But this is a clwnsy concept and 
I 
continues to direct our attention to the past when we need to focus on the ways in 
which the labour process is being reconstituted. 
If employers need to do for knowledge workers what Taylor did for manual work, 
ways are simultaneously being sought to secure from the manual worker the kind 
of commitment to the company that managerial and professional employees were 
expected to show. Ile effort might be packaged in a variety of ways as staffing 
policy, employee involvement, or customer care programmes witliin the company, 
and may involve new forms of work Organisation like team working and quality 
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circles. But the ostensible aim is to win the hearts and minds of the workforce in 
ways that improve quality, productivity and competitiveness by creating a new 
work culture. If this appears in management programmes as empowering the 
employee, it can equally well be described in terms used by Thompson and 
McHugh, as'Reinventing Organisation Man!, -reproducing conformity and loyalty 
to the company (1990: 223). As such it would mark, a more complete subordination 
of labour to capital, particularly if coupled with new work practices based on non- 
negotiated continuous improvement and increased individual monitoring and 
control. 
Finally, we might note that, while trade union proposals to accommodate the new 
management techniques have been spurned, the offer itself suggests that change 
has gone far enough to make the status quo increasingly untenable. At the same 
time it is scarcely conceivable that problems relating to working conditions and 
work loads, productivity and employment, pay and the distribution of rewards, 
discipline and authority structures, all of which have been the cause of conflict, 
organised and unorganised, in the past, can now be resolved in a new individual- 
centred employment relationship, where a common commitment to the company 
directs the workers attention to the customer and not her or his own interests as 
they see them. Indeed, if it is true that the labour process remains one which is 
based on exploitation and a tendency to reduce all labour to abstract,, average 
labour, then the ideological promise of human resource management is likely to 
generate disappointment in the same measure as it raises expectations. The final 
shape of the labour process that will issue from the management of the new 
technologiesat the end of the 20th century is far from settled. 
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Notes 
It is empiricism which lies at the root of the long standing British distrust ot and 
sometimes, hostility to, education. Caves is one of many to point to the distrust of sWled 
specialists and the disinclination to employ qualified scientists (1968 3 03); managers at Vickers 
in the 1930s who had a degree felt they had to hide the fact (Pagnamenta and Overy 1984: 272); 
Paul Chambers of ICI thought postgraduate university life 'a bad training for the real world 
(Clark 1966: 9); and more than half the graduate engineers interviewed by Whalley did not 
consider their degree relevant to their jobs (1986: 56). 
Alford notes that, 'In popular terms more responsibility for Britain's lack of international 
competitiveness has been laid at the door of trade unions than at that of management' (1988: 68). 
But Melman comments, 'One of the strildng aspects of our observations was the infrequency of 
reports from management as to worker opposition to production method changes' (I 956: 25). Theo 
Nichols (1986) addressed many of these questions in his 7he British Worker Question. There 
ought to be a British employer/management question. For the motor industry it would take 
account of the view of Williams et al that the failure of strategy in the motor industry'was 
determined at the product planning and development stage where management was clearly and 
unequivocally in charge. If BLMC was killed by massive managerial miscalculation, it is 
unnecessary to blaine the workers' (1983: 253); or Edwardes on the lack of a breakdown of cost 
information by model (1983: 52). 
The'decay of piecework schemes in the 1960s may have led some historians to read into 
the past their own understanding of the significance of shop floor struggles for workers control in 
a later period. 
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4 Takamiya. records how, in the production of televisions by a Japanese multinational, 
'Every movement of the operators is closely watched ad constantly improved upon. Every mistake 
they make is constantly and individually fed back to them... ' (1981: 9). 
Coriot believes there is a'restructuration of the totality of movements which had first 
I 
been fragmented (19 80: 4 1), but the result is not a return to craft, 'the worker who is assigned to 
these new jobs cannot hope, in general, to acquire a socially recognised qualification. 
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